From 3e68e630dff92a7abd791b7a8808eb682f37a060 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Noel Sabia Date: Sun, 18 Oct 2026 18:24:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] fix(ci): close the fail-open gate, enforce read-only sandbox Findings validated from review comments 71 and 75: - [BLOCKER] the no-verdict branch exited \${EXIT_CODE:-1} which is 0 when opencode succeeded without a verdict - job went green and the post step published non-review output. The else branch now exits 1 unconditionally, the verdict is anchored to the last five lines (the prompt itself contains VERDICT lines), and the post step re-verifies the contract before posting. - [BLOCKER] the v1 'permission' object is ignored by the opencode v2 CLI - shell commands executed in both review runs despite deny. The config now uses the v2 'permissions' array with 'shell' as the action name, denying edit/shell/webfetch/websearch/external_directory. - hygiene: droast linting prunes node_modules, audit comment names the exact key to re-add, shell blocks verified with sh -n. --- .gitea/workflows/pr-checker.yml | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/.gitea/workflows/pr-checker.yml b/.gitea/workflows/pr-checker.yml index 553a9ca..65aa5b6 100644 --- a/.gitea/workflows/pr-checker.yml +++ b/.gitea/workflows/pr-checker.yml @@ -109,8 +109,9 @@ jobs: - name: Audit dependencies for known vulnerabilities working-directory: ${{ env.APP_DIR }} run: pnpm audit --prod --audit-level moderate - # blocks the PR on vulnerabilities - flip to true only if a CVE fix - # is genuinely blocked, never to make red pipelines "go away" + # blocks the PR on vulnerabilities - re-add `continue-on-error: true` + # here only if a CVE fix is genuinely blocked upstream, never to + # make a red pipeline green # ------------------------------------------------------- dockerfile lint -- dockerfile-lint: @@ -164,7 +165,13 @@ jobs: run: | # --no-roast = technical output for CI; --min-severity warning so # info-level findings don't block the PR - droast --no-roast --min-severity warning . + # lint exactly the tree the discovery step sees: prune node_modules + # and .git so vendored Dockerfiles in dependencies cannot produce + # findings on third-party code + find . \ + -path ./.git -prune -o -path ./node_modules -prune -o \ + -type f \( -iname 'Dockerfile*' -o -iname '*dockerfile' -o -iname 'Containerfile*' \) \ + -print0 | xargs -0 -r droast --no-roast --min-severity warning # ------------------------------------------------------- snyk security ---- # DISABLED: Snyk free plan only includes ~100 test credits/month, which the @@ -257,17 +264,19 @@ jobs: # prompt-inject the agent into quoting the key in the review # comment (publicly visible). Env vars are invisible to file reads. # Permissions live in a global config OUTSIDE the checkout (no - # secrets in it, so nothing can leak): denying edit/bash/webfetch - # means no headless permission prompts can hang or kill the run, - # and the reviewer physically cannot modify the repo. - mkdir -p "$HOME/.config/opencode" - # OpenCode v2 permission schema: ordered array of + # secrets in it, so nothing can leak). OpenCode v2 schema: the + # field is "permissions" (plural) - an ordered array of # {action, resource, effect}; "bash" was renamed "shell" in v2. - # websearch is a distinct action from webfetch - deny both, plus - # external directories. + # The singular v1 "permission" object is ignored by the v2 CLI + # (verified empirically: shell commands executed despite deny). + # Denying shell/edit/webfetch/websearch/external_directory means + # no headless permission prompts can hang or kill the run, and + # the reviewer physically cannot modify the repo or browse + # attacker-controlled URLs. + mkdir -p "$HOME/.config/opencode" printf '{ "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json", - "permission": [ + "permissions": [ { "action": "edit", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" }, { "action": "shell", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" }, { "action": "webfetch", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" }, @@ -355,12 +364,18 @@ jobs: # dumps never do. opencode can exit 1 on benign tool denials # even after a full review, so a present verdict means post; # anything else means the review did not complete. - if grep -qE '^VERDICT: (APPROVE|REQUEST_CHANGES)' /tmp/review.md; then + # Anchored to the tail: the prompt itself contains VERDICT + # lines, so scanning the whole file could pass on echoed + # prompt text or injected quotes - only the last lines count. + if tail -n 5 /tmp/review.md | grep -qE '^VERDICT: (APPROVE|REQUEST_CHANGES)'; then [ "$EXIT_CODE" -ne 0 ] && echo "::warning::opencode exited ${EXIT_CODE} but produced a valid verdict - posting review" echo "Review completed with verdict." else + # fail closed: no verdict = no review. exit 1 unconditionally - + # falling back to EXIT_CODE would exit 0 when opencode succeeded + # but produced no review, and the job would go green. echo "::error::opencode produced no valid review (exit ${EXIT_CODE:-1}) - NOT posting this output as a review comment" - exit "${EXIT_CODE:-1}" + exit 1 fi - name: Post review as PR comment @@ -371,6 +386,12 @@ jobs: REPO: ${{ github.repository }} # Gitea sets GITHUB_API_URL, e.g. https://gitea.example.com/api/v1 run: | + # re-verify the output contract here: never post anything that is + # not a completed review, regardless of how the previous step ended + if ! tail -n 5 /tmp/review.md | grep -qE '^VERDICT: (APPROVE|REQUEST_CHANGES)'; then + echo "::error::no verdict in review output - nothing to post" + exit 1 + fi # jq is not in the node image - use node for JSON encoding BODY=$(node -e 'process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(require("fs").readFileSync("/tmp/review.md","utf8")))') HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /tmp/comment-response.json -w "%{http_code}" \