--- type: Decision title: PR pipeline layering description: Three layers - pre-commit hooks for cheap deterministic checks, Gitea Actions for thorough checks, an AI reviewer for judgment - and the rule that decides what runs where. tags: [decision, ci, gitea-actions, pre-commit, security] status: draft generated: { by: opencode-go/glm-5.3-flash, at: 2026-10-18T16:05:00Z } verified: { by: human:noel, at: not yet } sources: - id: pr-checker resource: .gitea/workflows/pr-checker.yml title: PR Check workflow - id: pre-commit resource: .pre-commit-config.yaml title: Pre-commit guardrails --- # Decision Every pull request is checked by three layers, ordered by cost: 1. **Pre-commit hooks** (local, seconds, deterministic): gitleaks, file hygiene, conventional-commit check, actionlint, eslint --fix on staged files. A commit that fails here never exists. 2. **Gitea Actions** (per PR push, minutes): ESLint, vue-tsc typecheck, gitleaks over full history, pnpm audit (blocking), droast Dockerfile lint, Snyk (currently disabled). 3. **AI code review** (per PR push): opencode with a plan-covered model, verdict-based, posted as a PR comment. The split rule: anything that finishes in seconds and auto-fixes goes in pre-commit; anything slow, network-bound or quota-bound goes in CI; anything that produces judgment rather than a pass/fail is the AI review. Nothing slow lives in pre-commit — one slow hook gets bypassed with `--no-verify` once and is dead weight forever. # Why Each layer catches what the previous one cannot. Pre-commit sees the commit before it exists; CI sees the whole PR on a clean machine; the AI review sees intent, contracts and cross-file consequences that no linter can. The ordering also protects the budget: the AI review only runs for code that already passed the deterministic gates. # What the pipeline bought us in practice Recorded so the reasoning survives: during the first week the pipeline caught leaked secrets in history (gitleaks), a review model configured against the wrong provider account, a Dockerfile-lint job that silently never ran (`hashFiles` evaluating empty in the act runner), a review that completed but exited non-zero, and an attacker-relevant credential exposure in the review setup — each fixed where it was cheapest. # Failure modes deliberately designed against | Failure seen | Guard now in place | |---|---| | Error logs posted as review comments | Posting gate is the output contract (a `VERDICT:` line), not the exit code | | Vendor container images without arm64 manifests | Binaries installed arch-aware in `node:22-bookworm`, never vendor CI images | | `hashFiles()` silently empty in the act runner | File discovery via `find` in a step, not workflow expressions | | Silent advisory failures | `continue-on-error` removed everywhere; a failed check is red | | Supply-chain (curl-piped binaries) | Pinned versions, checksums pinned in the workflow | # Not verified * That the Snyk job still works when re-enabled — it was disabled while the free quota was the binding constraint. * That the pipeline behaves on Gitea runner versions other than v0.6.1. # Revisit when * A second repository needs the same pipeline (extract a reusable workflow include). * The Go plan's usage limits are hit by review traffic.