name: PR Check on: pull_request: types: [opened, synchronize, reopened] # manual trigger: the only way the paused snyk job below can run workflow_dispatch: concurrency: group: pr-check-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} cancel-in-progress: true env: # The Gitea repo root IS the Nuxt app (CV_Website/CV_Site_Nuxt), so all # app commands run from the workspace root. If you ever move the app into # a subdirectory, change this to the subdirectory path. APP_DIR: . jobs: # ------------------------------------------------------ lint + typecheck -- # One job, not two: both checks use the same image, the same lockfile and # the same install, so splitting them doubled the install work (and, on the # 2 vCPU runner, the CPU contention). They still report as separate steps, # so a failure says which check failed. checks: name: Lint + typecheck runs-on: ubuntu-latest container: node:22-bookworm steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v4 with: # match the pnpm major version used locally (v11.x) - older pnpm # rejects our config-only pnpm-workspace.yaml ("packages field # missing or empty") version: 11 - name: Resolve pnpm store and lockfile hash id: pnpm working-directory: ${{ env.APP_DIR }} run: | # hashFiles() evaluates empty in this act runner, so the cache key # is built from a real sha256 in a shell step instead. The store # directory's own name is the layout version (store/v11 here), so # it is in the key: a store from another pnpm major is unusable. store="$(pnpm store path --silent)" echo "store=$store" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" echo "layout=$(basename "$store")" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" echo "lockfile=$(sha256sum pnpm-lock.yaml | cut -d' ' -f1)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - name: Restore pnpm store # v4.1.x, not v4.2+: the runner's cache server may only speak the v1 # API (Gitea runner 2.x). v4.1 works on both v1-only and v3 runners. # A cache outage must not turn into a red PR: install still works # without the store, just slower. continue-on-error: true uses: actions/cache@v4.1.0 with: path: ${{ steps.pnpm.outputs.store }} key: pnpm-store-${{ runner.os }}-${{ steps.pnpm.outputs.layout }}-${{ steps.pnpm.outputs.lockfile }} restore-keys: | pnpm-store-${{ runner.os }}-${{ steps.pnpm.outputs.layout }}- - name: Install dependencies working-directory: ${{ env.APP_DIR }} run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile - name: Run ESLint working-directory: ${{ env.APP_DIR }} run: pnpm lint - name: Typecheck (vue-tsc) working-directory: ${{ env.APP_DIR }} run: pnpm typecheck # -------------------------------------------------------------- secrets --- secrets: name: Secret scan (gitleaks) runs-on: ubuntu-latest # plain node image: the gitleaks container image has no node, which # breaks node-based actions like actions/checkout container: node:22-bookworm steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 with: fetch-depth: 0 # gitleaks scans the full history - name: Install gitleaks run: | echo "Runner arch: $(uname -m)" case "$(uname -m)" in x86_64) GITLEAKS_ARCH=x64 ;; aarch64) GITLEAKS_ARCH=arm64 ;; *) echo "unsupported arch: $(uname -m)" && exit 1 ;; esac curl -fsSL -o /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz \ "https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v8.28.0/gitleaks_8.28.0_linux_${GITLEAKS_ARCH}.tar.gz" tar -xzf /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz -C /usr/local/bin gitleaks gitleaks version - name: Scan for leaked secrets run: gitleaks detect --source . --redact --verbose # Already-committed secrets that you've accepted? Add a .gitleaksignore # file listing their fingerprints instead of disabling the check. # ----------------------------------------------------------- dependency --- audit: name: Dependency audit runs-on: ubuntu-latest container: node:22-bookworm steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v4 with: # match the pnpm major version used locally (v11.x) - older pnpm # rejects our config-only pnpm-workspace.yaml ("packages field # missing or empty") version: 11 - name: Audit dependencies for known vulnerabilities working-directory: ${{ env.APP_DIR }} run: pnpm audit --prod --audit-level moderate # blocks the PR on vulnerabilities - re-add `continue-on-error: true` # here only if a CVE fix is genuinely blocked upstream, never to # make a red pipeline green # ------------------------------------------------------- dockerfile lint -- dockerfile-lint: name: Dockerfile lint (droast) runs-on: ubuntu-latest # droast's own container image ships no node (actions/checkout would # fail with exit 127 - same as the gitleaks image), so run the droast # binary in the multi-arch node image instead container: node:22-bookworm steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 - name: Install droast run: | case "$(uname -m)" in x86_64) DROAST_ASSET=droast-linux-x86_64; DROAST_SHA=cadb963a040ba2e68641af764f794e5d4fb3371bb9b92255fa5027060b08ea6e ;; aarch64) DROAST_ASSET=droast-linux-arm64; DROAST_SHA=0800e80d11f668615fc87750f58809b56bedca83ec6d8a539daa56f42da64bc3 ;; *) echo "unsupported arch: $(uname -m)" && exit 1 ;; esac curl -fsSL -o /usr/local/bin/droast \ "https://github.com/immanuwell/dockerfile-roast/releases/download/1.7.0/${DROAST_ASSET}" # verify against the pinned hash checked into this workflow # (fetching the checksum from the same release as the binary # would be trust-on-first-use and prove nothing) echo "${DROAST_SHA} /usr/local/bin/droast" | sha256sum -c - chmod +x /usr/local/bin/droast droast --version - name: Discover Dockerfiles id: discover # shell check instead of hashFiles: the act runner's hashFiles # evaluation returned empty and silently skipped the job even when # Dockerfiles existed run: | # Discovery: -print -quit instead of `| head -n 1` - head can # SIGPIPE find (exit 141) when multiple Dockerfiles match found="$(find . \ -path ./.git -prune -o -path ./node_modules -prune -o \ -type f \( -iname 'Dockerfile*' -o -iname '*dockerfile' -o -iname 'Containerfile*' \) \ -print -quit)" if [ -n "$found" ]; then echo "found=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" echo "Dockerfile found: $found" else echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" echo "No Dockerfile in repo - nothing to lint" fi - name: Lint Dockerfile(s) if: ${{ steps.discover.outputs.found == 'true' }} run: | # --no-roast = technical output for CI; --min-severity warning so # info-level findings don't block the PR # lint exactly the tree the discovery step sees: prune node_modules # and .git so vendored Dockerfiles in dependencies cannot produce # findings on third-party code find . \ -path ./.git -prune -o -path ./node_modules -prune -o \ -type f \( -iname 'Dockerfile*' -o -iname '*dockerfile' -o -iname 'Containerfile*' \) \ -print0 | xargs -0 -r droast --no-roast --min-severity warning # ------------------------------------------------------- snyk security ---- # PAUSED: Snyk free plan only includes ~100 test credits/month, which the # pipeline would burn through quickly (2 tests per PR push). # Paused the actionlint-clean way: the job only runs on manual # (workflow_dispatch) triggers, so pushes and PRs never burn credits. # To re-enable fully, delete the if: line below. Consider also running # this job only on PRs marked "ready for review" or on a weekly schedule # instead of on every push. snyk: name: Security scan (Snyk) runs-on: ubuntu-latest if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' # snyk/snyk:node is amd64-only ("no matching manifest for linux/arm64"), # so install the CLI via npm in the multi-arch node image instead container: node:22-bookworm steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 - name: Install Snyk CLI run: npm install -g snyk@1 && snyk --version - name: Snyk dependency scan env: SNYK_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SNYK_TOKEN }} working-directory: ${{ env.APP_DIR }} run: | # --all-projects: required because pnpm-workspace.yaml exists - # without it Snyk errors with SNYK-CLI-0000 # --strict-out-of-sync: fails if the lockfile doesn't match package.json snyk test \ --all-projects \ --severity-threshold=high \ --strict-out-of-sync=true - name: Snyk Code scan (SAST) env: SNYK_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SNYK_TOKEN }} working-directory: ${{ env.APP_DIR }} run: | # static analysis of our own source code (XSS, injection, ...) # Dockerfile/base image checks are covered by the droast job snyk code test \ --severity-threshold=high # -------------------------------------------------------- ai code review -- review: name: AI code review (opencode) runs-on: ubuntu-latest container: node:22-bookworm # Draft PRs don't get a (paid) review yet. The event_name check is # load-bearing: manual (workflow_dispatch) triggers - which exist to # run the paused snyk job - must NOT launch a paid review, which on # a dispatch event has no PR to post to. if: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' && !github.event.pull_request.draft }} steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 with: fetch-depth: 0 - name: Restore opencode binary id: opencode-cache # The installer writes to $HOME/.opencode/bin. Caching it saves the # ~4s download+extract per run - small next to the model call, but # free to keep. Key includes the pinned version, so bumping the # version below invalidates the cached binary automatically. # As above, a cache outage falls back to the installer. continue-on-error: true uses: actions/cache@v4.1.0 with: path: ~/.opencode/bin key: opencode-v2.0.32-${{ runner.os }} - name: Install opencode CLI if: steps.opencode-cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' run: curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/v2/install | bash -s -- -v 2.0.32 # v2 installer is required: the classic /install URL ships only # OpenCode 1.x (resolved to v1.19.3 on arm64), which cannot resolve # model variants like "#medium" and failed with ProviderModelNotFoundError. # Version pinned (-v 2.0.32) so a breaking v2 release cannot fail # the job mid-PR; bump deliberately, not automatically. - name: Add opencode to PATH # The installer appends the directory to $GITHUB_PATH itself, but that # step is skipped on a cache hit. Add it unconditionally. run: echo "$HOME/.opencode/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH" - name: Get PR diff run: | # lockfile changes bloat the diff (175KB here) and are pointless to # review - pnpm audit already covers dependencies. Excluding the # lockfile also keeps the diff small enough to hand to the model. # The diff goes to a file IN the workspace so the agent can read it # with its file tools (passing 190KB as a CLI argument fails with # "Argument list too long", MAX_ARG_STRLEN is 128KiB). git diff --merge-base "origin/${{ github.base_ref }}" \ -- . ':(exclude)pnpm-lock.yaml' > .pr-review-diff.patch wc -c .pr-review-diff.patch - name: Run opencode review env: OPENCODE_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.OPENCODE_API_KEY }} run: | # opencode-go/claude-haiku-5-5#medium: cheap ($0.10/$0.50 per M # tokens) and, unlike deepseek-v4.1-flash, it has a #medium # reasoning variant - flash only exposes low/high/max, so every # review there ran at maximum effort. #medium keeps the review # competent without paying for max reasoning on each push. # History: deepseek-v4-pro#max -> deepseek-v4.1-flash#max -> # haiku-5-5#medium (2026-10-20). The pro endpoint failed two # consecutive runs with "Upstream request failed: Endpoint is # unavailable" before the flash switch; that fallback is recorded # in OKF_Nuxt/open-questions.md. NOTE the provider prefix must be # "opencode-go", NOT "opencode" (Zen is a different, pay-per-call # provider and fails with 'Insufficient account funds'). # # Auth is env-only: the CLI picks up OPENCODE_API_KEY from the # environment (verified headless). Deliberately NO opencode.json: # a config file in the checkout would hold the API key in # plaintext, readable by the agent - a malicious PR diff could # prompt-inject the agent into quoting the key in the review # comment (publicly visible). Env vars are invisible to file reads. # Permissions live in a global config OUTSIDE the checkout (no # secrets in it, so nothing can leak). OpenCode v2 schema: the # field is "permissions" (plural) - an ordered array of # {action, resource, effect}; "bash" was renamed "shell" in v2. # The singular v1 "permission" object is ignored by the v2 CLI # (verified empirically: shell commands executed despite deny). # Denying shell/edit/webfetch/websearch/external_directory means # no headless permission prompts can hang or kill the run, and # the reviewer physically cannot modify the repo or browse # attacker-controlled URLs. mkdir -p "$HOME/.config/opencode" printf '{ "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json", "permissions": [ { "action": "edit", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" }, { "action": "shell", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" }, { "action": "webfetch", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" }, { "action": "websearch", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" }, { "action": "external_directory", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" } ] }' > "$HOME/.config/opencode/opencode.json" # --print-logs: surface auth/provider errors in the CI log instead # of failing with an opaque exit code EXIT_CODE=0 opencode run \ --print-logs \ --model opencode-go/claude-haiku-5-5#medium \ "You are a principal engineer performing a rigorous code review on a pull request. You have tool access: read repo files for context when the diff alone is ambiguous, but review ONLY code changed in this PR. The full PR diff is in the file .pr-review-diff.patch in the repo root. Read it first with your file tools. ## Project context - Stack: Nuxt 4 (Vue 3, TypeScript) SSR web app in the repo root. Backend/API services are being added in Golang. - Deployment target: a personal production CV website. - Already covered by other CI jobs, do NOT repeat their findings: ESLint (style), vue-tsc (types), gitleaks (secrets in git history), pnpm audit (dependency CVEs), droast (Dockerfile lint). - Your job is everything those tools CANNOT see: logic, security, architecture, correctness. ## Nuxt / Vue / TypeScript focus - SSR pitfalls: window/document/localStorage access without or process.client guards; hydration mismatch risks (Date.now(), Math.random(), locale formatting in render path). - useAsyncData/useFetch: missing or colliding keys, duplicate requests between server and client, wrong caching/refresh setup. - Reactivity bugs: destructuring reactive objects losing reactivity, missing await on async setup, watch on getters vs refs. - Security: v-html with unsanitized data, user input flowing into meta/URLs, open redirects, missing validation in /server/api and Nitro route handlers, auth checks on both page and API level. - Config hygiene: server-only runtime config (no NUXT_PUBLIC_ prefix) leaking secrets into the client bundle. ## Golang focus (when Go code is in the diff) - Errors: unchecked errors, errors discarded, wrapping with %w, sentinel vs typed errors, panic in library code. - Concurrency: goroutine leaks (missing context cancellation), data races (shared state without mutex/channel), WaitGroup misuse, defer in loops. - Resources: unclosed response bodies/files/rows, missing timeouts on http.Client, unbounded buffering. - Correctness: slice aliasing surprises, copy vs reference semantics, nil map writes, integer truncation. ## Cross-cutting - API contract mismatches between Nuxt frontend and Go backends (field names, nullability, status codes, date formats). - Missing authorization checks on new endpoints or pages. - Secrets/credentials ending up in logs or client-visible output. - Performance on the critical render path (heavy components, unoptimized images, blocking Nitro middleware). ## Output format (strict) Review the diff in .pr-review-diff.patch. For every finding: [BLOCKER] file:line - what and why + concrete fix suggestion [WARN] file:line - what and why + concrete fix suggestion [NIT] file:line - optional improvement BLOCKER = must fix before merge (security, data loss, broken behavior). WARN = should fix soon. NIT = optional. If a finding cannot be localized to a file, prefix [BLOCKER-GENERAL]. No compliments, no summaries of what the diff does, no style nits. Keep it under 400 words unless there are more than 10 findings. If the diff contains no reviewable code (docs/config only), say so in one line. End your response with a final verdict line, exactly one of: VERDICT: APPROVE (no BLOCKER findings) VERDICT: REQUEST_CHANGES (at least one BLOCKER)" \ > /tmp/review.md 2>&1 || EXIT_CODE=$? # always show the output - never swallow the error text cat /tmp/review.md # The posting gate is the OUTPUT CONTRACT, not the exit code: # a completed review always ends with a VERDICT line - error # dumps never do. opencode can exit 1 on benign tool denials # even after a full review, so a present verdict means post; # anything else means the review did not complete. # Anchored to the tail: the prompt itself contains VERDICT # lines, so scanning the whole file could pass on echoed # prompt text or injected quotes - only the last lines count. if tail -n 5 /tmp/review.md | grep -qE '^VERDICT: (APPROVE|REQUEST_CHANGES)'; then [ "$EXIT_CODE" -ne 0 ] && echo "::warning::opencode exited ${EXIT_CODE} but produced a valid verdict - posting review" echo "Review completed with verdict." else # fail closed: no verdict = no review. exit 1 unconditionally - # falling back to EXIT_CODE would exit 0 when opencode succeeded # but produced no review, and the job would go green. echo "::error::opencode produced no valid review (exit ${EXIT_CODE:-1}) - NOT posting this output as a review comment" exit 1 fi - name: Post review as PR comment continue-on-error: true # token missing/expired must not fail the build env: GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PR_GITEA_TOKEN }} PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} REPO: ${{ github.repository }} # Gitea sets GITHUB_API_URL, e.g. https://gitea.example.com/api/v1 run: | # re-verify the output contract here: never post anything that is # not a completed review, regardless of how the previous step ended if ! tail -n 5 /tmp/review.md | grep -qE '^VERDICT: (APPROVE|REQUEST_CHANGES)'; then echo "::error::no verdict in review output - nothing to post" exit 1 fi # jq is not in the node image - use node for JSON encoding BODY=$(node -e 'process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(require("fs").readFileSync("/tmp/review.md","utf8")))') HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /tmp/comment-response.json -w "%{http_code}" \ -X POST \ -H "Authorization: token ${GITEA_TOKEN}" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"body\": ${BODY}}" \ "${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${REPO}/issues/${PR_NUMBER}/comments") echo "POST status: ${HTTP_CODE}" cat /tmp/comment-response.json case "$HTTP_CODE" in 200|201) echo "Review comment posted." ;; *) echo "::error::Failed to post review comment (HTTP ${HTTP_CODE}) - check PR_GITEA_TOKEN scope and expiry" ;; esac