refactor(deploy): run PR-Agent inside the Gitea compose stack
PR Check / Security scan (Snyk) (pull_request) Skipped
PR Check / Lint + typecheck (pull_request) Canceled after 22s
PR Check / Secret scan (gitleaks) (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
PR Check / Dependency audit (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
PR Check / Dockerfile lint (droast) (pull_request) Canceled after 0s

Move the service and its env file into the Gitea stack, remove the separate deploy directory and the unused /opt operator-access scripts, and keep the operational guide in OKF_Nuxt/pr-agent.md.
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@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
--- ---
type: Decision type: Decision
title: PR-Agent for Gitea reviews title: PR-Agent for Gitea reviews
description: A pinned PR-Agent webhook server on server0 reviews pull requests through a scoped Gitea bot user, replacing the per-PR opencode job. description: A pinned PR-Agent service inside the Gitea compose stack reviews pull requests through a scoped Gitea bot user, replacing the per-PR opencode job.
tags: [decision, ci, ai, gitea, pr-agent, security] tags: [decision, ci, ai, gitea, pr-agent, security]
status: draft status: draft
generated: { by: opencode-go/deepseek-v4.1-flash, at: 2026-10-30T20:00:00Z } generated: { by: opencode-go/deepseek-v4.1-flash, at: 2026-10-30T20:00:00Z }
verified: { by: human:noel, at: not yet } verified: { by: human:noel, at: not yet }
sources: sources:
- id: compose - id: gitea-compose
resource: deploy/pr-agent/docker-compose.yml resource: /home/noel/self-hosted/gitea/docker-compose.yml
title: PR-Agent compose service title: Gitea compose stack, pr-agent service
- id: env-example - id: operations
resource: deploy/pr-agent/.env.example resource: OKF_Nuxt/pr-agent.md
title: Environment variables, without secrets title: PR-Agent operations and configuration
- id: pr-checker - id: pr-checker
resource: .gitea/workflows/pr-checker.yml resource: .gitea/workflows/pr-checker.yml
title: PR Check workflow, opencode job removed title: PR Check workflow, opencode job removed
@@ -30,10 +30,13 @@ sources:
# Decision # Decision
PR-Agent runs as `pragent/pr-agent:0.49.0-gitea_app` in a long-lived PR-Agent runs as `pragent/pr-agent:0.49.0-gitea_app` in a long-lived
container on `server0`, attached to the existing `gitea_gitea` Docker container on `server0`, as the `pr-agent` service in the Gitea compose
network. It publishes no ports. Gitea delivers pull-request and comment stack. It attaches to the existing `gitea_gitea` Docker network and
events to `http://pr-agent:3000/api/v1/gitea_webhooks`; the bot user publishes no ports. Gitea delivers pull-request and comment events to
`pr-agent` posts the result with a scoped personal access token. `http://pr-agent:3000/api/v1/gitea_webhooks`; the bot user `pr-agent`
posts the result with a scoped personal access token. The service
definition lives in `/home/noel/self-hosted/gitea/docker-compose.yml`; the
operator guide is [PR-Agent operations](../pr-agent.md).
The opencode review job is removed from `pr-checker.yml`. PR-Agent runs The opencode review job is removed from `pr-checker.yml`. PR-Agent runs
`/describe` and `/review` on pull request open/reopen and answers slash `/describe` and `/review` on pull request open/reopen and answers slash
@@ -85,15 +88,15 @@ provider rejects the request before it reaches the model.
* Auto commands are `/describe` and `/review`. `/improve` stays available * Auto commands are `/describe` and `/review`. `/improve` stays available
on demand; the default auto list would add a second model call and a on demand; the default auto list would add a second model call and a
second comment to every PR. second comment to every PR.
* Secrets live only in `/home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent/.env` (mode 600) on * Secrets live only in `/home/noel/self-hosted/gitea/pr-agent.env` (mode
`server0`. The repository contains the compose file and an example env 600) on `server0`. The repository contains the decision and the operator
file, never the token or webhook secret. guide, never the token, webhook secret or model key.
# Evidence # Evidence
* 2026-10-30: a direct `glm-5.3-flash` call through the handler returned * 2026-10-30: a direct `glm-5.3-flash` call through the handler returned
`OK`, and `/review` on PR #28 posted a PR Reviewer Guide through the Gitea `OK`, and `/review` on PR #28 posted a PR Reviewer Guide through the Gitea
comment API. The key is set only in the server-side `.env`. comment API. The key is set only in `gitea/pr-agent.env`.
# Not verified # Not verified
@@ -110,7 +113,7 @@ provider rejects the request before it reaches the model.
* The first review fails, returns unstructured output, or misses the kind * The first review fails, returns unstructured output, or misses the kind
of finding the opencode prompt used to catch. of finding the opencode prompt used to catch.
* A newer `gitea_app` image tag is worth taking; bump the tag and run * A newer `gitea_app` image tag is worth taking; bump the tag in the Gitea
`docker compose up -d`. compose file and run `docker compose up -d pr-agent` from that directory.
* Review volume makes the container's memory limit tight, or Gitea adds a * Review volume makes the container's memory limit tight, or Gitea adds a
role that can comment without push access. role that can comment without push access.
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@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ config files — the configs say what, these documents say why.
* [Open questions](open-questions.md) - What is still undecided for the Nuxt site. * [Open questions](open-questions.md) - What is still undecided for the Nuxt site.
* [Backend endpoints](backend-endpoints.md) - The smallest API the frontend needs from the Go gateway: health, chapters, metrics, knockdown, events. * [Backend endpoints](backend-endpoints.md) - The smallest API the frontend needs from the Go gateway: health, chapters, metrics, knockdown, events.
* [Profile data](profile.md) - The LinkedIn export behind the terminal chapters, what is real vs mock, and how to refresh it. * [Profile data](profile.md) - The LinkedIn export behind the terminal chapters, what is real vs mock, and how to refresh it.
* [PR-Agent operations](pr-agent.md) - The Gitea-side review service: configuration, commands, logs and model.
* [Future updates](future-updates.md) - Pipeline improvement backlog with effort estimates, not yet decided. * [Future updates](future-updates.md) - Pipeline improvement backlog with effort estimates, not yet decided.
* [Update log](log.md) - History of changes to this bundle. * [Update log](log.md) - History of changes to this bundle.
@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ config files — the configs say what, these documents say why.
## CI/CD and releases (2026-10-18) ## CI/CD and releases (2026-10-18)
* [PR pipeline layering](decisions/pr-pipeline-layering.md) - Three layers: pre-commit for cheap deterministic checks, Gitea Actions for thorough ones, AI review for judgment. * [PR pipeline layering](decisions/pr-pipeline-layering.md) - Three layers: pre-commit for cheap deterministic checks, Gitea Actions for thorough ones, AI review for judgment.
* [PR-Agent for Gitea reviews](decisions/pr-agent.md) - A pinned webhook server on server0 replaces the per-PR opencode job; internal-only, scoped bot, OpenCode Go model. * [PR-Agent for Gitea reviews](decisions/pr-agent.md) - A pinned review service inside the Gitea compose stack replaces the per-PR opencode job; internal-only, scoped bot, OpenCode Go model.
* [AI review setup (opencode)](decisions/ai-review-setup.md) - Superseded 2026-10-30; kept for the env-only auth and verdict-gate reasoning. * [AI review setup (opencode)](decisions/ai-review-setup.md) - Superseded 2026-10-30; kept for the env-only auth and verdict-gate reasoning.
* [Vulnerability audit policy](decisions/vulnerability-audit-policy.md) - Blocking audit; reviewed ignore-list for unfixable advisories in pnpm-workspace.yaml. * [Vulnerability audit policy](decisions/vulnerability-audit-policy.md) - Blocking audit; reviewed ignore-list for unfixable advisories in pnpm-workspace.yaml.
* [Release engineering](decisions/release-engineering.md) - release-please in manifest mode; conventional commits enforced at commit time. * [Release engineering](decisions/release-engineering.md) - release-please in manifest mode; conventional commits enforced at commit time.
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# Update Log # Update Log
## 2026-10-30 (PR-Agent moved into the Gitea compose stack)
* **Refactor**: the `pr-agent` service now lives in `/home/noel/self-hosted/gitea/docker-compose.yml` with `/home/noel/self-hosted/gitea/pr-agent.env`. The separate `/home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent` stack and the unused `/opt` operator-access scripts were removed; the service is managed with the Gitea stack.
* **Docs**: the operator README moved to [PR-Agent operations](pr-agent.md). The decision, index and update log point at the new topology.
* **Evidence**: after the move, the container is healthy, a signed webhook from the Gitea container returns 200, and a direct `glm-5.3-flash` call returns `OK`.
## 2026-10-30 (PR #28: lockfile and PR-Agent routing repaired) ## 2026-10-30 (PR #28: lockfile and PR-Agent routing repaired)
* **Fix**: `pnpm-lock.yaml` - merging `main` left the lockfile at `@nuxt/icon` 2.6.0 while `package.json` asked for 2.6.2, so `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` aborted in CI. The lockfile now resolves 2.6.2. * **Fix**: `pnpm-lock.yaml` - merging `main` left the lockfile at `@nuxt/icon` 2.6.0 while `package.json` asked for 2.6.2, so `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` aborted in CI. The lockfile now resolves 2.6.2.
* **Fix**: `pnpm-workspace.yaml` - `seroval` 1.6.9 was the two moderate audit findings (GHSA-f86p-h4j2-7qgj, GHSA-9wx9-5pv9-3349). The patched 1.6.11 is forced through `overrides`; the blocking audit now reports only two low-severity advisories and passes the moderate gate. * **Fix**: `pnpm-workspace.yaml` - `seroval` 1.6.9 was the two moderate audit findings (GHSA-f86p-h4j2-7qgj, GHSA-9wx9-5pv9-3349). The patched 1.6.11 is forced through `overrides`; the blocking audit now reports only two low-severity advisories and passes the moderate gate.
* **Fix**: PR-Agent model routing - OpenCode Go rejects requests without `x-opencode-session`; `LITELLM__EXTRA_HEADERS` now supplies it, and the fallback keeps the `openai/` prefix. Auto commands are `/describe` and `/review`; `/improve` is on demand. A dummy-key call reaches the provider's auth check instead of failing on the missing header. * **Fix**: PR-Agent model routing - OpenCode Go rejects requests without `x-opencode-session`; `LITELLM__EXTRA_HEADERS` now supplies it, and the fallback keeps the `openai/` prefix. Auto commands are `/describe` and `/review`; `/improve` is on demand. A dummy-key call reaches the provider's auth check instead of failing on the missing header.
* **Evidence**: the key was wired into the live `.env`; a direct `glm-5.3-flash` call returned `OK`, and `/review` on PR #28 posted a PR Reviewer Guide (no findings). The failed-review comment was removed. * **Evidence**: the key was wired into the live `.env`; a direct `glm-5.3-flash` call returned `OK`, and `/review` on PR #28 posted a PR Reviewer Guide (no findings). The failed-review comment was removed.
* **State**: the key is set only in the server-side `.env`; the first `/review` posted on PR #28 with no findings. * **State**: the key is set only in `gitea/pr-agent.env`; the first `/review` posted on PR #28 with no findings.
## 2026-10-30 (PR-Agent replaces the opencode review job) ## 2026-10-30 (PR-Agent replaces the opencode review job)
* **Decision**: [PR-Agent for Gitea reviews](decisions/pr-agent.md) - a pinned `pragent/pr-agent:0.49.0-gitea_app` container on `server0` reviews PRs through the Gitea bot user `pr-agent`; the endpoint stays on the `gitea_gitea` Docker network. * **Decision**: [PR-Agent for Gitea reviews](decisions/pr-agent.md) - a pinned `pragent/pr-agent:0.49.0-gitea_app` container on `server0` reviews PRs through the Gitea bot user `pr-agent`; the endpoint stays on the `gitea_gitea` Docker network.
* **Update**: [pr-checker.yml](../.gitea/workflows/pr-checker.yml) - removed the `review` job, the opencode installer and the verdict-posting step. PR-Agent now runs `/describe` and `/review` on PR open/reopen and answers slash commands. * **Update**: [pr-checker.yml](../.gitea/workflows/pr-checker.yml) - removed the `review` job, the opencode installer and the verdict-posting step. PR-Agent now runs `/describe` and `/review` on PR open/reopen and answers slash commands.
* **Creation**: `deploy/pr-agent/` - compose service, example environment and operator README. The real `.env` lives only at `/home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent/.env` (mode 600) on `server0`. * **Creation**: `deploy/pr-agent/` (later removed; the service now lives in the Gitea compose stack) - compose service, example environment and operator README. The real `.env` lived only at `/home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent/.env` (mode 600) on `server0`.
* **State**: the container is running and the webhook signature path is verified. Gitea gained `[webhook] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST = private:3000` (one restart, healthy) and the repository has a signed webhook. The OpenCode Go API key was still missing at commit time, so no model call or real review has run yet. * **State**: the container is running and the webhook signature path is verified. Gitea gained `[webhook] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST = private:3000` (one restart, healthy) and the repository has a signed webhook. The OpenCode Go API key was still missing at commit time, so no model call or real review has run yet.
## 2026-10-27 (release-please still never tagged: the deleted head branch) ## 2026-10-27 (release-please still never tagged: the deleted head branch)
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---
type: Reference
title: PR-Agent operations
description: The Gitea-side pull-request review service, its configuration in the Gitea compose stack, and the commands it answers.
tags: [pr-agent, gitea, operations, ci, ai]
status: draft
generated: { by: opencode-go/deepseek-v4.1-flash, at: 2026-10-30T20:40:00Z }
verified: { by: human:noel, at: not yet }
sources:
- id: gitea-compose
resource: /home/noel/self-hosted/gitea/docker-compose.yml
title: Gitea compose stack, pr-agent service
- id: install
resource: https://docs.pr-agent.ai/installation/gitea/
title: PR-Agent Gitea installation
- id: gitea-egress
resource: https://docs.gitea.com/administration/config-cheat-sheet#webhook
title: Gitea webhook egress allowlist
---
# What runs
PR-Agent is the `pr-agent` service inside the Gitea compose stack on
`server0`. It listens on the internal `gitea_gitea` network at
`http://pr-agent:3000`; no port is published. Gitea calls its signed
webhook at `/api/v1/gitea_webhooks`, and the bot user `pr-agent` posts the
results.
| Piece | Value |
|---|---|
| Service | `pr-agent` in `/home/noel/self-hosted/gitea/docker-compose.yml` |
| Image | `pragent/pr-agent:0.49.0-gitea_app` |
| Config | `/home/noel/self-hosted/gitea/pr-agent.env` (mode 600) |
| Logs | `cd /home/noel/self-hosted/gitea && docker compose logs -f pr-agent` |
| Restart | `cd /home/noel/self-hosted/gitea && docker compose up -d pr-agent` |
| Upgrade | bump the image tag in the compose file, then restart the service |
The service is managed with the same access as the rest of the Gitea
stack. The earlier plan for a separate `/opt/pr-agent` stack and a
restricted `agent` account was not applied; those scripts were removed when
the service moved into this stack. Hardening the Gitea stack's operator
access is a separate change.
# Gitea side
1. Bot user `pr-agent` is a collaborator with write permission on
`CV_Website/CV_Site_Nuxt`. Its personal access token is scoped to
`read:repository`, `write:issue` and `read:user`.
2. The repository webhook sends `push`, `issues`, `pull_request` and
`issue_comment` events, with JSON content type and the shared secret.
3. Gitea's `[webhook] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` includes `private:3000`. Without
it, Gitea's default egress policy refuses deliveries to the Docker
network.
# Commands
| Trigger | What runs |
|---|---|
| PR opened or reopened | `/describe` and `/review` automatically |
| New push to an open PR | nothing; comment `/review` or `/review -i` |
| Comment `/review`, `/improve`, `/ask` | that command |
`/review -i` reviews only the commits added since the previous review.
`/improve` stays on demand; adding it to the auto list would make a second
model call and a second comment on every PR. Draft PRs are not skipped.
# Configuration
`pr-agent.env` holds the deployment values. The repository never contains
the token, webhook secret, or API key:
```ini
CONFIG__GIT_PROVIDER=gitea
GITEA__URL=http://gitea:3000
GITEA__WEB_URL=https://git.noelsabia.dev
GITEA__PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN=...
GITEA__WEBHOOK_SECRET=...
CONFIG__MODEL=openai/glm-5.3-flash
CONFIG__FALLBACK_MODELS=["openai/glm-5.3"]
CONFIG__CUSTOM_MODEL_MAX_TOKENS=128000
OPENAI__API_BASE=https://opencode.ai/inference/go/openai/v1
OPENAI__KEY=...
LITELLM__EXTRA_HEADERS={"x-opencode-session":"pr-agent"}
GITEA__PR_COMMANDS=["/describe","/review"]
```
OpenCode Go requires the `x-opencode-session` header. The fallback keeps
the `openai/` prefix; a bare `glm-5.3` is treated by LiteLLM as a
provider-less model. `CONFIG__CUSTOM_MODEL_MAX_TOKENS` supplies the context
limit; the effective review budget is capped by PR-Agent's default
`max_model_tokens` of 32000.
The compose service:
```yaml
pr-agent:
image: pragent/pr-agent:0.49.0-gitea_app
container_name: pr-agent
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- ./pr-agent.env
environment:
PORT: "3000"
GUNICORN_WORKERS: "2"
mem_limit: 1g
networks:
- gitea
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "python", "-c", "import socket; socket.create_connection(('127.0.0.1', 3000), 3).close()"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 30s
```
# Checks
A signed webhook from the Gitea container returns 200, and a direct
`glm-5.3-flash` call returns a completion. A `403` in the Gitea webhook
delivery log means the secret does not match or `ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is
missing; a `401` from PR-Agent means the signature and secret disagree.
On a model failure, check `docker compose logs pr-agent` and confirm
`OPENAI__KEY` is set in `pr-agent.env`.
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# Copy to .env on server0 and fill in; never commit .env.
# chmod 600 .env
CONFIG__GIT_PROVIDER=gitea
# The API is reached over the Docker network; links in comments use the
# public URL instead.
GITEA__URL=http://gitea:3000
GITEA__WEB_URL=https://git.noelsabia.dev
# Bot user pr-agent, scoped token (read:repository, write:issue, read:user).
# Not the admin account and not a workflow secret.
GITEA__PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN=
# Secret configured on the Gitea webhook. Required: the server rejects
# unsigned webhooks with HTTP 403.
GITEA__WEBHOOK_SECRET=
# OpenCode Go exposes an OpenAI-compatible chat-completions endpoint, so
# PR-Agent reaches it through its openai provider with a custom base URL.
CONFIG__MODEL=openai/glm-5.3-flash
CONFIG__FALLBACK_MODELS=["openai/glm-5.3"]
CONFIG__CUSTOM_MODEL_MAX_TOKENS=128000
OPENAI__API_BASE=https://opencode.ai/inference/go/openai/v1
OPENAI__KEY=
# OpenCode Go requires a session id header; a stable id is enough here.
LITELLM__EXTRA_HEADERS={"x-opencode-session":"pr-agent"}
# Auto commands on PR open. /improve remains available as a comment command;
# leaving it in the auto list adds a second model call to every PR.
GITEA__PR_COMMANDS=["/describe","/review"]
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# PR-Agent for Gitea
PR-Agent runs as a webhook server next to Gitea on `server0`. Gitea sends
pull-request and comment events over the `gitea_gitea` Docker network; the
endpoint is not published to the internet.
| Piece | Value |
|---|---|
| Image | `pragent/pr-agent:0.49.0-gitea_app` |
| Container | `pr-agent` |
| Webhook URL, from Gitea | `http://pr-agent:3000/api/v1/gitea_webhooks` |
| Config | `/opt/pr-agent/.env` (root, mode 600) |
| Logs | `ssh … agent@server0 logs` |
| Deploy / restart | `ssh … agent@server0 deploy` |
| Status | `ssh … agent@server0 status` |
| Upgrade | edit the root-owned compose file, then run `deploy` |
The table describes the target state. The live stack is still at
`/home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent` and is managed with `noel`'s SSH key until
`setup-agent-access.sh` has been run.
## Gitea side
1. The bot user `pr-agent` is a collaborator on `CV_Website/CV_Site_Nuxt` with
write permission. Its personal access token is scoped to
`read:repository`, `write:issue` and `read:user`.
2. The repository webhook sends `push`, `issues`, `pull_request` and
`issue_comment` events, with JSON content type and the shared secret.
3. Gitea's `[webhook] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` includes `private:3000`. Without it,
Gitea's default egress policy refuses webhook deliveries to private
addresses, including the Docker network.
## Operator access
The agent does not log in as `noel`. A dedicated `agent` account has one
forced command and three actions:
```sh
ssh -i ~/.ssh/pr_agent_control -o IdentitiesOnly=yes agent@91.99.207.62 status
ssh -i ~/.ssh/pr_agent_control -o IdentitiesOnly=yes agent@91.99.207.62 logs
ssh -i ~/.ssh/pr_agent_control -o IdentitiesOnly=yes agent@91.99.207.62 deploy
```
The SSH key is restricted with `restrict,command=…`; the account has no
Docker group, no general sudo, and no shell. Sudo permits only the three
root-owned helper scripts in `/usr/local/sbin`, and those helpers operate on
the fixed `/opt/pr-agent/docker-compose.yml`. The compose file, `.env` and
helpers are root-owned, so the agent cannot turn “restart” into a different
container or a host mount.
`setup-agent-access.sh` creates the account and moves the stack to
`/opt/pr-agent`. `remove-noel-access.sh` then removes the inherited access
from `noel`: the `docker` and `sudo` groups, the keys in
`/home/noel/.ssh/authorized_keys`, and the old PR-Agent directory. Run both
on the server as root, and only run the second after the restricted command
works and you have another admin path.
For git, use a repository-scoped deploy key instead of the personal Gitea
key: `~/.ssh/pr_agent_gitea.pub` is added as a write deploy key on
`CV_Website/CV_Site_Nuxt`. The old personal key must be removed from Gitea,
or it still grants every repository the user can see.
## AI model
The agent uses OpenCode Go's OpenAI-compatible endpoint:
```text
model openai/glm-5.3-flash
fallback openai/glm-5.3
api base https://opencode.ai/inference/go/openai/v1
```
`CONFIG__CUSTOM_MODEL_MAX_TOKENS` tells PR-Agent the context limit, because
the model is not in its token table. The effective review budget is still
capped by PR-Agent's default `config.max_model_tokens` of 32000.
OpenCode Go requires an `x-opencode-session` header; PR-Agent sends the
stable id `pr-agent` through `LITELLM__EXTRA_HEADERS`.
The API key lives only in the server's `.env`, never in the repo. Set
`OPENAI__KEY` in the live `/home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent/.env` until the
`/opt` migration has run; afterwards use `/opt/pr-agent/.env` and the deploy
helper.
## First check
Open a pull request in `CV_Website/CV_Site_Nuxt`. The server runs `/describe`
and `/review` on open/reopen; comment commands such as `/review`, `/improve`
and `/ask` are handled from the PR conversation. `/improve` is deliberately
on demand: adding it to the auto list would make a second model call and a
second comment for every PR. If nothing appears:
```sh
ssh -i ~/.ssh/pr_agent_control -o IdentitiesOnly=yes agent@91.99.207.62 logs
```
A `403` in the Gitea webhook delivery log means the secret does not match or
`ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is still missing; a `401` from PR-Agent means the
signature header and secret disagree.
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@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
# PR-Agent webhook server for the self-hosted Gitea instance.
#
# Runs on the existing gitea_gitea network and publishes no ports. Gitea
# reaches it as http://pr-agent:3000/api/v1/gitea_webhooks, so the webhook
# endpoint is never internet-facing. Gitea still publishes comment links with
# its own ROOT_URL (https://git.noelsabia.dev).
#
# Deployed by hand on server0 from /home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent; see the
# README next to this file.
services:
pr-agent:
image: pragent/pr-agent:0.49.0-gitea_app
container_name: pr-agent
restart: unless-stopped
env_file:
- .env
environment:
PORT: "3000"
# Importing the app costs roughly 250 MB. Two workers leave headroom on
# the 3.8 GB host that also runs Gitea, its runner and a web app.
GUNICORN_WORKERS: "2"
mem_limit: 1g
networks:
- gitea
healthcheck:
# The server has no HTTP health route; an open TCP socket is enough to
# distinguish a running gunicorn master from a crashed container.
test: ["CMD", "python", "-c", "import socket; socket.create_connection(('127.0.0.1', 3000), 3).close()"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 30s
networks:
gitea:
external: true
name: gitea_gitea
-56
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@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Final step: remove the agent's inherited noel access.
#
# Run on server0 only after the agent command works:
# ssh -i ~/.ssh/pr_agent_control -o IdentitiesOnly=yes agent@91.99.207.62 status
#
# This removes noel from docker and sudo, clears noel's authorized_keys,
# and deletes the old PR-Agent directory that held the secrets. Make sure
# you have another admin path (provider console or a new key) first.
set -euo pipefail
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "run as root" >&2
exit 1
fi
cat <<'EOF'
This will:
- remove noel from the docker and sudo groups
- clear every key in /home/noel/.ssh/authorized_keys
- delete /home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent (the /opt copy remains)
Existing noel SSH sessions keep their old groups until they log out.
Make sure you have another admin path before continuing.
EOF
read -r -p "Type REMOVE to continue: " answer
[ "$answer" = "REMOVE" ] || { echo "aborted"; exit 1; }
if id -nG noel | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -qx docker; then
gpasswd -d noel docker
fi
if id -nG noel | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -qx sudo; then
deluser noel sudo
fi
if [ -f /home/noel/.ssh/authorized_keys ]; then
cp -a /home/noel/.ssh/authorized_keys \
"/root/noel-authorized_keys.$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S).bak"
: > /home/noel/.ssh/authorized_keys
chown noel:noel /home/noel/.ssh/authorized_keys
chmod 600 /home/noel/.ssh/authorized_keys
fi
rm -rf /home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent
cat <<'EOF'
Done. Test the restricted path again:
ssh -i ~/.ssh/pr_agent_control -o IdentitiesOnly=yes agent@91.99.207.62 status
Still to do outside this script:
- remove the old personal SSH key from Gitea (Settings > SSH / GPG Keys)
- add ~/.ssh/pr_agent_gitea.pub as a write deploy key on CV_Site_Nuxt
- put the OpenCode Go key in /opt/pr-agent/.env and run the deploy helper
EOF
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@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# One-time root setup for the least-privilege PR-Agent operator account.
#
# Run on server0:
# sudo bash /home/noel/agent-access-setup.sh
#
# This creates the agent user and moves the PR-Agent stack to /opt/pr-agent.
# It does NOT remove noel's current docker/sudo access. Verify the agent
# command printed at the end first, then run remove-noel-access.sh.
set -euo pipefail
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "run as root" >&2
exit 1
fi
AGENT_USER=agent
AGENT_HOME=/home/$AGENT_USER
PR_AGENT_DIR=/opt/pr-agent
SRC_DIR=/home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent
PUBKEY_FILE=/home/noel/.ssh/pr_agent_control.pub
DOCKER=/usr/bin/docker
for f in "$SRC_DIR/docker-compose.yml" "$SRC_DIR/README.md" "$SRC_DIR/.env" "$PUBKEY_FILE"; do
[ -f "$f" ] || { echo "missing $f" >&2; exit 1; }
done
case "$(cat "$PUBKEY_FILE")" in
ssh-*|ecdsa-*|sk-ssh-*) ;;
*) echo "$PUBKEY_FILE does not look like an SSH public key" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
grep -q '^Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/\*.conf' /etc/ssh/sshd_config \
|| { echo "sshd does not include sshd_config.d" >&2; exit 1; }
if ! id "$AGENT_USER" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash "$AGENT_USER"
fi
passwd -l "$AGENT_USER" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
chmod 700 "$AGENT_HOME"
install -d -m 700 -o "$AGENT_USER" -g "$AGENT_USER" "$AGENT_HOME/.ssh"
# The stack must not be writable by the agent: a changed compose file would
# turn "restart the service" into arbitrary root containers.
install -d -m 755 -o root -g root "$PR_AGENT_DIR"
if [ ! -f "$PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml" ]; then
install -m 644 -o root -g root "$SRC_DIR/docker-compose.yml" "$PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml"
fi
install -m 644 -o root -g root "$SRC_DIR/README.md" "$PR_AGENT_DIR/README.md"
if [ ! -f "$PR_AGENT_DIR/.env" ]; then
install -m 600 -o root -g root "$SRC_DIR/.env" "$PR_AGENT_DIR/.env"
fi
if ! grep -q '^name:' "$PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml"; then
sed -i '1i name: pr-agent' "$PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml"
fi
cat > /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-deploy <<EOF
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
$DOCKER compose --project-directory $PR_AGENT_DIR -f $PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml pull
exec $DOCKER compose --project-directory $PR_AGENT_DIR -f $PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml up -d
EOF
cat > /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-logs <<EOF
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
exec $DOCKER compose --project-directory $PR_AGENT_DIR -f $PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml logs --tail=200 pr-agent
EOF
cat > /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-status <<EOF
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
exec $DOCKER compose --project-directory $PR_AGENT_DIR -f $PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml ps
EOF
cat > /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-control <<'EOF'
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
case "${SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND:-}" in
deploy) exec sudo -n /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-deploy ;;
logs) exec sudo -n /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-logs ;;
status) exec sudo -n /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-status ;;
*) echo "allowed: deploy, logs, status" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
EOF
chown root:root /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-deploy /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-logs \
/usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-status /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-control
chmod 755 /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-deploy /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-logs \
/usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-status /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-control
cat > /etc/sudoers.d/pr-agent-control <<'EOF'
agent ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-deploy, /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-logs, /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-status
EOF
chmod 440 /etc/sudoers.d/pr-agent-control
visudo -cf /etc/sudoers.d/pr-agent-control >/dev/null
PUB=$(cat "$PUBKEY_FILE")
printf 'restrict,command="/usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-control" %s\n' "$PUB" \
> "$AGENT_HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys"
chown "$AGENT_USER:$AGENT_USER" "$AGENT_HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys"
chmod 600 "$AGENT_HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys"
cat > /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/60-pr-agent-agent.conf <<'EOF'
Match User agent
ForceCommand /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-control
PermitTTY no
AllowTcpForwarding no
X11Forwarding no
PermitTunnel no
AllowAgentForwarding no
EOF
chmod 644 /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/60-pr-agent-agent.conf
if ! sshd -t; then
rm -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/60-pr-agent-agent.conf
echo "sshd config test failed; removed the new file" >&2
exit 1
fi
systemctl reload ssh
cd "$PR_AGENT_DIR"
"$DOCKER" compose pull
"$DOCKER" compose up -d
sleep 5
"$DOCKER" compose ps
cat <<'EOF'
Agent access is ready. Test from the laptop:
ssh -i ~/.ssh/pr_agent_control -o IdentitiesOnly=yes agent@91.99.207.62 status
Old access is still in place. Only after that command works, run:
sudo bash /home/noel/agent-access-remove.sh
EOF