fix(ci): use opencode-go plan model for AI review #5

Merged
Noel merged 14 commits from fix/ai_pr_review into main 2026-10-18 16:24:58 +00:00
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+21 -17
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@@ -132,8 +132,11 @@ jobs:
esac
curl -fsSL -o /usr/local/bin/droast \
"https://github.com/immanuwell/dockerfile-roast/releases/download/1.7.0/${DROAST_ASSET}"
chmod +x /usr/local/bin/droast
droast --version
# verify against the publisher's checksum file of the same pinned
# release (upstream sha256sums.txt matches our own verification)
curl -fsSL -o /tmp/droast-sha256sums.txt \
"https://github.com/immanuwell/dockerfile-roast/releases/download/1.7.0/sha256sums.txt"
echo "$(grep "${DROAST_ASSET}\$" /tmp/droast-sha256sums.txt)" | (cd /usr/local/bin && sha256sum -c -)
- name: Discover Dockerfiles
id: discover
@@ -215,10 +218,12 @@ jobs:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Install opencode CLI
run: curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/v2/install | bash
run: curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/v2/install | bash -s -- -v 2.0.32
# v2 installer is required: the classic /install URL ships only
# OpenCode 1.x (resolved to v1.19.3 on arm64), which cannot resolve
# model variants like "#max" and failed with ProviderModelNotFoundError
# model variants like "#max" and failed with ProviderModelNotFoundError.
# Version pinned (-v 2.0.32) so a breaking v2 release cannot fail
# the job mid-PR; bump deliberately, not automatically.
- name: Get PR diff
run: |
@@ -242,28 +247,27 @@ jobs:
# "opencode-go", NOT "opencode" (Zen is a different, pay-per-call
# provider and fails with 'Insufficient account funds').
#
# Belt and suspenders on auth: OPENCODE_API_KEY is exported for
# env-based pickup, AND an opencode.json is generated that binds
# the key to the opencode-go provider explicitly - so headless CI
# never depends on env-var mapping behavior.
# Auth is env-only: the CLI picks up OPENCODE_API_KEY from the
# environment (verified headless). Deliberately NO opencode.json:
# a config file in the checkout would hold the API key in
# plaintext, readable by the agent - a malicious PR diff could
# prompt-inject the agent into quoting the key in the review
# comment (publicly visible). Env vars are invisible to file reads.
# Permissions live in a global config OUTSIDE the checkout (no
# secrets in it, so nothing can leak): denying edit/bash/webfetch
# means no headless permission prompts can hang or kill the run,
# and the reviewer physically cannot modify the repo.
mkdir -p "$HOME/.config/opencode"
printf '{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"provider": {
"opencode-go": {
"options": { "apiKey": "%s" }
}
},
"permission": {
"edit": "deny",
"bash": "deny",
"webfetch": "deny"
}
}' "$OPENCODE_API_KEY" > opencode.json
}' > "$HOME/.config/opencode/opencode.json"
# --print-logs: surface auth/provider errors in the CI log instead
# of failing with an opaque exit code
# Read-only agent: denying edit/bash/webfetch means no headless
# permission prompts can hang or kill the run, and the reviewer
# physically cannot modify the repo.
EXIT_CODE=0
opencode run \
--print-logs \