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15
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+114
-18
@@ -109,24 +109,69 @@ jobs:
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- name: Audit dependencies for known vulnerabilities
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working-directory: ${{ env.APP_DIR }}
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run: pnpm audit --prod --audit-level moderate
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continue-on-error: true # advisory: does not block the PR by default
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# blocks the PR on vulnerabilities - re-add `continue-on-error: true`
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# here only if a CVE fix is genuinely blocked upstream, never to
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# make a red pipeline green
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# ------------------------------------------------------- dockerfile lint --
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dockerfile-lint:
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name: Dockerfile lint (droast)
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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container:
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image: immanuwell/droast:1.7.0
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# skips until the repo contains a Dockerfile
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if: ${{ hashFiles('**/Dockerfile', '**/Dockerfile.*', '**/Containerfile') != '' }}
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# droast's own container image ships no node (actions/checkout would
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# fail with exit 127 - same as the gitleaks image), so run the droast
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# binary in the multi-arch node image instead
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container: node:22-bookworm
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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- name: Install droast
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run: |
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case "$(uname -m)" in
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x86_64) DROAST_ASSET=droast-linux-x86_64; DROAST_SHA=cadb963a040ba2e68641af764f794e5d4fb3371bb9b92255fa5027060b08ea6e ;;
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aarch64) DROAST_ASSET=droast-linux-arm64; DROAST_SHA=0800e80d11f668615fc87750f58809b56bedca83ec6d8a539daa56f42da64bc3 ;;
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*) echo "unsupported arch: $(uname -m)" && exit 1 ;;
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esac
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curl -fsSL -o /usr/local/bin/droast \
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"https://github.com/immanuwell/dockerfile-roast/releases/download/1.7.0/${DROAST_ASSET}"
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# verify against the pinned hash checked into this workflow
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# (fetching the checksum from the same release as the binary
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# would be trust-on-first-use and prove nothing)
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echo "${DROAST_SHA} /usr/local/bin/droast" | sha256sum -c -
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chmod +x /usr/local/bin/droast
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droast --version
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- name: Discover Dockerfiles
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id: discover
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# shell check instead of hashFiles: the act runner's hashFiles
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# evaluation returned empty and silently skipped the job even when
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# Dockerfiles existed
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run: |
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# Discovery: -print -quit instead of `| head -n 1` - head can
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# SIGPIPE find (exit 141) when multiple Dockerfiles match
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found="$(find . \
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-path ./.git -prune -o -path ./node_modules -prune -o \
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-type f \( -iname 'Dockerfile*' -o -iname '*dockerfile' -o -iname 'Containerfile*' \) \
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-print -quit)"
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if [ -n "$found" ]; then
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echo "found=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
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echo "Dockerfile found: $found"
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else
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echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
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echo "No Dockerfile in repo - nothing to lint"
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fi
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- name: Lint Dockerfile(s)
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if: ${{ steps.discover.outputs.found == 'true' }}
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run: |
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# --no-roast = technical output for CI; --min-severity warning so
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# info-level findings don't block the PR
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droast --no-roast --min-severity warning .
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# lint exactly the tree the discovery step sees: prune node_modules
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# and .git so vendored Dockerfiles in dependencies cannot produce
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# findings on third-party code
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find . \
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-path ./.git -prune -o -path ./node_modules -prune -o \
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-type f \( -iname 'Dockerfile*' -o -iname '*dockerfile' -o -iname 'Containerfile*' \) \
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-print0 | xargs -0 -r droast --no-roast --min-severity warning
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# ------------------------------------------------------- snyk security ----
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# DISABLED: Snyk free plan only includes ~100 test credits/month, which the
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@@ -183,10 +228,12 @@ jobs:
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fetch-depth: 0
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- name: Install opencode CLI
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run: curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/install | bash
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env:
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# pin the version for reproducible CI, e.g. v1.0.0
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OPENCODE_VERSION: latest
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run: curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/v2/install | bash -s -- -v 2.0.32
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# v2 installer is required: the classic /install URL ships only
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# OpenCode 1.x (resolved to v1.19.3 on arm64), which cannot resolve
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# model variants like "#max" and failed with ProviderModelNotFoundError.
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# Version pinned (-v 2.0.32) so a breaking v2 release cannot fail
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# the job mid-PR; bump deliberately, not automatically.
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- name: Get PR diff
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run: |
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@@ -209,10 +256,39 @@ jobs:
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# (variants: high, max). NOTE the provider prefix must be
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# "opencode-go", NOT "opencode" (Zen is a different, pay-per-call
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# provider and fails with 'Insufficient account funds').
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# Output is redirected (not piped through tee): if opencode fails,
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# the job must fail here so the error log is never posted as a
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# "review" comment.
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#
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# Auth is env-only: the CLI picks up OPENCODE_API_KEY from the
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# environment (verified headless). Deliberately NO opencode.json:
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# a config file in the checkout would hold the API key in
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# plaintext, readable by the agent - a malicious PR diff could
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# prompt-inject the agent into quoting the key in the review
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# comment (publicly visible). Env vars are invisible to file reads.
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# Permissions live in a global config OUTSIDE the checkout (no
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# secrets in it, so nothing can leak). OpenCode v2 schema: the
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# field is "permissions" (plural) - an ordered array of
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# {action, resource, effect}; "bash" was renamed "shell" in v2.
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# The singular v1 "permission" object is ignored by the v2 CLI
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# (verified empirically: shell commands executed despite deny).
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# Denying shell/edit/webfetch/websearch/external_directory means
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# no headless permission prompts can hang or kill the run, and
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# the reviewer physically cannot modify the repo or browse
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# attacker-controlled URLs.
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mkdir -p "$HOME/.config/opencode"
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printf '{
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"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
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"permissions": [
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{ "action": "edit", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" },
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{ "action": "shell", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" },
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{ "action": "webfetch", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" },
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{ "action": "websearch", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" },
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{ "action": "external_directory", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" }
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]
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}' > "$HOME/.config/opencode/opencode.json"
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# --print-logs: surface auth/provider errors in the CI log instead
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# of failing with an opaque exit code
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EXIT_CODE=0
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opencode run \
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--print-logs \
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--model opencode-go/deepseek-v4-pro#max \
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"You are a principal engineer performing a rigorous code review on a
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pull request. You have tool access: read repo files for context when
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@@ -280,12 +356,26 @@ jobs:
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End your response with a final verdict line, exactly one of:
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VERDICT: APPROVE (no BLOCKER findings)
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VERDICT: REQUEST_CHANGES (at least one BLOCKER)" \
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> /tmp/review.md 2>&1
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EXIT_CODE=$?
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> /tmp/review.md 2>&1 || EXIT_CODE=$?
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# always show the output - never swallow the error text
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cat /tmp/review.md
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if [ $EXIT_CODE -ne 0 ]; then
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echo "::error::opencode review failed (exit ${EXIT_CODE}) - NOT posting this output as a review comment"
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exit $EXIT_CODE
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# The posting gate is the OUTPUT CONTRACT, not the exit code:
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# a completed review always ends with a VERDICT line - error
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# dumps never do. opencode can exit 1 on benign tool denials
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# even after a full review, so a present verdict means post;
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# anything else means the review did not complete.
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# Anchored to the tail: the prompt itself contains VERDICT
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# lines, so scanning the whole file could pass on echoed
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# prompt text or injected quotes - only the last lines count.
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if tail -n 5 /tmp/review.md | grep -qE '^VERDICT: (APPROVE|REQUEST_CHANGES)'; then
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[ "$EXIT_CODE" -ne 0 ] && echo "::warning::opencode exited ${EXIT_CODE} but produced a valid verdict - posting review"
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echo "Review completed with verdict."
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else
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# fail closed: no verdict = no review. exit 1 unconditionally -
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# falling back to EXIT_CODE would exit 0 when opencode succeeded
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# but produced no review, and the job would go green.
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echo "::error::opencode produced no valid review (exit ${EXIT_CODE:-1}) - NOT posting this output as a review comment"
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exit 1
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fi
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- name: Post review as PR comment
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@@ -296,6 +386,12 @@ jobs:
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REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
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# Gitea sets GITHUB_API_URL, e.g. https://gitea.example.com/api/v1
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run: |
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# re-verify the output contract here: never post anything that is
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# not a completed review, regardless of how the previous step ended
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if ! tail -n 5 /tmp/review.md | grep -qE '^VERDICT: (APPROVE|REQUEST_CHANGES)'; then
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echo "::error::no verdict in review output - nothing to post"
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exit 1
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fi
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# jq is not in the node image - use node for JSON encoding
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BODY=$(node -e 'process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(require("fs").readFileSync("/tmp/review.md","utf8")))')
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HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /tmp/comment-response.json -w "%{http_code}" \
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Reference in new issue
Block a user