Add PulseCast paper drafts, figures, references, and research notes
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# BLE PAX counters: how they count, how they fail, and what can be validated
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**Research note 01 — PulseCast / Future City Hackathon 2026**
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Prepared: 14 November 2026
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Scope: passive BLE scanning for pedestrian counting; the 8-sensor Heilbronn network; implications for a privacy-first alternative.
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**Confidence labels** used throughout:
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| Label | Meaning |
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|---|---|
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| **[Established]** | Replicated peer-reviewed finding or protocol fact. |
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| **[Primary-code]** | Verified directly in the public Code for Heilbronn firmware / commit. |
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| **[Forensic]** | Derived from the delivered CSV; reproducible with the code in Appendix A. |
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| **[Peer-reviewed]** | Published in a peer-reviewed venue; single study unless stated. |
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| **[Gray]** | Practitioner, government, vendor or thesis source; useful but not peer-reviewed. |
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| **[Inference]** | Reasoned from evidence; not directly measured. |
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| **[Uncertain]** | Conflicting or missing evidence. |
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> **The single most important correction.** The PulseCast series is **not** a 15-minute count of people, and **not** a 15-minute aggregate of device counts. In the public Code for Heilbronn firmware, each sensor wakes every 900 s, scans BLE for about **10 s**, counts distinct locally-administered advertising addresses in that window, multiplies the integer by **0.7**, and transmits **one value**. The 15-minute cadence is the *sampling interval*, not the integration window. Every downstream claim about "people per 15 minutes" inherits this.
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>
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> **Caveat on firmware versions.** The 2026 production window is exactly consistent with the public 2026 firmware: 100% of its 83,156 published values are exact multiples of 0.7. The older `density-01` hardware produced integer values from October 2025 to March 2026, then switched to multiples of 0.7 in April 2026 — a firmware/calibration break. The exact scan duration of the 2025 build is not public. The direction of every argument below is unchanged whether the scan was 10 s or the configured 30 s.
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---
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## Executive summary
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1. **The unit is a short snapshot, not a 15-minute count.** The public firmware scans for ≈10 s every 900 s — a temporal duty cycle of ≈1.1% (at most 3.3% if the configured 30 s were honoured). A passer-by is detected only if their dwell overlaps the scan window; a person who lingers is counted again in every 15-minute bin. The metric therefore conflates **flow** (people passing) with **dwell** (people staying), and is not a screenline crossing count. **[Primary-code]**
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2. **The published value is `0.7 × U`, where `U` is an integer count of distinct locally-administered BLE addresses in one scan.** In the 8-sensor production window (2026-06-12 → 2026-11-07), **100% of 83,156 values are exact multiples of 0.7**; the reconstructed `U` ranges 0–418, median 12, p95 71, p99 114, with 2.7% zeros. The older `density-01` series is integer-valued until 2026-03, then switches to 0.7 — evidence of a firmware/calibration change, not a change in footfall. **[Forensic]**
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3. **A single scalar cannot correct three different biases.** The factor 0.7 would have to absorb (i) the share of people carrying any detectable advertising device (`d < 1`), (ii) the mean number of distinct advertising devices per carrier (`m > 1`), and (iii) the probability that a device advertises within the short scan (`q < 1`). The true relationship is `y/P = 0.7 · d · m · q`. No calibration data are published, and the default is a provisioning fallback, not a validated penetration correction. **[Primary-code] [Inference]**
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4. **MAC randomization does not inflate the count *within* a 10-s scan, but it destroys everything across scans.** RPA rotation is 900 s by default (range 1–3600 s), and measured address lifetimes are ~15–45 min. Within a 10-s window, rotation is rare; across 15-minute bins, the sensor's dedup bitmap is reset at every wake, so the same person is counted again. Randomization mainly prevents **cross-sensor deduplication, dwell estimation and re-identification**, not within-scan counting. **[Established] [Primary-code]**
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5. **The counter silently excludes public-address devices and silently includes non-phone gadgets.** The firmware counts only addresses with the locally-administered bit set. A phone or wearable using a public/static address is invisible; a smart TV, beacon, earbud case or car head-unit with a random address is counted. Vendor OUI cannot be used to separate phones from infrastructure because the counted addresses are random. **[Primary-code] [Inference]**
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6. **The literature does not support absolute counts from BLE alone.** Classic Bluetooth discoverability was 2–7% of pedestrians; modern BLE representativity in transit settings was 14–49%, with strong age bias. Absolute indoor count errors range from MAE 1.4–5.5 people (MAPE 24–91%, worst in low occupancy), and a BLE-only ridership model can have **negative R²** until fused with other data. The consistent finding is: **relative trends yes, absolute levels no — unless calibrated against ground truth.** **[Peer-reviewed] [Gray]**
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7. **Environmental failure modes are large relative to the signal.** Outdoor BLE range was 20–25 m for two phones in a vineyard test near Heilbronn; a human body adds 10–20 dB path loss (10 dB back-shadowing, 3 dB side at 3 m); Wi-Fi coexistence cut BLE throughput by ~41% in a shielded-chamber experiment; and LoRaWAN adds 1% duty-cycle constraints and real packet loss. Crowding adds collisions and queue drops. **[Peer-reviewed] [Gray]**
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8. **The 15-minute series is heterogeneous and incomplete.** Seven sensors have a median gap of 15.3–15.4 min; `density-01` runs at 16.1 min. For the seven named sensors, 2.6–16.2% of intervals exceed 16 min; `density-01` is at a 16.1-min median, so 99.8% of its intervals exceed 16 min. Outages reach ~2.5 h. Missingness is caused by LoRaWAN joins, transmission failures and power, and is not a random sample of footfall. **[Forensic]**
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9. **The privacy claim is a design claim, not a property of the data.** The current firmware reduces addresses to a 16-bit ID (the last two bytes; the blog calls this "hashing"), resets every wake, and transmits only counts — genuine data minimisation. But the sensing is still involuntary, the sensor is capable of raw capture, and the legal status of MAC-based counting in Germany is contested: one state DPA concluded that WLAN tracking for visitor counting was unlawful, and the DSK treats reading MAC addresses as touching terminal-equipment privacy. "Privacy-preserving" must be argued from architecture and governance, not asserted. **[Gray] [Uncertain]**
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10. **Implication for PulseCast.** Keep the forecaster, change the claim. Treat the series as a **relative activity index in device-address units**, validate it against manual counts, publish the unit and the factor, propagate calibration uncertainty into staffing decisions, and never present device counts as people. The privacy-first alternative must beat *this* sampling design — not a strawman — on cost, coverage, accuracy and privacy.
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---
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## 1. How BLE PAX counting works
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### 1.1 Radio basics
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BLE operates in the 2.4 GHz ISM band, divided into 40 channels of 2 MHz. Three channels are reserved for advertising: **37 (2402 MHz), 38 (2426 MHz), 39 (2480 MHz)**. Legacy advertising transmits the same payload on up to three of these channels, one at a time, with a random delay of 0–10 ms per advertising event; the advertising interval is configurable from 20 ms to 10.24 s. A passive scanner tunes to the advertising channels, reports the advertiser's 48-bit address and an RSSI value, and never needs to connect. [1][3]
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Two consequences matter for counting:
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- **The address is self-asserted.** Before a connection is authenticated, the advertising address is whatever the device chooses. It can be public, random static, resolvable private (RPA) or non-resolvable private (NRPA). A listener cannot tell whether two addresses belong to the same physical device, or whether one device is impersonating another. [1][4]
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- **RSSI is a noisy proxy for proximity, not distance.** It has 1 dB resolution and is affected by orientation, body shadowing, multipath and channel. Using it as a hard range gate creates a detection zone that is neither circular nor stable. [20][21]
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### 1.2 The PulseCast / Code for Heilbronn implementation
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The Heilbronn network is maintained by Code for Heilbronn (CFHN). Their public blog and repository identify the hardware and firmware; the Fraunhofer IAO/KODIS project page documents the wider Heilbronn and Schwäbisch Hall deployment. [8]
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- **Hardware:** Heltec Wireless Paper / Heltec WiFi LoRa 32 V3 — ESP32-S3, SX1262 LoRa transceiver, BLE 4.2. [6][7]
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- **Firmware:** PlatformIO project `sensor-pax`, built on a vendored `paxlib` derived from the Deutsche Bahn `libpax` / ESP32-Paxcounter lineage. BLE only; Wi-Fi counting is compiled out. [7]
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- **Counting rule:** `mac_add()` accepts an advertising report only if the **locally administered bit** (`paddr[0] & 0b10`) is set; it then uses the **last two bytes** of the address as a 16-bit ID in a bitmap. New bit → increment; existing bit → ignore. The bitmap is cleared on every boot. [7] The blog calls this "hashing"; the code does **not** hash — it truncates the address to its low 16 bits. That is a dedup key, not a cryptographic hash, and it leaks the low bits of the address.
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- **Scan parameters:** passive scan; `BLESCANWINDOW = 80 ms`, `BLESCANINTERVAL = 80 ms` → 100% duty cycle *during the scan*; RSSI threshold `-80 dBm`; report interval **10 s**; counter mode **1 (cumulative)**. [7]
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- **Wake cycle:** `sleep_sec` default **900 s**; the node wakes, scans, waits for the first 10-s report callback, stops the scan, sends one LoRaWAN uplink, and deep-sleeps. [7]
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- **Payload:** `paxCount * factor`, with `factor` default **0.7** in `provision.h`; the value is formatted with four decimals. [7]
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A code-level trace of one cycle:
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```
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wake (deep-sleep reset)
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└─ paxSetup(): blescantime=30, window=80ms, interval=80ms, RSSI≥−80 dBm
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libpax_counter_init(callback, count, 10 s, mode=1)
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└─ start_BLE_scan(): passive; duplicate filter disabled
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└─ first 10-s timer callback → new_data_available = true
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└─ paxStop(); paxCount = count_from_libpax.pax
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└─ payload = sprintf("%s,0,%.4f,1,%.4f", id, paxCount * cfg.factor, battery)
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└─ LoRaWAN TX; deep sleep 900 s
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```
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**Why ≈10 s, not 30 s.** `paxSetup()` sets `configuration.blescantime = 30`, but the vendored `start_BLE_scan()` accepts `blescantime` and never uses it: it only programs scan window and interval, then starts scanning. The only stop condition is `main.cpp`'s wait for `new_data_available`, which is set by the 10-s report callback. The effective scan is therefore **≈10 s** (plus up to 100 ms of loop delay). If a deployed build implemented `blescantime` as a hard stop, the scan would be 30 s and the duty cycle 3.3%; the argument below is unchanged in direction. **[Primary-code, high confidence for the public commit; moderate confidence for the deployed 2025 binary]**
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**Why the bitmap reset matters.** With `counter_mode = 1`, `report()` does *not* reset the bitmap. But each wake is a cold boot from deep sleep, so the bitmap starts empty anyway. The dedup window is therefore **one scan**, not one hour and not one day. The 2025 blog says addresses are "hashed and stored for at most one hour" — that may describe an earlier firmware or a backend design; the public 2026 firmware does not implement a one-hour store. This is an open question (Section 7). [6][7]
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### 1.3 What one published value means
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Let:
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- `U` = number of distinct 16-bit IDs derived from locally-administered advertising addresses observed during one ≈10 s scan;
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- `f` = configured multiplier (default 0.7);
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- `y` = published "density" value.
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Then:
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```
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y = f · U
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```
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`U` is **not** the number of people in the area, the number of devices in the area, the number of devices passing in 15 minutes, or the number of 15-minute unique visitors. It is a **short-window count of distinct randomized advertising addresses**, scaled by a constant.
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If a person carries `m` advertising devices, is detectable with probability `d` (device ownership × Bluetooth state × advertising state), and their devices advertise within the scan with probability `q`, then the expected relationship to the true number of people present `P` is:
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```
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E[y] = f · d · m · q · P
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```
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The factor `f = 0.7` can only be a correct people-per-device conversion if `d · m · q = 1/0.7 ≈ 1.43`. That is possible if `d` is high and `m ≈ 1.4`, but it is not measured. Assuming `q ≈ 1` (devices in range for the full scan), if `d = 0.5` and `m = 1.4`, `y/P ≈ 0.49` — a 2× undercount. If `d = 0.9` and `m = 1.2`, `y/P ≈ 0.76` — a 24% undercount. The scale is therefore **arbitrary without ground truth**, and a single global factor cannot track seasonal, demographic or device-mix changes. **[Inference]**
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### 1.4 Forensic evidence from the delivered CSV
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The delivered file `data/raw/schwarz-pax.csv` contains 192,464 rows; 96,232 are `densityData`. The 8-sensor production window (2026-06-12 → 2026-11-07) contains **83,156 density rows** across eight sensor names. Every one of those values is an exact multiple of 0.7:
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| Sensor (production window) | Rows | Values exact multiples of 0.7 | Reconstructed `U`: median | p95 | max | `U = 0` |
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|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
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| hn-stadtgalerie-01 | 8,982 | 100% | 12 | 96 | 196 | 0.0% |
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| hn-neckarufer-01 | 9,527 | 100% | 17 | 88 | 365 | 0.1% |
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| hn-marahaus-01 | 9,254 | 100% | 13 | 55 | 278 | 0.0% |
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| hn-hagenbuchersee-02 | 10,099 | 100% | 16 | 92 | 287 | 0.7% |
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| hn-hagenbuchersee-01 | 12,345 | 100% | 9 | 71 | 418 | 5.6% |
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| hn-soleo-01 | 10,327 | 100% | 12 | 40 | 159 | 4.8% |
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| hn-goetzentuem-01 | 9,952 | 100% | 12 | 42 | 301 | 3.0% |
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| density-01 (f8c19730) | 12,670 | 100% | 11 | 40 | 90 | 5.5% |
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| **All eight** | **83,156** | **100%** | **12** | **71** | **418** | **2.7%** |
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**Interpretation.** A continuous-valued physical series would not land on exact multiples of 0.7 in 83,156 consecutive observations. The only plausible explanation is that the published value is `round(0.7 × integer, 4)`. The reconstructed `U` is an integer count of distinct randomized addresses in a scan. This is a **direct, data-internal confirmation** of the firmware reading. **[Forensic]**
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**The calibration break.** The older `density-01` hardware (`863f75b0`, 2025-10-16 → 2026-03-12) is **100% integer-valued** and has a mean of 1.7–5.5 depending on month. The replacement hardware (`f8c19730`, 2026-04-16 → 2026-11-07) is **100% multiples of 0.7** and has a mean of 8.3–11.6 across full months. The series therefore splices two instrument regimes: an integer-count firmware and a 0.7-scaled firmware. Any model that uses the 13-month `density-01` history across the break is fitting a calibration change, not footfall. **[Forensic]**
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**What this does not prove.** The data cannot tell us the deployed scan duration, the exact `factor` value per sensor (only that 0.7 appears throughout the delivered 2026 production data), whether the 2025 firmware used a one-hour dedup window, or whether the sensors were re-provisioned. Those are open questions (Section 7).
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### 1.5 Dedup, dwell time and the 15-minute cadence
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A PAX counter *can* estimate dwell by tracking a persistent ID across consecutive scans and recording first/last seen. This one does not:
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- **Within a scan**, the bitmap deduplicates by a 16-bit ID taken from the last two address bytes. Two devices sharing those bytes collide (expected collisions ≈ `U(U−1)/(2·65536)`; negligible at `U = 12`, ~1.3 at `U = 418`). A device that changes only its low bytes is counted as new.
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- **Across scans**, the bitmap is gone. There is no first/last-seen timestamp in the payload. The only data that leave the sensor are `U`, `U × 0.7` and battery voltage.
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- **Dwell resolution** would be at best 15 min even if IDs persisted, and RPA rotation (~15 min default) caps observable track length. Any dwell estimate beyond ~15 min is structurally impossible with this design.
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What repeated counts *can* proxy is **aggregate persistence**: a person who stays for an hour is counted in up to four bins, while a passer-by is counted with probability ≈ `(scan + dwell)/900`. But this is confounded with arrival rate and with the number of devices per person, and cannot be inverted without strong assumptions. **Do not claim dwell from this data.** **[Primary-code] [Inference]**
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### 1.6 Transport, aggregation and missingness
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- **One row per uplink.** The evidence is consistent with one row per uplink; the 15-minute series is a sequence of point samples, not an average or sum over the interval.
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- **Cadence is sensor-specific.** Seven sensors have a median gap of 15.3–15.4 min; `density-01` has 16.1 min. For the seven named sensors, 2.6–16.2% of intervals exceed 16 min; `density-01` runs at a 16.1-min median, so 99.8% of its intervals exceed 16 min. Long outages reach ~2.5 h. The pooled share of >16-min gaps is 23.7%, inflated by `density-01`'s cadence.
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- **Missingness is not random.** A failed LoRaWAN join, a failed TX, a battery brownout or a sensor reboot removes a row. The application sends once and sleeps; if the uplink fails, the count is not queued for a later wake. Missing rows are therefore **missing observations**, not zeros, and may correlate with weather, power and site conditions. **[Primary-code] [Forensic]**
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- **LoRaWAN constraints.** EU868 imposes a 1% duty cycle on the default sub-band; a 51-byte payload at SF7–SF12 has a time-on-air from tens of milliseconds to >2 s. A 15-minute uplink is well within the duty cycle, but join storms, downlinks and retransmissions can still fail. In a Brno urban measurement, the cumulative packet delivery ratio was 83%, and 50% of nodes within 1–2 km of a gateway experienced at least one packet loss. [23] **[Peer-reviewed]**
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---
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## 2. MAC address randomization
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### 2.1 Address taxonomy
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| Type | Top two bits | Lifetime | Who can resolve it | Relevance to counting |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| Public | — (OUI-assigned) | Permanent | Anyone; OUI identifies vendor | **Excluded** by the CFHN LAA filter; would allow vendor/type filtering if counted |
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| Random static | `11` | Until power cycle | Anyone; no resolution | Counted if the LAA bit is set; stable within a session |
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| Resolvable private (RPA) | `10` | 900 s default; 1–3600 s configurable | Only holders of the IRK | Counted; rotates; can be tracked via payload side channels |
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| Non-resolvable private (NRPA) | `00` | Implementation-defined | No one | Counted; rotates; used by some Apple advertising |
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The locally-administered bit is set for all random types. That is why the CFHN filter counts them and excludes public addresses. [1][4]
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### 2.2 Rotation intervals
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| Source | Claim | Confidence |
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|---|---|---|
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| Bluetooth Core Spec / SIG | RPA timeout default **900 s**; configurable 1–3600 s; new "Randomized RPA Updates" default range 480–900 s | **[Established]** [2] |
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| Apple Platform Security | iOS/iPadOS use address randomization; no interval stated | **[Established]** [4] |
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| Android AOSP | Controller/host support for RPA generation and resolution; no interval stated | **[Established]** [5] |
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| Becker et al. 2019 (measurement) | Address lifetime: Windows 10 ~16 min; macOS/iOS ~20 min; Android 15–45 min; Fitbit Charge static (never rotates) | **[Peer-reviewed]** [17] |
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Wi-Fi private-address rotation (per-network, days-to-weeks) is a **separate mechanism**; do not transfer its intervals to BLE. The 900 s RPA default and the 900 s wake cycle are the same order of magnitude, so a device can rotate its BLE address between consecutive bins while the person stays in place. Because the counter resets at every wake, this does **not** double-count within a bin; it mainly makes cross-bin and cross-sensor linkage impossible.
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### 2.3 Effect on unique counts, dwell and re-identification
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| Quantity | Effect of randomization | Why |
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|---|---|---|
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| Within-scan unique count | **Little inflation** | Rotation interval (15–45 min) ≫ scan (10 s); most devices keep one address per scan |
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| Across-bin count | **No dedup possible** | Bitmap resets each wake; a lingerer is counted again; rotation is irrelevant |
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| Dwell time | **Not measurable** | No first/last-seen timestamp; rotation caps track length at ~15 min |
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| Cross-sensor re-identification | **Prevented at the address level** | Different sensors see different addresses; no shared ID |
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| Privacy | **Improved, not solved** | RPA can be tracked via payload carry-over (Becker: Apple 53 min, Windows 11.2 h); static-address accessories are permanent [17] |
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**The counterintuitive result:** MAC randomization is often blamed for *inflating* PAX counts. In this design, it does not inflate the within-scan count; the dominant overcount is **repeated counting of the same lingering person across 15-minute bins**, and the dominant undercount is **short dwell inside a 10-s scan**. Randomization mainly destroys the ability to *correct* either bias. This is a more precise and more damaging critique than "random MACs inflate counts." **[Primary-code] [Inference]**
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### 2.4 Re-identification beyond rotation
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Randomization is not anonymity. Becker, Li and Starobinski showed that BLE advertising payloads contain identifying tokens that change asynchronously with the address; an "address-carryover" algorithm tracked:
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- Windows 10 devices for up to **11.2 h** across 12 address randomizations;
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- Apple devices for up to **53 min** across five randomizations;
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- a Fitbit Charge indefinitely, because its address never changed.
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They also found an iOS side channel that reveals user activity, and a Microsoft Surface pen that leaks an identifier. Android devices in their sample did not advertise suitable tokens, but that is an implementation detail, not a guarantee. [17] **[Peer-reviewed]**
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For PulseCast, the implication is architectural: even if the current firmware transmits only counts, the **sensor is capable of capturing raw addresses**, and BLE advertising in general has been used for re-identification research. A privacy claim must therefore cover firmware integrity, update channels, physical access and retention — not only the payload.
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### 2.5 Spoofing, cloning, static MACs and vendor OUI
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- **Spoofing is trivial.** An ESP32 or a phone can advertise arbitrary addresses at arbitrary intervals. A single attacker can generate hundreds of distinct 16-bit IDs in a 10-s window, inflating a sensor's count without any real footfall. There is no authentication before connection. [1] **[Established]**
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- **Cloning is trivial.** Copying a known address produces a duplicate; the 16-bit ID makes collisions easy to construct deliberately.
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- **Static-address devices are invisible.** The LAA filter excludes public addresses and any random-static device whose address happens to have the LAA bit clear. A Fitbit with a static random address is counted (LAA set), but a public-address phone is not. The LAA bit is **not** the same as the Bluetooth random-address type bits: the spec fixes the two most significant bits, not the LAA bit. If an OS does not set LAA=1 for its random addresses, the filter drops them. This is an unquantified undercount and a candidate explanation for the low raw counts. **[Inference] [Uncertain]**
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- **Vendor OUI is unusable here.** OUI is only meaningful for public addresses. Because the counter discards public addresses, it cannot distinguish a phone from a TV, a beacon, a car head-unit or a smart meter. The count is "locally-administered BLE advertisers," not "people."
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- **Non-device sources.** BLE is used by earbuds, watches, fitness trackers, smart home devices, beacons, cars, scooters and point-of-sale terminals. A shopping street at 19:00 contains many such devices, and their density is not proportional to pedestrian flow.
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### 2.6 The privacy posture of the current design
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The CFHN design is genuinely data-minimising:
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- Addresses are reduced to a 16-bit ID at the edge; only that ID is kept, and only for one scan.
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- Only counts leave the sensor; no raw addresses are transmitted.
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- The blog explicitly says addresses are hashed and stored for at most one hour. [6] The public 2026 code truncates rather than hashes, and keeps the ID only for one scan; the one-hour claim should be treated as unverified for the deployed firmware.
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But:
|
||||
|
||||
- The sensing is **passive and involuntary**. A bystander cannot consent, cannot see the sensor, and cannot opt out except by disabling Bluetooth.
|
||||
- The sensor is **capable of raw capture**; the privacy guarantee depends on firmware behaviour that a third party cannot verify from the data.
|
||||
- The 16-bit ID is **not a cryptographic anonymity guarantee**. It is a truncation used as a dedup key: it leaks the low 16 bits of the address, makes collisions easy to construct, and provides no cryptographic protection.
|
||||
- German data protection authorities have treated MAC-based visitor counting sceptically. The Schleswig-Holstein DPA's 2019 activity report concluded that WLAN tracking for visitor counting was unlawful; the DSK's 2022 guidance says that reading MAC addresses can fall under §25 TDDDG's consent requirement for terminal-equipment access. The legal position is contested and fact-specific, not settled. [33][34] **[Gray] [Uncertain]**
|
||||
|
||||
The honest formulation for the paper: **"The current firmware minimises data, but the modality is privacy-invasive by design: it observes identifiers that people did not choose to broadcast to the operator, and its privacy properties depend on unverifiable edge behaviour."** That is defensible; "the sensors are privacy-preserving" is not.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Failure modes
|
||||
|
||||
The table separates mechanisms that **under-count** from those that **over-count** and those that **change the composition** of the count. Directions are for the current design; some are context-dependent.
|
||||
|
||||
| # | Mechanism | Direction | Magnitude / evidence | Confidence |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 1 | **Temporal sampling**: ≈10 s scan every 900 s (1.1% duty cycle) | Under-count of passers-by; over-count of lingerers across bins | A person with 30 s dwell has ≈(10+30)/900 ≈ 4.4% chance of overlapping a scan; a 1 h lingerer is counted up to 4 times | **[Primary-code] [Inference]** |
|
||||
| 2 | **Construct mismatch**: circular presence zone, no direction | Unknown; conflates flow and dwell | A PAX scan counts devices present during the window, not screenline crossings; NCHRP's guidance is built around screenline counts | **[Established]** [24] |
|
||||
| 3 | **Detection range / RSSI gate** | Under-count | 20–25 m outdoors for two phones in a vineyard test near Heilbronn; RSSI threshold −80 dBm; range varies with antenna, height, enclosure | **[Gray]** [9] |
|
||||
| 4 | **Body shadowing / orientation** | Under-count, composition bias | +10 dB path loss for one body, +15 dB for two (indoor); 10 dB back vs 3 dB side at 3 m | **[Peer-reviewed]** [20][21] |
|
||||
| 5 | **Crowding / collisions / queue drops** | Under-count at high density | HCI advertising reports can be dropped when the 30-deep queue fills; dense advertising increases collisions; no drop counter in the vendored build | **[Primary-code] [Inference]** |
|
||||
| 6 | **Wi-Fi coexistence** | Under-count | BLE throughput −41% with Wi-Fi channel 6 active; PER 2–9% (up to 12%) in a shielded chamber | **[Gray]** [22] |
|
||||
| 7 | **Only locally-administered addresses** | Under-count of public-address and LAA-clear devices; over-count of non-phone random devices | Public-address phones/wearables invisible; TVs, beacons, earbuds counted; LAA bit is not the random-address type bits | **[Primary-code] [Inference]** |
|
||||
| 8 | **16-bit ID collisions** | Under-count | ≈`U(U−1)/(2·65536)`; negligible at median, ~1.3 collisions at U=418 | **[Primary-code] [Inference]** |
|
||||
| 9 | **Device multiplicity** | Over-count | One person may carry phone + watch + earbuds; wearables can outnumber discoverable phones; exact ratio unknown for Heilbronn | **[Peer-reviewed]** [15] **[Uncertain]** |
|
||||
| 10 | **Demographic / behavioural bias** | Composition bias | Smartphone use 86% of 16+ in Germany but 53% of 65+; BLE representativity fell when elderly dominated; locked iPhones were not detected in the KODIS test | **[Official statistics]** [31][32] **[Gray]** [9][15] |
|
||||
| 11 | **LoRaWAN loss / join failure** | Missing rows (not zeros) | 2.6–16.2% of intervals >16 min for the seven named sensors; `density-01` at 16.1 min; outages up to ~2.5 h; Brno urban PDR 83% | **[Forensic] [Peer-reviewed]** [23] |
|
||||
| 12 | **Clock / time sync** | Binning / phase error | Payload has no device timestamp; server receive time is used. Sleep scheduling and network latency shift the sampling phase; clock drift changes it over time | **[Primary-code] [Uncertain]** |
|
||||
| 13 | **Placement / enclosure / weather** | Unknown, site-specific | Height, orientation, glass, metal, condensation, snow; no placement metadata in the CSV | **[Inference]** |
|
||||
| 14 | **Firmware / calibration change** | Level shift | `density-01` switches from integer counts to 0.7-scaled values in April 2026; mean jumps from ~5.5 to ~9.5 | **[Forensic]** |
|
||||
| 15 | **Spoofing / adversarial inflation** | Over-count | Trivial to advertise hundreds to thousands of addresses; no auth | **[Established]** [1] |
|
||||
| 16 | **Cross-sensor double counting** | Over-count | No shared ID across sensors; overlapping coverage would count the same device twice; 580 m cluster makes overlap limited but not zero | **[Primary-code] [Inference]** |
|
||||
|
||||
**The dominant three.** For a paper, do not present a flat list. Argue that three mechanisms dominate and are not fixable by calibration:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Temporal sampling (1.1%)** — the sensor sees a tiny, phase-random slice of each 15-minute interval. This is a design property, not noise.
|
||||
2. **Construct mismatch (presence vs flow)** — the count is proportional to `flow × dwell`, so a street with cafés and a street with commuters can produce the same count at different footfall.
|
||||
3. **Unknown penetration × multiplicity** — `d` and `m` move in opposite directions and are not measured. A single constant cannot track them across seasons, weather, events and demographics.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Evidence table
|
||||
|
||||
Peer-reviewed and primary sources first; gray literature is marked.
|
||||
|
||||
| Study / source | Setting | Method | Key finding | Citation |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Nicolai & Kenn (2007) | Bremen (DE) and San Francisco (US) | Manual gate counts + Bluetooth inquiry | 2.3% (Bremen) and 6.2% (SF) of people had discoverable Bluetooth; R² 0.85–0.91 in Bremen; Bath study (O'Neill et al., as reported) ~7%, R² 0.89 | [10] |
|
||||
| Malinovskiy, Saunier & Wang (2012) | Montreal and Seattle | Static Bluetooth sensors + manual counts | 5% (Montreal) and 2.25% (Seattle) sample rates; trends and dwell (>60 s) usable; low-volume scenarios insufficient | [11] |
|
||||
| Weppner & Lukowicz (2013) | Kaiserslautern public viewing | Phone-based Bluetooth scans | >75% accuracy on 7 crowd-density classes using relative features; only 0.2% of people carried a scanning phone | [12] |
|
||||
| Kurkcu & Ozbay (2017) | NYU transit terminal | 6 Wi-Fi/Bluetooth sensors, 2 months | If penetration is known, counts/flows/wait times can be accurate; reported Bluetooth detection as low as 2%; expansion depends on known penetration | [13] |
|
||||
| Angel et al. (2024) | Tel Aviv, 65 detectors | Calibration + speed classification | 89% pedestrian detection accuracy; 60k unique MACs/day; accuracy is record classification, not volume validation | [14] |
|
||||
| Minea (2022) | Bucharest subway | Manual counts vs BLE/BT scans | 14–49% representativity; 31.6% average at one station; age bias; wearables outnumber discoverable phones | [15] |
|
||||
| Matsuda et al. (2023) | 4 indoor spaces, Japan | BLE scanners + camera/manual labels | MAE 1.4–5.5 people; MAPE 24–91%; performance poor below 10 people | [16] |
|
||||
| Becker, Li & Starobinski (2019) | Lab/field BLE capture | Address + payload tracking | Address life ~16 min (Windows), ~20 min (Apple), 15–45 min (Android); carry-over tracking 53 min (Apple), 11.2 h (Windows); Fitbit static | [17] |
|
||||
| Martin et al. (2017) | 2.6M Wi-Fi MAC corpus | Wi-Fi randomization study | iOS randomized; Android adoption low in 2015–16; 96% of Android defeatable | [18] |
|
||||
| Fenske et al. (2021) | 160 phone models | Lab Wi-Fi randomization test | Newer phones are better; many older phones still leak; randomization is device/OS-dependent | [19] |
|
||||
| Januszkiewicz (2018) | Indoor 2.4 GHz | FDTD + measurements | +10 dB path loss for one body, +15 dB for two; 10–20 dB near body | [20] |
|
||||
| Deng, Fu & Wang (2018) | Indoor BLE | RSSI measurements | 10 dB back-shadowing, 3 dB side at 3 m; 6–8 dB typical BSIE | [21] |
|
||||
| Mahmud et al. (2023), INL | Anechoic chamber | BLE + Wi-Fi coexistence | BLE throughput −41% under Wi-Fi; PER 2–9% (up to 12%) | [22] |
|
||||
| Masek et al. (2021) | Brno, 311 locations | LoRaWAN urban measurement | 83% cumulative PDR; 50% of nodes within 1–2 km had packet loss | [23] |
|
||||
| Ryus et al. (2014), NCHRP 797 | US | Standards/methods review | Correction factors from validation counts; annual revalidation; accuracy vs consistency; screenline vs presence | [24] |
|
||||
| FHWA TMG Ch. 4 | US | Federal guidance | Manual counts as ground truth; automated counters need calibration; short counts are highly variable | [25] |
|
||||
| Ohlms et al. (2018), VTRC 19-R4 | Virginia | State program review | Bluetooth alone not feasible as of 2016; reported Wi-Fi detection ~26.4%; validation produces site-specific correction factors | [26] |
|
||||
| Hook & Regal (1995, 2000) | Epidemiology | Capture-recapture theory | Four assumptions; positive dependence biases estimates downward; empirical underestimation 16–25% | [27][28] |
|
||||
| Code for Heilbronn (2025–26) | Heilbronn | Blog + firmware repo | Heltec ESP32 + SX1262; BLE-only; LAA filter; 16-bit ID (truncation); 0.7 factor; 900 s sleep; one uplink per wake | [6][7] |
|
||||
| Fraunhofer IAO/KODIS (2023) | Heilbronn vineyards | 3 LoPy4 + 2 phones | BLE range 20–25 m; locked iPhone not detected; simultaneous Wi-Fi+BLE causes errors; trend use only | [9] |
|
||||
| Destatis (2024); Bitkom (2026) | Germany | Household/person surveys | 90.8% of households have a smartphone; 86% of 16+ use one; 53% of 65+ | [31][32] |
|
||||
|
||||
**What the table establishes.** Across four decades and three radio generations (classic Bluetooth inquiry, Wi-Fi probe requests, BLE advertising), the same pattern recurs: **detection is a small, biased, variable sample of people; counts track trends; absolute levels require external calibration.** The Heilbronn deployment is not an outlier; it is a particularly sparse instance of a known design.
|
||||
|
||||
**What the table does not establish.** No study validates a 10-s BLE scan every 15 min against manual counts in a German shopping street. No study measures the device-multiplicity distribution in Heilbronn. No study quantifies the effect of the 0.7 factor. These are gaps, not evidence of accuracy.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Calibration and validation
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.1 What counts as ground truth?
|
||||
|
||||
| Method | Strength | Weakness | Use for BLE |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Manual screenline counts | Direct, transparent, cheap | Labour-intensive; 2 h fatigue; observer bias; no direction at high flow | **Best short-term reference**; stratify by daypart and day type |
|
||||
| Video with manual annotation | Auditable; can rewind; direction | Privacy; storage; occlusion in crowds | **Best for dense sites**; annotate a sample, not 24/7 |
|
||||
| Passive infrared / laser beam | Continuous; cheap | Occlusion; group counting; no identity | **Independent continuous reference**, but has its own bias |
|
||||
| Turnstiles / gate counts | Exact at controlled entries | Only for enclosed sites | Good for a shop entrance, not a street |
|
||||
| Wi-Fi probe counts | Higher detection than BLE in some studies | Randomization; OS differences; also privacy-invasive | **Not ground truth**; a second biased sensor |
|
||||
|
||||
The NCHRP guidance is explicit: accuracy is the magnitude of difference from a ground-truth count; consistency is the residual variability after correcting expected bias; correction factors should be developed locally and revalidated at least annually. [24] The FHWA TMG likewise treats manual counts as the reference and warns that short non-motorized counts are highly variable. [25]
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.2 Ratio / expansion estimation
|
||||
|
||||
The simplest calibration is a ratio estimator:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
P_hat = y / r, r = mean(y / P) over validation samples
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Equivalently, `P_hat = k · y` with `k = 1/r`. This is the "penetration rate" or "expansion factor" approach used in Bluetooth transport studies; the ratio estimator itself is standard sampling theory. [11][13][30]
|
||||
|
||||
**What it requires:** a stable `r` across the conditions where it is applied. **What breaks it:**
|
||||
|
||||
- `r` varies with device mix (iOS/Android/wearables), age, weather, time of day, event type and sensor placement.
|
||||
- `r` is a ratio of two noisy quantities; its variance is dominated by small `P` bins. At `P = 10`, a ±3 count error is ±30%.
|
||||
- A single global `k` applied to all sensors hides site-specific detection zones.
|
||||
- If `r` is estimated from a period with different firmware/factor, it is not transferable.
|
||||
|
||||
NCHRP's guidance is explicit that a correction factor is only valid for the site and conditions where it was developed; local factors and auxiliary counts are preferred over a single global constant. [24] The same logic applies to BLE: a global 0.7 cannot absorb site, season and device-mix variation. The lesson is not "Bluetooth is useless"; it is **"a single expansion factor is not enough; you need auxiliary counts and a model."**
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.3 Capture-recapture
|
||||
|
||||
With two or more independent observations of the same population, the Lincoln–Petersen estimator is:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
N_hat = (n1 · n2) / m
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
where `n1`, `n2` are the counts in each sample and `m` is the number matched. Four assumptions must hold: closed population, correct matching, independence of samples, and homogeneous capture probability. [27]
|
||||
|
||||
**Why this is hard for BLE:**
|
||||
|
||||
- **Matching** requires a persistent identifier. The current firmware has none; even with persistent IDs, RPA rotation breaks matching after ~15 min.
|
||||
- **Independence** is violated if both sensors see the same bodies/obstacles or if a person carrying more devices is more likely to be captured by both.
|
||||
- **Heterogeneity** is severe: a person with a phone + watch has multiple chances; a person with a locked iPhone may have none. Heterogeneous capture probabilities can bias `N_hat` downward; positive dependence also biases it downward. Hook & Regal found 16–25% underestimation in empirical capture-recapture studies with positive dependence. [28]
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict:** capture-recapture is a useful **diagnostic** (e.g., two adjacent sensors with overlapping coverage, or manual + sensor), but naive Lincoln–Petersen on BLE counts will not give a defensible population estimate. If used, report the assumptions and a sensitivity range, not a point estimate.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.4 Regression calibration
|
||||
|
||||
Regress ground truth on sensor counts:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
P_t = α + β · y_t + γ · X_t + ε_t
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
where `X_t` includes hour, day type, weather, sensor ID and event flags. Use a time-based holdout and report out-of-sample MAE/MAPE, not in-sample R².
|
||||
|
||||
**Why it can help:** it allows the detection rate to vary with covariates; it can absorb site-specific factors; it gives a principled way to propagate uncertainty.
|
||||
|
||||
**Why it can mislead:**
|
||||
|
||||
- Classical measurement error in `y` attenuates `β` toward zero; the naive model looks less responsive than it is. Regression calibration replaces `y` with `E[P|y]` and can correct this, but only if the calibration model is correctly specified and validated on independent data. [29]
|
||||
- If the sensor's detection rate changes after the calibration period (firmware, device mix, season), the calibration is stale.
|
||||
- Extrapolating beyond the observed range (e.g., event peaks) is unsupported.
|
||||
- A high R² on a holdout does not prove the level is right; it proves the *variation* is tracked.
|
||||
|
||||
For PulseCast, the honest use is: **calibrate the index to people for a defined site and period, report the calibration window and covariates, and revalidate.** Do not apply a June calibration to November without evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.5 What can and cannot be inferred
|
||||
|
||||
| Question | Can the current data answer it? | Why |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Is today busier than yesterday? | **Yes, as a relative index** | Same sensor, same unit, short horizon; detection conditions similar |
|
||||
| What is the hourly/daily profile? | **Yes, descriptively** | The series has a coherent daily/weekly shape; high lag-1 autocorrelation (0.84–0.95 at 15 min) |
|
||||
| How many people passed in the last 15 min? | **No** | `y = 0.7 × U`, where `U` is a 10-s snapshot count; not an integrated flow |
|
||||
| How many people are in the area now? | **No, not without calibration** | `U` is devices, not people; `d`, `m`, `q` unknown |
|
||||
| How long do people stay? | **No** | No first/last-seen; dedup resets; RPA rotation |
|
||||
| Which sensor has more footfall? | **Only with equal detection zones and factors** | Placement, range and factor differ; the 0.7 factor is global but the environment is not |
|
||||
| Did an event increase footfall? | **Suggestive** | Relative change is visible; magnitude is not identified |
|
||||
| Are older people under-represented? | **Yes, likely** | 53% smartphone use among 65+ vs 86% overall; BLE representativity falls with elderly share [15][31][32] |
|
||||
| Can we forecast next week? | **Yes, in device units** | The series is predictable; the forecast inherits the unit error |
|
||||
| Can we claim privacy-preservation? | **Only with architecture + governance evidence** | Payload is minimised; sensing is involuntary; firmware is unverifiable |
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.6 A minimum validation protocol for PulseCast
|
||||
|
||||
If the paper wants to make a calibration claim, this is the smallest defensible protocol:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Sites:** at least 3 sensors spanning the range of environments (shopping street, riverfront, mall entrance).
|
||||
2. **Reference:** manual screenline counts by two observers, 15-min bins, 2 h per session; video for dense bins.
|
||||
3. **Design:** 2 weeks; 4 dayparts (morning, lunch, afternoon, evening); 2 weekdays + 1 weekend day per week; at least 200 people per bin for stable ratios.
|
||||
4. **Synchronisation:** align sensor timestamps to the manual bin; discard bins with a gap > 1 min.
|
||||
5. **Metrics:** ratio `y/P`, bias, MAE, MAPE, Bland–Altman limits of agreement; report by site and daypart, not only pooled.
|
||||
6. **Model:** calibration with hour, day type, weather and sensor ID; time-based holdout; report out-of-sample error.
|
||||
7. **Uncertainty:** bootstrap the ratio; propagate the calibration interval into the staffing recommendation.
|
||||
8. **Revalidation:** repeat at least seasonally; re-check after firmware or device-mix changes.
|
||||
9. **Report:** publish the raw `U`, the factor, the calibration window and the residual diagnostics. Do not publish only the calibrated people number.
|
||||
|
||||
This is more work than a hackathon usually allows, but even a **one-day, three-site pilot** would be enough to replace "we assume 0.7" with "we measured a ratio of X (95% CI Y) on one day in November." That is a much stronger paper.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Implications for PulseCast
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.1 Reframe the target
|
||||
|
||||
The current target is a 15-minute "density" value. The defensible target is a **relative activity index**: the number of distinct locally-administered BLE advertising addresses seen in a short scan, scaled by a documented constant. Forecast that index, and separately report a calibrated people estimate only where validation exists.
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested wording for the paper:
|
||||
|
||||
> "The sensor reports `y = 0.7 · U`, where `U` is the number of distinct locally-administered BLE advertising addresses observed during a single ~10-second scan. `U` is a device-address count, not a person count. We treat `y` as a relative activity index and evaluate forecasts in index units. A people-level interpretation would require external calibration, which this dataset does not contain."
|
||||
|
||||
This is honest, precise and still supports the forecasting contribution.
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.2 Keep the forecasting, change the claim
|
||||
|
||||
The series is predictable: daily and weekly cycles, weather sensitivity, holiday effects. A global gradient-boosted model with time-based holdout is a reasonable method. The forecast skill is real **in index units**. The current model's holdout metrics (MAE 3.36, WAPE 27.8%, R² 0.779; 7-day MAE 4.37, WAPE 36.2%, R² 0.672) are computed on `y`, so they measure index forecast skill; a people-level error cannot be derived from them without a calibration study. The paper can claim:
|
||||
|
||||
- "We forecast the sensor activity index with MAE X, WAPE Y%, R² Z, against a seasonal-naive baseline."
|
||||
- "The weather ablation shows temperature/rain add information beyond the time features."
|
||||
- "The staffing heuristic translates index units into staff hours under explicit assumptions."
|
||||
|
||||
It cannot claim:
|
||||
|
||||
- "We forecast footfall."
|
||||
- "The model estimates visitors."
|
||||
- "The staffing plan is calibrated to people."
|
||||
|
||||
unless a validation study is added.
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.3 Sensitivity analysis for the 0.7 factor
|
||||
|
||||
Because `f = 0.7` is a default, not a measurement, the paper should show how conclusions change under plausible alternatives. A simple approach:
|
||||
|
||||
- Recompute the staffing plan for `f ∈ {0.4, 0.7, 1.0, 1.4}` (or a range implied by the literature).
|
||||
- Report the range of staff hours, not a single number.
|
||||
- State that the ranking of hours is invariant to a global multiplicative factor, but the **level** and the **cost** are not.
|
||||
|
||||
This turns an unidentifiable constant into a transparent assumption. It also protects against the reviewer objection "why 0.7?"
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.4 Do not compare levels across sensors
|
||||
|
||||
The eight sensors differ in placement, range, enclosure, cadence (`density-01` at 16.1 min vs 15.3 min), and possibly factor. A ranking of "busiest sensor" is only valid if detection zones and factors are equal. The paper can compare **temporal shapes** (when each site peaks) more defensibly than **levels** (how many people each site has).
|
||||
|
||||
If a heat map is required, label it "activity index, not footfall" and avoid summing across sensors (sums double-count if coverage overlaps and mix units).
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.5 What a privacy-first alternative must demonstrate
|
||||
|
||||
The paper argues for a privacy-first alternative. To be credible, the alternative should be evaluated on the same axes as the PAX counter:
|
||||
|
||||
| Axis | PAX counter (current) | Requirement for alternative |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Unit | Device-address count × 0.7 | People or clearly defined physical quantity |
|
||||
| Sampling | 10 s / 900 s (1.1%) | Continuous or documented sampling; no phase bias |
|
||||
| Direction | None | Direction or screenline crossing |
|
||||
| Dwell | Not measurable | Measurable or explicitly out of scope |
|
||||
| Identity | 16-bit address ID at edge | No device identifiers at all |
|
||||
| Consent | Impossible | Notice + opt-out, or genuinely anonymous sensing |
|
||||
| Accuracy | Unvalidated | Validated against manual/video ground truth |
|
||||
| Failure modes | Range, body, crowding, weather, LoRaWAN | Documented and quantified |
|
||||
| Cost | Low | Comparable total cost (hardware + install + maintenance) |
|
||||
| Governance | Firmware-dependent | Auditable, open, DPIA-compatible |
|
||||
|
||||
Candidate modalities that can meet these requirements better: thermal array counting, radar/LiDAR, stereo vision with on-device counting (no images stored), passive infrared beams at entrances, or manual/video sampling with a statistically designed schedule. Each has its own failure modes; the paper should compare, not assert.
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.6 What the paper should say — and not say
|
||||
|
||||
**Say:**
|
||||
|
||||
- "The deployed sensors count locally-administered BLE advertising addresses in short scans; the published value is 0.7 × that count."
|
||||
- "This is a relative index; absolute people counts are not identified without external calibration."
|
||||
- "The 15-minute series is a sequence of point samples, not an aggregate."
|
||||
- "MAC randomization and the absence of cross-scan dedup prevent dwell estimation and cross-sensor deduplication."
|
||||
- "The privacy claim depends on edge firmware behaviour and on a legal basis that is contested."
|
||||
- "Our forecast is evaluated in index units; the staffing plan is a decision aid under explicit assumptions."
|
||||
|
||||
**Do not say:**
|
||||
|
||||
- "The sensors count people."
|
||||
- "The data is 15-minute footfall."
|
||||
- "0.7 converts devices to people." (It is a default, not a validated conversion.)
|
||||
- "The sensors are privacy-preserving." (Say "data-minimising" and explain the residual risks.)
|
||||
- "MAC randomization inflates the counts." (In this design, the dominant bias is temporal sampling and repeated counting of lingerers, not within-scan rotation.)
|
||||
- "The model generalises to other cities." (It is a single 580 m cluster, 5 months, 8 sensors.)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Open questions
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Which firmware ran in 2025?** The 2025 blog describes a one-hour hashed store; the 2026 code resets every scan. Resolve by obtaining the deployed binary or the git history/tags for `sensor-pax`. **Why it matters:** the 2025–Mar 2026 `density-01` segment may have a different dedup window and factor.
|
||||
2. **What are the deployed factors?** The default is 0.7; provisioning requires a value. Are all sensors 0.7? Were any calibrated? **Why it matters:** a per-sensor factor changes cross-sensor comparisons.
|
||||
3. **What is the actual scan duration in the field?** The code suggests ≈10 s; the configured value is 30 s. Measure with a BLE advertiser of known rate plus a current/logic trace, or instrument the firmware. **Why it matters:** the duty cycle (1.1% vs 3.3%) changes the undercount factor by 3×.
|
||||
4. **What is the device-multiplicity distribution in Heilbronn?** Phone + watch + earbuds vs phone only; locals vs tourists; age groups. **Why it matters:** `m` is the main overcount; `d` is the main undercount; their product is unknown.
|
||||
5. **What is the share of locked/standby phones that do not advertise?** The KODIS test found a locked iPhone SE was not detected; is that reproducible across models? **Why it matters:** it sets the effective `d`.
|
||||
6. **How much do sensors overlap?** With 20–25 m range and a 580 m cluster, overlap is likely limited, but adjacent sensors may see the same device. **Why it matters:** cross-sensor double counting.
|
||||
7. **Is missingness random?** Compare missing intervals with weather, battery voltage and gateway logs. **Why it matters:** if outages correlate with heat/storm, the series is biased.
|
||||
8. **What is the legal basis in Baden-Württemberg?** A DPIA, a documented legitimate-interest assessment, and signage/notice. **Why it matters:** the paper's privacy argument needs a jurisdiction-specific anchor, not a generic GDPR gesture.
|
||||
9. **Can a privacy-first sensor match the cost?** Thermal/radar/video vs ESP32 + LoRaWAN. **Why it matters:** the alternative must be deployable at 8+ sites, not only in a lab.
|
||||
10. **What would falsify the "relative index" claim?** A manual validation showing that the index's ratio to people varies systematically by daypart or weather. **Why it matters:** it defines the paper's own success criterion.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
[1] Bluetooth SIG. *Bluetooth Core Specification v5.3.* 2021. https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/specs/core-specification-5-3/ — advertising channels, intervals, address types, scan parameters.
|
||||
|
||||
[2] Bluetooth SIG. "Enhancing device privacy and energy efficiency with Bluetooth Randomized RPA Updates." 15 May 2025. https://www.bluetooth.com/blog/enhancing-device-privacy-and-energy-efficiency-with-bluetooth-randomized-rpa-updates/ — RPA timeout default 900 s, range 1–3600 s; randomized update range 480–900 s.
|
||||
|
||||
[3] Bluetooth SIG. *Understanding Reliability in Bluetooth Technology.* 2020. https://www.bluetooth.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/EN-Understanding_Reliability.pdf — three primary advertising channels; random 0–10 ms delay; collision avoidance.
|
||||
|
||||
[4] Apple. "Bluetooth security." *Apple Platform Security.* https://support.apple.com/guide/security/bluetooth-security-sec82597d97e/web — BLE address randomization; no interval stated.
|
||||
|
||||
[5] Android Open Source Project. "HCI requirements." https://source.android.com/docs/core/connect/bluetooth/hci_requirements — RPA generation/resolution support; address type fields.
|
||||
|
||||
[6] Code for Heilbronn. "Passantenzahlen messen mit LORA." 18 September 2025. https://codeforheilbronn.de/blog/2025/09/passantenzahlen-messen-mit-lora/ — hardware, claimed hashing, one-hour retention claim, LoRaWAN.
|
||||
|
||||
[7] Code for Heilbronn. *lorax / lora-frequenzmessung*, branch `develop`. https://codeberg.org/cfhn/lorax — firmware: `sensor-pax/src/main.cpp`, `pax.h`, `provision.h`; vendored `sensor-pax/lib/paxlib/libpax.cpp`, `blescan.cpp`, `libpax_api.cpp`. Accessed 14 November 2026.
|
||||
|
||||
[8] Fraunhofer IAO / KODIS. "Frequenzmessung im innerstädtischen Bereich." https://www.kodis.iao.fraunhofer.de/de/projekte/frequenzmessung.html — ESP32 Paxcounter deployment in Heilbronn and Schwäbisch Hall.
|
||||
|
||||
[9] Straßburg, S., Buhl, D., Ködel, L., Göbels, V.P., & Schaefer, K. "Passenger Frequency Measurement — Part I." Research Center KODIS, 11 December 2023. https://medium.com/research-center-kodis/passenger-frequency-measurement-part-i-6a75d2aa63fd — 20–25 m BLE range; locked iPhone not detected; Wi-Fi/BLE interference; trend use only.
|
||||
|
||||
[10] Nicolai, T., & Kenn, H. (2007). "About the relationship between people and discoverable Bluetooth devices in urban environments." *Mobility '07*, 72–78. DOI: 10.1145/1378063.1378076.
|
||||
|
||||
[11] Malinovskiy, Y., Saunier, N., & Wang, Y. (2012). "Analysis of pedestrian travel with static Bluetooth sensors." *Transportation Research Record* 2299:137–149. DOI: 10.3141/2299-15.
|
||||
|
||||
[12] Weppner, J., & Lukowicz, P. (2013). "Bluetooth based collaborative crowd density estimation with mobile phones." *IEEE PerCom 2013*, 193–200. DOI: 10.1109/PerCom.2013.6526732.
|
||||
|
||||
[13] Kurkcu, A., & Ozbay, K. (2017). "Estimating pedestrian densities, wait times, and flows with Wi-Fi and Bluetooth sensors." *Transportation Research Record* 2644(1):72–82. DOI: 10.3141/2644-09.
|
||||
|
||||
[14] Angel, A., Cohen, A., Dalyot, S., & Plaut, P. (2024). "Estimating pedestrian traffic with Bluetooth sensor technology." *Geo-spatial Information Science* 27(5):1391–1404. DOI: 10.1080/10095020.2023.2247446.
|
||||
|
||||
[15] Minea, M. (2022). "An experimental assessment of people's location efficiency using low-energy communications-based movement tracking." *Sensors* 22(22):9025. DOI: 10.3390/s22229025.
|
||||
|
||||
[16] Matsuda, Y., Ueda, K., Taya, E., Suwa, H., & Yasumoto, K. (2023). "BLECE: BLE-based crowdedness estimation method for restaurants and public facilities." *ICMU 2023*, 1–6. DOI: 10.23919/ICMU58504.2023.10412158.
|
||||
|
||||
[17] Becker, J.K., Li, D., & Starobinski, D. (2019). "Tracking anonymized Bluetooth devices." *Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies* 2019(3):50–65. DOI: 10.2478/popets-2019-0036.
|
||||
|
||||
[18] Martin, J., Mayberry, T., Donahue, C., Foppe, L., Brown, L., Riggins, C., Rye, E.C., & Brown, D. (2017). "A study of MAC address randomization in mobile devices and when it fails." *Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies* 2017(4):365–383. DOI: 10.1515/popets-2017-0054.
|
||||
|
||||
[19] Fenske, E., Brown, D., Martin, J., Mayberry, T., Ryan, P., & Rye, E. (2021). "Three years later: A study of MAC address randomization in mobile devices and when it succeeds." *Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies* 2021(3):164–181. DOI: 10.2478/popets-2021-0042.
|
||||
|
||||
[20] Januszkiewicz, Ł. (2018). "Analysis of human body shadowing effect on wireless sensor networks operating in the 2.4 GHz band." *Sensors* 18(10):3412. DOI: 10.3390/s18103412.
|
||||
|
||||
[21] Deng, Z., Fu, X., & Wang, H. (2018). "An IMU-aided body-shadowing error compensation method for indoor Bluetooth positioning." *Sensors* 18(1):304. DOI: 10.3390/s18010304.
|
||||
|
||||
[22] Mahmud, S.A., Kasera, S., Ji, M., & Agarwal, V. (2023). *Experimental Evaluation of Interference in 2.4 GHz Wireless Network.* INL/RPT-23-74719, Idaho National Laboratory. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/2242485.
|
||||
|
||||
[23] Masek, P., Stusek, M., Svertoka, E., Pospisil, J., Burget, R., Lohan, E.S., Marghescu, I., Hosek, J., & Ometov, A. (2021). "Measurements of LoRaWAN technology in urban scenarios: A data descriptor." *Data* 6(6):62. DOI: 10.3390/data6060062.
|
||||
|
||||
[24] Ryus, P., Ferguson, E., Laustsen, K.M., Schneider, R.J., Proulx, F.R., Hull, T., & Miranda-Moreno, L. (2014). *Guidebook on Pedestrian and Bicycle Volume Data Collection.* NCHRP Report 797, Transportation Research Board. https://escholarship.org/content/qt11q5p33w/qt11q5p33w.pdf.
|
||||
|
||||
[25] Federal Highway Administration. *Traffic Monitoring Guide*, Chapter 4: "Traffic Monitoring for Non-Motorized Traffic." 2013. https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/tmguide/tmg_2013/traffic-monitoring-for-non-motorized.cfm.
|
||||
|
||||
[26] Ohlms, P.B., Dougald, L.E., & MacKnight, H.E. (2018). *Assessing the Feasibility of a Pedestrian and Bicycle Count Program in Virginia.* VTRC 19-R4, Virginia Transportation Research Council. https://vtrc.virginia.gov/media/vtrc/vtrc-pdf/vtrc-pdf/19-R4.pdf.
|
||||
|
||||
[27] Hook, E.B., & Regal, R.R. (1995). "Capture-recapture methods in epidemiology: Methods and limitations." *Epidemiologic Reviews* 17(2):243–264. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.epirev.a036192.
|
||||
|
||||
[28] Hook, E.B., & Regal, R.R. (2000). "Accuracy of alternative approaches to capture-recapture estimates of disease frequency: Internal validity analysis of data from five sources." *American Journal of Epidemiology* 152(8):771–778. DOI: 10.1093/aje/152.8.771.
|
||||
|
||||
[29] Carroll, R.J., Ruppert, D., Stefanski, L.A., & Crainiceanu, C.M. (2006). *Measurement Error in Nonlinear Models: A Modern Perspective*, 2nd ed. Chapman & Hall/CRC. ISBN 978-1-58488-633-4.
|
||||
|
||||
[30] Cochran, W.G. (1977). *Sampling Techniques*, 3rd ed. Wiley. ISBN 978-0-471-16240-7.
|
||||
|
||||
[31] Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis). "Ausstattung privater Haushalte mit Informations- und Kommunikationstechnik." 2024. https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Einkommen-Konsum-Lebensbedingungen/Ausstattung-Gebrauchsgueter/Tabellen/liste-gebietsstaende-Infotechnik.html.
|
||||
|
||||
[32] Bitkom Research. "Smartphone-Markt 2026." 2026. https://bitkom-research.de/studien/smartphone-markt-2026 — 86% of 16+ use a smartphone; 53% of 65+.
|
||||
|
||||
[33] Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein. *37. Tätigkeitsbericht 2019*, pp. 97–99. https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/tb/tb37/uld-37-taetigkeitsbericht-2019.pdf — WLAN tracking for visitor counting considered unlawful.
|
||||
|
||||
[34] Datenschutzkonferenz (DSK). *Orientierungshilfe für Anbieter digitaler Dienste.* 2022, para. 22. https://www.datenschutzkonferenz-online.de/media/oh/OH_Digitale_Dienste.pdf — reading MAC addresses can require consent under §25 TDDDG.
|
||||
|
||||
[35] Yung, C. (2024). *A machine learning framework for public transport ridership estimation using multi-source data fusion with low-cost Bluetooth data.* Master's thesis, Aalto University. https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:aalto-202501241673 — BLE-only model R² = −0.49; fused model R² = 0.86. **[Gray/thesis]**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Appendix A — Reproduction
|
||||
|
||||
The forensic claims are reproducible from the delivered CSV with standard Python. No external data are needed.
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
import csv, datetime as dt, statistics, collections
|
||||
|
||||
rows = [r for r in csv.DictReader(open("data/raw/schwarz-pax.csv"))
|
||||
if r["type"] == "densityData"]
|
||||
|
||||
start = dt.datetime.fromisoformat("2026-06-12T00:00:00+00:00")
|
||||
end = dt.datetime.fromisoformat("2026-11-08T00:00:00+00:00")
|
||||
prod = [r for r in rows
|
||||
if start <= dt.datetime.fromisoformat(r["time"]) < end
|
||||
and r["name"] not in ("maker-fair", "niklas-01", "hn-bollwerksturm-01")]
|
||||
|
||||
vals = [float(r["value"]) for r in prod]
|
||||
raw = [round(v / 0.7) for v in vals]
|
||||
|
||||
# 1. All production values are exact multiples of 0.7
|
||||
assert all(abs(v / 0.7 - round(v / 0.7)) < 1e-6 for v in vals)
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Reconstructed integer counts
|
||||
print("rows:", len(vals))
|
||||
print("median U:", statistics.median(raw))
|
||||
print("p95 U:", sorted(raw)[int(0.95 * len(raw))])
|
||||
print("max U:", max(raw))
|
||||
print("zero share:", raw.count(0) / len(raw))
|
||||
|
||||
# 3. Per-sensor multiples-of-0.7 check (production window only)
|
||||
by = collections.defaultdict(list)
|
||||
for r in prod:
|
||||
by[r["name"]].append(float(r["value"]))
|
||||
for name, v in by.items():
|
||||
share = sum(abs(x / 0.7 - round(x / 0.7)) < 1e-6 for x in v) / len(v)
|
||||
print(f"{name:26s} n={len(v):6d} multiples0.7={share:.1%}")
|
||||
|
||||
# 4. The old density-01 hardware is integer-valued, not 0.7-scaled
|
||||
old = [r for r in rows if r["name"] == "density-01"
|
||||
and dt.datetime.fromisoformat(r["time"]) < dt.datetime.fromisoformat("2026-04-01T00:00:00+00:00")]
|
||||
old_vals = [float(r["value"]) for r in old]
|
||||
print("old density-01 integer share:",
|
||||
sum(abs(v - round(v)) < 1e-6 for v in old_vals) / len(old_vals))
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Expected output for the production window: `rows: 83156`, `median U: 12`, `p95 U: 71`, `max U: 418`, `zero share: ~0.027`, and `multiples0.7=100.0%` for all eight production sensors. The older `density-01` hardware (`863f75b0`, 2025-10 → 2026-03) is 100% integer-valued; the replacement (`f8c19730`, 2026-04 → 2026-11) is 100% multiples of 0.7.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Appendix B — Source map for the strongest claims
|
||||
|
||||
| Claim | Source |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| 10-s scan every 900 s; 16-bit ID (truncation); LAA filter; 0.7 factor | `sensor-pax/src/pax.h`, `main.cpp`, `provision.h`; `lib/paxlib/libpax.cpp`, `blescan.cpp`, `libpax_api.cpp` [7] |
|
||||
| 100% of production values are multiples of 0.7 | Forensic, Appendix A |
|
||||
| `density-01` integer-to-0.7 regime break | Forensic, Appendix A; monthly means in Section 1.4 |
|
||||
| RPA default 900 s, range 1–3600 s | Bluetooth SIG 2025 [2] |
|
||||
| Address lifetimes 15–45 min | Becker et al. 2019 [17] |
|
||||
| 20–25 m range; locked iPhone not detected | KODIS blog [9] |
|
||||
| 10–20 dB body loss | Januszkiewicz 2018 [20]; Deng et al. 2018 [21] |
|
||||
| BLE throughput −41% under Wi-Fi | INL report [22] |
|
||||
| 2–7% classic BT discoverability | Nicolai & Kenn 2007 [10]; Malinovskiy et al. 2012 [11] |
|
||||
| 14–49% BLE representativity; age bias | Minea 2022 [15] |
|
||||
| MAE 1.4–5.5 people; MAPE 24–91% | Matsuda et al. 2023 [16] |
|
||||
| BLE-only R² = −0.49 | Yung 2024 [35] |
|
||||
| 83% LoRaWAN PDR in Brno | Masek et al. 2021 [23] |
|
||||
| Capture-recapture assumptions and downward bias | Hook & Regal 1995/2000 [27][28] |
|
||||
| NCHRP correction-factor methodology | Ryus et al. 2014 [24] |
|
||||
| German legal uncertainty | ULD 2019 [33]; DSK 2022 [34] |
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user