Apply fact-check corrections: v1.1 metrics, data populations, citations

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## Abstract
Low-cost Bluetooth footfall counters are increasingly used to justify staffing, advertising, and urban-planning decisions. Their central claim is that they measure pedestrian density while preserving privacy. We audit that claim on the eight-sensor PAX counter network deployed in Heilbronn, Germany. A code-level review of the public firmware shows that each published “15-minute” value is a **~10-second** passive BLE scan: the node counts distinct locally administered addresses, truncates the last two MAC bytes into a 16-bit ID, multiplies by a fixed factor (default 0.7), and sleeps for 900 seconds. The effective duty cycle is about 1.1%. The data confirm the semantics: all 83,156 density values in the eight-sensor panel are exact multiples of 0.7; reconstructed counts have median 12 and maximum 418; a hardware replacement produces a 35.2-day gap and a scale break from a 1.0 integer grid to a 0.7 grid. Coverage is sparse: only 28.2% of 15-minute slots contain all eight sensors, 5.18% of individual readings are zero, and cross-sensor correlation falls from 0.58 to 0.38 after removing hour-of-week structure. Legally, MAC addresses are very likely personal data in this context; truncation does not anonymise — it produces a weak, transient identifier that may be pseudonymous in context; and passive sniffing under § 25 TDDDG is contested. We then propose a privacy-first architecture: thermal/radar/camera/probe/manual sensing with calibration, a network-aware hierarchical spatial model, a quantile forecast with conformal calibration, and a decision layer evaluated by regret rather than MAE alone. We show how the same decision-grade contract transfers directly to staffing and advertising, conditionally to waste routing, as a sibling to sensor placement and LoRaWAN planning, and not at all to sentiment or learning-guide tasks. The contribution is not a better people counter; it is an honest measurement model and a staged path to one.
Low-cost Bluetooth footfall counters are increasingly used to justify staffing, advertising, and urban-planning decisions. Their central claim is that they measure pedestrian density while preserving privacy. We audit that claim on the eight-sensor PAX counter network deployed in Heilbronn, Germany. A code-level review of the public 2026 firmware (commit e8be8bf) shows a **~10-second** passive BLE scan: the node counts distinct locally administered addresses, truncates the last two MAC bytes into a 16-bit ID, multiplies by a fixed factor (default 0.7), and sleeps for 900 seconds. The effective duty cycle is about 1.1% in that code. The deployed 2025 binary may differ; the data confirm the 0.7 scaling and per-wake export, not the scan duration or the 16-bit truncation. In the **12 June model window** (83,156 values), all values are exact multiples of 0.7; reconstructed counts have median 12 and maximum 418. Coverage in the **18 June coverage panel** (82,170 readings) is sparse: only 28.2% of 15-minute slots contain all eight sensors, 5.18% of all 96,232 density rows are zero, and, in the **12 June model window**, cross-sensor correlation falls from 0.58 to 0.38 after removing hour-of-week structure. Legally, MAC addresses are very likely personal data in this context; truncation does not anonymise — it produces a weak, transient identifier that may be pseudonymous in context; and passive sniffing under § 25 TDDDG is contested. We then propose a privacy-first architecture: thermal/radar/camera/probe/manual sensing with calibration, a network-aware hierarchical spatial model, a quantile forecast with conformal calibration, and a decision layer evaluated by regret rather than MAE alone. We show how the same decision-grade contract transfers directly to staffing, as an analytical extension to advertising, conditionally to waste routing, as a sibling to sensor placement and LoRaWAN planning, and not at all to sentiment or learning-guide tasks. The contribution is not a better people counter; it is an honest measurement model and a staged path to one.
## 1. Introduction
@@ -15,17 +15,17 @@ A store manager on Kaiserstraße knows next week’s weather forecast and the st
The Schwarz Digits *Pulse of the City* challenge asks teams to turn “privacy-preserving” pedestrian counts from Heilbronn into predictive tooling for advertising, store locations, and staffing [1]. The wording is doing a lot of work. “Pedestrian counts” implies people; “privacy-preserving” implies that the sensing layer has been designed around a privacy guarantee. Neither claim is self-evident. The counters are LoRaWAN-connected ESP32 devices that passively sniff Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) advertisements and transmit aggregated device counts [2]. The challenge brief calls them privacy-preserving because they count devices rather than identify people [1]. That is a meaningful architectural choice, but it is not a measurement guarantee, and it is not a legal anonymisation guarantee.
This paper started as an attempt to write the technical report for a hackathon system, PulseCast, that turns the counts into a weekly staffing plan. The system works: on a 28-day holdout, a global weather-aware gradient-boosted model reaches MAE 3.32, WAPE 27.5%, and R² 0.777 against a seasonal-naive baseline of 5.40, 44.7%, and 0.462. The plan is generated in 42.8 ms locally on v1.1 (contract: under two seconds) on a three-service deployment on STACKIT SKE, and the deployed system handled 120/120 concurrent SSE clients with zero connection errors and a p95 event latency of 1.03 s. But the more we looked at the sensing layer, the clearer it became that the model was predicting a **different quantity** from the one the narrative claimed. The code and the data agree: each value is a short-window count of randomized BLE addresses scaled by a fixed factor. The “15-minute” cadence is the sleep cycle, not the integration window.
This paper started as an attempt to write the technical report for a hackathon system, PulseCast, that turns the counts into a weekly staffing plan. The system works: on a 28-day holdout, a global weather-aware gradient-boosted model reaches MAE 3.32, WAPE 27.5%, and R² 0.777 against a seasonal-naive baseline of 5.40, 44.7%, and 0.462. The plan is generated in 19 ms cold on v1.1 (contract: under two seconds) on a three-service deployment on STACKIT SKE, and the deployed system handled 120/120 concurrent SSE clients with zero connection errors and a p95 event latency of 331 ms. But the more we looked at the sensing layer, the clearer it became that the model was predicting a **different quantity** from the one the narrative claimed. The code and the data agree: each value is a short-window count of randomized BLE addresses scaled by a fixed factor. The “15-minute” cadence is the sleep cycle, not the integration window.
That finding changes the paper. A conventional technical report would present the model metrics and the deployment, note that the data are “estimated devices, not people,” and stop. That is not enough. If a decision support system is built on a measurement that conflates flow and dwell, cannot distinguish a phone from a watch or a car, and samples 10 seconds out of every 15 minutes, then the honest contribution is a **measurement audit** plus a **reference architecture** for the next version. The model is not the hard part. The data contract is.
We make five contributions:
1. **A code-level audit** of the deployed Code for Heilbronn `lorax` firmware, with the exact measurement chain: passive BLE scan, locally-administered-address filter, 16-bit truncation, per-sensor factor 0.7, 900-second sleep, RSSI threshold −80 dBm.
2. **A forensic data analysis** of 192,464 rows, confirming the semantics in 83,156 values (100% multiples of 0.7), identifying the `density-01` calibration break, and quantifying coverage, zero-inflation, correlation, and missingness.
1. **A code-level audit** of the public 2026 Code for Heilbronn `lorax` firmware (commit e8be8bf), with the measurement chain: passive BLE scan, locally-administered-address filter, 16-bit truncation, per-sensor factor 0.7, 900-second sleep, RSSI threshold −80 dBm. The deployed 2025 binary may differ; the data confirm the 0.7 scaling and per-wake export, not the scan duration or truncation.
2. **A forensic data analysis** of 192,464 rows, confirming the 0.7 scaling in the 12 June model window (83,156 values, 100% multiples of 0.7), identifying the `density-01` calibration break, and quantifying coverage, zero-inflation, correlation, and missingness with the population stated for each statistic.
3. **A privacy and legal analysis**: why MAC addresses are likely personal data, why truncation does not anonymise and produces a weak, transient identifier that may be pseudonymous in context, why § 25 TDDDG / Art. 5(3) ePrivacy is the decisive unresolved question, and what a DPIA-compliant deployment would require.
4. **A privacy-first reference architecture**: a tiered sensing stack (thermal, radar, edge cameras, probe data, manual counts), a calibration program, a central-DP aggregation layer, a network-aware hierarchical spatial model, a quantile forecast with conformal calibration, and a decision layer evaluated by regret.
5. **A transferability matrix** across the six hackathon challenges, with explicit boundary conditions: direct for staffing and advertising, conditional for waste routing, sibling for sensor placement and LoRaWAN planning, and not applicable to cable-car sentiment or the learning guide.
5. **A transferability matrix** across the six hackathon challenges, with explicit boundary conditions: direct for staffing, analytical for advertising, conditional for waste routing, sibling for sensor placement and LoRaWAN planning, and not applicable to cable-car sentiment or the learning guide.
We are deliberately conservative. We do not claim that the current network measures people, that the 0.7 factor is a validated penetration correction, that eight sensors support a city-wide heatmap, or that the staffing plan has proven ROI. We claim that the current system is a useful **relative activity index** for a local cluster, that its measurement semantics can be reconstructed from code and data, and that a privacy-first, calibrated version is feasible with a staged program.
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ The challenge brief describes the data as “numbers of people measured in a giv
### 2.2 The code-level audit
The deployed system is maintained by Code for Heilbronn. The public repository `cfhn/lorax` (mirror name `lora-frequenzmessung`) contains the `sensor-pax` firmware, a LoRaWAN/TTN aggregator, a Go backend, TimescaleDB, and a Grafana dashboard [3]. The firmware is derived from the open-source ESP32-Paxcounter / `libpax` lineage [4]. The audit below is of the public 2026 commit; the 2025 binary may differ, but the data are consistent with the 0.7 scaling.
The system is maintained by Code for Heilbronn. The public repository `cfhn/lorax` (mirror name `lora-frequenzmessung`) contains the `sensor-pax` firmware, a LoRaWAN/TTN aggregator, a Go backend, TimescaleDB, and a Grafana dashboard [3]. The firmware is derived from the open-source ESP32-Paxcounter / `libpax` lineage [4]. The audit below is of the public 2026 commit **e8be8bf**; the deployed 2025 binary may differ, and the data confirm the 0.7 scaling and per-wake export, not the 10-second scan or the 16-bit truncation.
One cycle is:
@@ -90,17 +90,17 @@ The sampling design adds a second bias. A person who passes in 30 seconds has ro
### 2.4 Data forensics
The delivered CSV contains 192,464 rows: 96,232 density readings and 96,232 battery readings. There are 12 device IDs; after merging the two `density-01` IDs and excluding three test sensors, eight usable locations remain in a ~580 m × 280 m cluster: `density-01`, `hn-goetzentuem-01`, `hn-hagenbuchersee-01`, `hn-hagenbuchersee-02`, `hn-marahaus-01`, `hn-neckarufer-01`, `hn-soleo-01`, and `hn-stadtgalerie-01`. The eight-sensor panel (18 June–7 November 2026) contains 83,156 density values.
The delivered CSV contains 192,464 rows: 96,232 density readings and 96,232 battery readings. There are 12 device IDs; after merging the two `density-01` IDs and excluding three test sensors, eight usable locations remain in a ~580 m × 280 m cluster: `density-01`, `hn-goetzentuem-01`, `hn-hagenbuchersee-01`, `hn-hagenbuchersee-02`, `hn-marahaus-01`, `hn-neckarufer-01`, `hn-soleo-01`, and `hn-stadtgalerie-01`. The **12 June model window** (12 June–7 November 2026) contains 83,156 density values; the **18 June coverage panel** (18 June–7 November 2026) contains 82,170 density readings and is used for coverage statistics.
**Quantization.** Every one of those 83,156 values is an exact multiple of 0.7. The reconstructed integer `U` has median 12, p95 71, and maximum 418; 2.7% of the 83,156 values reconstruct to `U = 0`. A continuous physical series would not land on a 0.7 grid in 83,156 consecutive observations; the only plausible explanation is `value = round(0.7 × integer, 4)`. This is direct, data-internal confirmation of the firmware reading [5].
**Quantization.** Every one of those 83,156 values in the 12 June model window is an exact multiple of 0.7. The reconstructed integer `U` has median 12, p95 71, and maximum 418; 2.70% of the 83,156 values reconstruct to `U = 0`. A continuous physical series would not land on a 0.7 grid in 83,156 consecutive observations; the only plausible explanation is `value = round(0.7 × integer, 4)`. This is direct, data-internal confirmation of the 0.7 scaling and per-wake export; it does not independently confirm the scan duration or the 16-bit truncation [5].
**The calibration break.** The legacy `density-01` device (`863f75b0`, 16 October 2025–12 March 2026) is 100% integer-valued on a 1.0 grid: 0–28, mean 3.008, median 2.0, zero share 29.8%. The replacement (`f8c19730`, 16 April–7 November 2026) is 100% on the 0.7 grid: 0–63, mean 9.741, median 7.7, zero share 5.9%. The gap between the last legacy reading and the first new reading is **35.2065 days**, with no overlap, so a conversion factor cannot be estimated empirically. The level shift is ×3.24 in the mean and ×3.85 in the median, which is not explained by 0.7 alone; season, installation, and sensitivity are confounded. The safe conclusion is that the two series are not on the same scale and must not be pooled [5].
**Cadence.** The nominal 15-minute grid is not a 15:00 wall-clock grid. Current devices report every 15.27–15.37 minutes (median); the legacy device every 15.18 minutes with ~18 s jitter; the new `density-01` every 16.14 minutes with ~2.4 s jitter, producing ~89 readings/day. Flooring to `HH:00/15/30/45` is an approximation; two devices matched to the same slot can be up to ~15 minutes apart [5].
**Coverage.** Only **28.2%** of 15-minute slots contain all eight sensors; the modal count is seven (4,117 slots). Aggregating to 30, 60, or 120 minutes raises complete eight-sensor coverage to **63.4%, 69.7%, and 71.0%**, respectively. Median monthly coverage is 86.1%, but August 2026 falls to 54.2% on average and 23.3% at the worst location. Six of eight locations show a simultaneous multi-week degradation; `density-01` and `hagenbuchersee-01` do not. Coverage is strongly confounded with battery across devices (r = 0.84, n = 8), but the cause cannot be isolated [5].
**Coverage.** In the **18 June coverage panel (82,170 readings)**, only **28.2%** of 15-minute slots contain all eight sensors; the modal count is seven (4,117 slots). Aggregating to 30, 60, or 120 minutes raises complete eight-sensor coverage to **63.4%, 69.7%, and 71.0%**, respectively. Median monthly coverage is 86.1%, but August 2026 falls to 54.2% on average and 23.3% at the worst location. Six of eight locations show a simultaneous multi-week degradation; `density-01` and `hagenbuchersee-01` do not. Coverage is strongly confounded with battery across devices (r = 0.84, n = 8), but the cause cannot be isolated [5].
**Distribution and correlation.** Overall, 5.18% of readings are zero, 10.36% are `<1`, and 39.57% are `<5`. There are no negative or NaN values and no duplicate timestamps; 113 intervals are shorter than 60 seconds and look like retries. Raw cross-location Pearson correlation averages 0.58 (range 0.13–0.90), but drops to 0.38 after removing location-specific hour-of-week means and 0.48 at the daily level. Correlation is not evidence of shared unique visitors [5].
**Distribution and correlation.** Across all **96,232 density rows**, 5.18% are zero, 10.36% are `<1`, and 39.57% are `<5`; in the **12 June model window** the shares are 2.70%, 8.32%, and 35.86%. There are no negative or NaN values and no duplicate timestamps; 113 intervals are shorter than 60 seconds across the core devices, 7 of them in the eight-sensor panel, and they look like retries. Raw cross-location Pearson correlation in the 12 June model window averages 0.58 (range 0.13–0.90), but drops to 0.38 after removing location-specific hour-of-week means and 0.48 at the daily level. Correlation is not evidence of shared unique visitors [5].
**What the aggregates cannot tell us.** The CSV contains no MAC addresses, address type, RSSI, unique IDs, or ground truth. MAC-randomization rate, penetration rate, unique-device count, dwell time, repeat visits, detection radius, and false-positive/false-negative rates cannot be measured from these aggregates. The 0.7 grid is a proxy for firmware processing, not a direct measurement of randomization or penetration. Any claim about those quantities must come from a calibration study.
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ If § 25 applies, prior consent is required, and a GDPR Art. 6 basis is not a su
If the data are personal data — as we argue they should be treated — a DPIA is very likely required. Continuous sensing of a publicly accessible inner-city area is the paradigm of “systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large scale” under Art. 35(3)(c) [13]. The Baden-Württemberg private-sector “Muss-Liste” explicitly lists offline tracking of customer movements in department stores/shopping centres and the non-intended use of device sensors or radio signals to determine location or movement over a substantial period (Nos. 2 and 10) [21]. As of November 2026, we are not aware of a public-sector positive list in Baden-Württemberg, so for the city the statutory criterion applies directly [40].
A public body acting in the performance of its public tasks cannot rely on Art. 6(1)(f); it needs Art. 6(1)(e) read with Art. 6(3) and a legal basis in Union or Member State law, or consent. A private association or company can use Art. 6(1)(f), but the balancing test is strict for public-space tracking that is invisible to most passers-by or conducted without meaningful notice, and German and Dutch DPAs have repeatedly found that the data subject’s interests prevail. The DPIA must assess necessity and alternatives: manual counts, light barriers, thermal/radar, on-device video counting, and sample-based surveys. If a less intrusive sensor can meet the accuracy requirement, the MAC-based design is hard to justify.
A public body acting in the performance of its public tasks cannot rely on Art. 6(1)(f); it needs Art. 6(1)(e) read with Art. 6(3) and a legal basis in Union or Member State law, or consent. A private association or company can use Art. 6(1)(f), but the balancing test is strict for public-space tracking that is invisible to most passers-by or conducted without meaningful notice, and German and Dutch DPAs have repeatedly found that the data subject’s interests prevail [19, 44]. The DPIA must assess necessity and alternatives: manual counts, light barriers, thermal/radar, on-device video counting, and sample-based surveys. If a less intrusive sensor can meet the accuracy requirement, the MAC-based design is hard to justify.
### 3.5 Enforcement is real but fact-specific
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ The good news is that the MAC-based design is not the only option. The alternati
| BLE MAC sniffing (baseline) | 5–12% of devices discoverable; 97%/92% count accuracy only when penetration is assumed 100% [10]; MAC randomization defeated for ~96% of Android phones [7] | €100–500 | Very high | None for public footfall; at most a short-lived calibrated index under a DPIA |
| Thermal/IR array | 89–95% doorway accuracy; degrades >30 °C, >7.5 m, groups [30] | €150–400/node | Low | Default at store entrances and narrow passages |
| mmWave radar | 96% presence, 69% count outdoor; −2.5% aggregate bias [28]; 3-month F1 84%, flow r 60–85% [29] | €300–700 | Low | Wide, weather-exposed crossings; presence/flow |
| Edge AI camera | 13.8% day / 29.8% night MAPE outdoors; 2–14% in official review [26] | €500–2,000; commercial €1,100–7,400 | High (DPIA) | 2–4 reference sites; pedestrian/cyclist classification |
| Edge AI camera | 13.8% day / 29.8% night MAPE outdoors [26] | €500–2,000; commercial €1,100–7,400 | High (DPIA) | 2–4 reference sites; pedestrian/cyclist classification |
| LiDAR | >97% disaggregate count; 1.6–4.3% 15-min error [27] | €1,000–8,000 | Low–moderate | 1–2 high-accuracy reference sites |
| Aggregated probe data | City-wide movement; coverage/bias unknown | Licence | High/commercial | City context, O/D, trends — not street-level truth |
| Manual counts | ~11% clicker error; 2-hour observer fatigue | €25–40/hour | Low | Quarterly calibration audits |
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ The PET analysis supports a layered design:
- **No cross-sensor/cross-day linkage.** No trajectories, dwell, or repeat-visit metrics.
- **Central DP at a trusted city aggregator.** Use a device-day privacy unit and contribution bounds (e.g. at most four sensor-bin pairs per device per day). Publish fixed daily/weekly coarse releases with a budget ledger.
- **Do not use local DP for sparse 15-min bins.** Local DP error scales as `1/(ε√n)` versus central `1/(εn)`, so it destroys utility at small-city scale. At ε = 1, a 14-device cell carries ±3 noise; a live 15-min public heatmap is not viable with a meaningful annual budget [23].
- **k-anonymity as a secondary check.** Four spatio-temporal points identify ~95% of people in a 1.5M-person mobility dataset; generalizing to k = 20 erases the local footfall signal [25]. Use k as a suppression rule, not the primary guarantee.
- **k-anonymity as a secondary check.** Four spatio-temporal points identify ~95% of people in a 1.5M-person mobility dataset [25]. In our judgement, generalizing to k = 20 would erase the local footfall signal. Use k as a suppression rule, not the primary guarantee.
- **No federated learning.** The pedestrian’s phone does not run our code, so FL is not applicable to passive BLE sniffing.
- **No non-DP synthetic data as an anonymity claim.** Non-DP synthetic data has no formal guarantee; use DP synthesis plus membership-inference/Anonymeter evaluation for public release, not for the live dashboard.
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ A 12-week pilot at six sites would be enough to estimate detection rates and cal
- **DPIA signed off**; legal basis documented;
- **cost within the pilot budget**.
A planning estimate is **€81k–161k** for year 1 and **€30k–50k** recurring, excluding backend and staff time. These are estimates, not quotations; the point is that the privacy-first stack is not free, but it is comparable to the legal and reputational cost of a contested MAC deployment.
A planning estimate is **€81k–161k** for year 1 including a **€20k–40k** backend allowance (**€61k–121k** excluding backend), and **€30k–50k** recurring, excluding staff time. These are estimates, not quotations; the point is that the privacy-first stack is not free, but it is comparable to the legal and reputational cost of a contested MAC deployment.
## 5. From sparse observations to decisions
@@ -313,10 +313,12 @@ The forecast core should be a global (panel) gradient-boosted model with quantil
The decision layer should be explicit about the objective and constraints. For staffing, the current heuristic is a reasonable first step:
```text
required staff = ceil(forecast / visitors-per-staff-hour × safety factor)
required staff = ceil(index × k / visitors-per-staff-hour × safety factor)
subject to minimum staff, shift length, opening hours, cost
```
`k` converts index units to visitors. It is **unvalidated**. Setting `k = 1` would treat one index unit as one visitor, which the measurement audit says is not justified; the plan is only as calibrated as `k`.
A production system could use a stochastic optimization or a robust optimization, but only when the utility and constraints are measured. The important move is to separate the predictor from the decision rule, propagate uncertainty, and evaluate **decision regret**: what would the plan have cost if the true footfall had been known? Without POS/queue/labor data, the paper can only compare to a flat schedule under stated assumptions. That is a heuristic comparison, not ROI.
### 5.6 Evaluation harness
@@ -338,7 +340,7 @@ This is standard MLOps hygiene [35], but it is often skipped in hackathon system
The PulseCast results are a useful anchor. The production 7-day model reaches 3.32/27.5/0.777; the day-ahead model 3.36/27.8/0.763; the seasonal naive 5.40/44.7/0.462. Per-sensor MAE ranges 2.26–5.83. The weather ablation is large; the holiday effect is small. The mission brief’s 3.36/27.8/0.779 was the quick baseline; the generated metrics are canonical: production 7-day 3.32/27.5/0.777, day-ahead 3.36/27.8/0.763. These results show that a global model can learn the daily/weekly shape and the weather sensitivity of the index. They do not show that the index is people, that the model generalizes across cities, or that the staffing plan improves outcomes. The honest reading is a **relative decision-support signal**.
The deployed system provides a second kind of evidence. The public app is at https://pulse.noelsabia.dev and the API at https://api-pulse.noelsabia.dev. The v1.1 images are 16.9 MB (api), 249 MB (web), and 952 MB (ml). Plan generation is 42.8 ms locally; the contract is under two seconds. In the 120-client Cloudflare k6 run, 120/120 SSE connections opened and closed with zero connection errors; p95 event latency was 1.03 s, p95 scenario latency 194 ms, presenter POST latency 82.69 ms, and 2,760 events were received over 4m53s. These numbers show that the delivery path works at the demo scale. They do not validate the measurement or the decision quality.
The deployed system provides a second kind of evidence. The public app is at https://pulse.noelsabia.dev and the API at https://api-pulse.noelsabia.dev. The v1.1 images are 16.9 MB (api), 249 MB (web), and 952 MB (ml). Plan generation is 19 ms cold; the contract is under two seconds. In the v1.1 120-client Cloudflare k6 run, 120/120 SSE connections opened and closed with zero connection errors; p95 event latency was 331 ms, p95 scenario latency 646 ms, presenter POST latency 49.60 ms, and the run lasted 4m57.9s. These numbers show that the delivery path works at the demo scale. They do not validate the measurement or the decision quality.
![Figure 4. Forecast versus actual.](figures/fig_forecast.png)
@@ -369,7 +371,7 @@ evaluation: L(y, x_hat) + R(a*, x_oracle) + privacy leakage
| Challenge | Class | What transfers | What must change | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pulse / staffing | Direct | Observation handling, local field, weather-aware forecast, staffing heuristic, deployment | Store-specific assumptions; calibration; outcome data | MAE 3.32 vs 5.40 naive |
| Pulse / advertising | Direct (local) | Same field and forecast; allocation objective replaces staffing | Ad inventory, cost, reach, dwell, conversion; city-wide sites for a real campaign | No result; analytical extension |
| Pulse / advertising | Analytical, not tested | Same field and forecast; allocation objective replaces staffing | Ad inventory, cost, reach, dwell, conversion; city-wide sites for a real campaign | No result; analytical extension |
| Waste routing | Conditional | Temporal forecast, clustering, configurable VRP, holiday/season context | Coordinates or zone map, capacity/type, fleet/depot/shift, overflow ground truth | No result; dataset documented |
| Sensor placement | Sibling | Observation model, spatial inference, error-vs-cost evaluation | Decision changes `H_t`; active learning/optimal design; no temporal forecast | Protocol only |
| LoRaWAN planning | Sibling | Link/coverage prediction, candidate-site ranking, address-weighted coverage | Packet-loss estimate, buildings/terrain, longer window, GPS calibration | No result; dataset documented |
@@ -380,7 +382,7 @@ evaluation: L(y, x_hat) + R(a*, x_oracle) + privacy leakage
### 6.4 Case studies
**Staffing (empirical).** The only end-to-end evidence-backed case. The path is: PAX index → weather-aware global forecast → staffing heuristic → plan. The next step is calibration and decision-level evaluation.
**Staffing (empirical).** The only evidence-backed forecast; the decision layer is unevaluated. The path is: PAX index → weather-aware global forecast → staffing heuristic → plan. The next step is calibration and decision-level evaluation.
**Advertising (analytical extension).** The same field and forecast can rank the eight locations and time windows by expected exposure. This is a decision-layer substitution, not a new sensing study. It cannot support city-wide ad planning or effectiveness claims without more sites and ad-economics data.
@@ -428,7 +430,7 @@ A paper that reports these tests, even if some fail, is stronger than one that a
### 7.4 System
Measured on v1.1: 120/120 SSE connections opened and closed, zero connection errors, p95 event latency 1.03 s, p95 scenario latency 194 ms, presenter POST 82.69 ms, 2,760 events over 4m53s; plan generation 42.8 ms locally (contract < 2 s); images 16.9 MB (api), 249 MB (web), 952 MB (ml). Remaining checks:
Measured on v1.1: 120/120 SSE connections opened and closed, zero connection errors, p95 event latency 331 ms, p95 scenario latency 646 ms, presenter POST 49.60 ms, over 4m57.9s; plan generation 19 ms cold (contract < 2 s); images 16.9 MB (api), 249 MB (web), 952 MB (ml). Remaining checks:
- cold deployment time `[TODO]`;
- failure drills: FastAPI down, Open-Meteo down, tunnel down, pod restart;
@@ -453,7 +455,7 @@ Subsampling and factor sensitivity are the most informative for the paper’s th
The main limitation is the measurement, not the model. The sensor samples about 10 seconds out of every 15 minutes, counts only randomized BLE addresses, truncates the address to 16 bits, multiplies by a fixed 0.7 factor, and cannot distinguish people from devices. The published value is a useful relative index, but it is not a census and not a 15-minute count. Device penetration is unknown. A single global factor cannot absorb device ownership, multiple devices per person, Bluetooth settings, and the short scan window.
Coverage is also a limitation. Eight sensors in a 580 m × 280 m cluster cannot support a city-wide heatmap or a store-location recommender. Only 28.2% of 15-minute slots have all eight sensors, and gaps are not random. The 28-day holdout is short, the weather is observed rather than forecast, and there is no event log, POS data, or labor-cost data. The deployment has one API replica, no SSO, no HA, and no live sensor ingestion. The 15-minute and 1-hour horizons are replay/nowcast, not a live feed.
Coverage is also a limitation. Eight sensors in a 580 m × 280 m cluster cannot support a city-wide heatmap or a store-location recommender. In the 18 June coverage panel, only 28.2% of 15-minute slots have all eight sensors, and gaps are not random. The 28-day holdout is short, the weather is observed rather than forecast, and there is no event log, POS data, or labor-cost data. The deployment has one API replica, no SSO, no HA, and no live sensor ingestion. The 15-minute and 1-hour horizons are replay/nowcast, not a live feed.
The privacy claim also needs care. The application stores no MAC addresses, and only aggregate counts leave the sensor. But the sensing stage still processes link-layer identifiers at the edge; the 16-bit ID is a pseudonymous dedup key, not a cryptographic hash; and passive MAC sensing in public space has a contested legal basis in Germany. The “privacy-preserving” label is an architectural claim, not a formal guarantee. A production deployment would need a DPIA, a documented legal basis, data minimization, retention limits, and, where possible, a sensor that does not extract MAC addresses at all.
@@ -506,13 +508,13 @@ AI tools were used for drafting and editing. The authors checked each number and
[5] PulseCast data-quality analysis. `paper/research/07-data-quality.md`, 2026.
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[6] Bluetooth SIG. “Enhancing device privacy and energy efficiency with Bluetooth Randomized RPA Updates,” 14 May 2025. https://www.bluetooth.com/blog/enhancing-device-privacy-and-energy-efficiency-with-bluetooth-randomized-rpa-updates/
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[8] J. K. Becker, D. Li, and D. Starobinski. “Tracking anonymized Bluetooth devices.” *Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies* 2019(3):50–65. DOI: 10.2478/popets-2019-0036.
[9] M. Vanhoef, C. Matte, M. Cunche, L. S. Cardoso, and F. Piessens. “Why MAC address randomization is not enough: An analysis of Wi-Fi network discovery mechanisms.” *AsiaCCS 2016*, 413–424. DOI: 10.1145/2897845.2897860.
[9] M. Vanhoef, C. Matte, M. Cunche, L. S. Cardoso, and F. Piessens. “Why MAC address randomization is not enough: An analysis of Wi-Fi network discovery mechanisms.” *AsiaCCS 2016*, 413–424. DOI: 10.1145/2897845.2897883.
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[18] Conseil d’État. *JCDecaux France*, no. 393714, 8 February 2017. https://www.conseil-etat.fr/fr/arianeweb/CE/decision/2017-02-08/393714
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[19] Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens. *Wifi and bluetooth*. https://www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en/themes/internet-and-smart-devices/wifi-and-bluetooth
[36] Rechtbank Overijssel. *Enschede / Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens*, ECLI:NL:RBOVE:2024:594, 2 February 2024.
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[20] Telekommunikation-Digitale-Dienste-Datenschutz-Gesetz (TDDDG), § 25. https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ttdsg/__25.html
[21] LfDI Baden-Württemberg. *Muss-Liste* nach Art. 35 Abs. 4 DS-GVO, Nos. 2 and 10. https://www.baden-wuerttemberg.datenschutz.de/
[21] LfDI Baden-Württemberg. *Muss-Liste* nach Art. 35 Abs. 4 DS-GVO, Nos. 2 and 10. https://www.baden-wuerttemberg.datenschutz.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Liste-von-Verarbeitungsvorg%C3%A4ngen-nach-Art.-35-Abs.-4-DS-GVO-LfDI-BW.pdf
[22] ULD Schleswig-Holstein. *Tätigkeitsbericht 2019*, §5.4.8. https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/tb/tb37/uld-37-taetigkeitsbericht-2019.pdf
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[42] Der Hamburgische Beauftragte für Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit (HmbBfDI). *25. Tätigkeitsbericht Datenschutz 2014/2015*, §V.9. https://datenschutz-hamburg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/HmbBfDI/Datenschutz/Taetigkeitsberichte_Datenschutz/Taetigkeitsberichte_PDF/25.TB_2014-2015.pdf
[43] Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens. *Boete wifitracking Enschede*, 29 April 2021, updated 29 July 2026. https://www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/documenten/boete-wifitracking-enschede
[44] Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens. *Legal bases for WiFi tracking and Bluetooth tracking*. https://www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en/themes/internet-and-smart-devices/wifi-and-bluetooth/legal-bases-for-wifi-tracking-and-bluetooth-tracking