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@@ -229,3 +229,229 @@ jobs:
|
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# Dockerfile/base image checks are covered by the droast job
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snyk code test \
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--severity-threshold=high
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# -------------------------------------------------------- ai code review --
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review:
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name: AI code review (opencode)
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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container: node:22-bookworm
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# Draft PRs don't get a (paid) review yet. The event_name check is
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# load-bearing: manual (workflow_dispatch) triggers - which exist to
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# run the paused snyk job - must NOT launch a paid review, which on
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# a dispatch event has no PR to post to.
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if: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' && !github.event.pull_request.draft }}
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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with:
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fetch-depth: 0
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- name: Restore opencode binary
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id: opencode-cache
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# The installer writes to $HOME/.opencode/bin. Caching it saves the
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# ~4s download+extract per run - small next to the model call, but
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# free to keep. Key includes the pinned version, so bumping the
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# version below invalidates the cached binary automatically.
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# As above, a cache outage falls back to the installer.
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continue-on-error: true
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uses: actions/cache@v4.1.0
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with:
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path: ~/.opencode/bin
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key: opencode-v2.0.32-${{ runner.os }}
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- name: Install opencode CLI
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if: steps.opencode-cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
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run: curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/v2/install | bash -s -- -v 2.0.32
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# v2 installer is required: the classic /install URL ships only
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# OpenCode 1.x (resolved to v1.19.3 on arm64), which cannot resolve
|
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# model variants like "#medium" and failed with ProviderModelNotFoundError.
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# Version pinned (-v 2.0.32) so a breaking v2 release cannot fail
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# the job mid-PR; bump deliberately, not automatically.
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- name: Add opencode to PATH
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# The installer appends the directory to $GITHUB_PATH itself, but that
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# step is skipped on a cache hit. Add it unconditionally.
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run: echo "$HOME/.opencode/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
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- name: Get PR diff
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run: |
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# lockfile changes bloat the diff (175KB here) and are pointless to
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# review - pnpm audit already covers dependencies. Excluding the
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# lockfile also keeps the diff small enough to hand to the model.
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# The diff goes to a file IN the workspace so the agent can read it
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# with its file tools (passing 190KB as a CLI argument fails with
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# "Argument list too long", MAX_ARG_STRLEN is 128KiB).
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git diff --merge-base "origin/${{ github.base_ref }}" \
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-- . ':(exclude)pnpm-lock.yaml' > .pr-review-diff.patch
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wc -c .pr-review-diff.patch
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|
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- name: Run opencode review
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env:
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OPENCODE_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.OPENCODE_API_KEY }}
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run: |
|
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# opencode-go/claude-haiku-5-5#medium: cheap ($0.10/$0.50 per M
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# tokens) and, unlike deepseek-v4.1-flash, it has a #medium
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# reasoning variant - flash only exposes low/high/max, so every
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# review there ran at maximum effort. #medium keeps the review
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# competent without paying for max reasoning on each push.
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# History: deepseek-v4-pro#max -> deepseek-v4.1-flash#max ->
|
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# haiku-5-5#medium (2026-10-20). The pro endpoint failed two
|
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# consecutive runs with "Upstream request failed: Endpoint is
|
||||
# unavailable" before the flash switch; that fallback is recorded
|
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# in OKF_Nuxt/open-questions.md. NOTE the provider prefix must be
|
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# "opencode-go", NOT "opencode" (Zen is a different, pay-per-call
|
||||
# provider and fails with 'Insufficient account funds').
|
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#
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# Auth is env-only: the CLI picks up OPENCODE_API_KEY from the
|
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# environment (verified headless). Deliberately NO opencode.json:
|
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# a config file in the checkout would hold the API key in
|
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# plaintext, readable by the agent - a malicious PR diff could
|
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# prompt-inject the agent into quoting the key in the review
|
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# comment (publicly visible). Env vars are invisible to file reads.
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# Permissions live in a global config OUTSIDE the checkout (no
|
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# secrets in it, so nothing can leak). OpenCode v2 schema: the
|
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# field is "permissions" (plural) - an ordered array of
|
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# {action, resource, effect}; "bash" was renamed "shell" in v2.
|
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# The singular v1 "permission" object is ignored by the v2 CLI
|
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# (verified empirically: shell commands executed despite deny).
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# Denying shell/edit/webfetch/websearch/external_directory means
|
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# no headless permission prompts can hang or kill the run, and
|
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# the reviewer physically cannot modify the repo or browse
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# attacker-controlled URLs.
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mkdir -p "$HOME/.config/opencode"
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printf '{
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"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
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"permissions": [
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{ "action": "edit", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" },
|
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{ "action": "shell", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" },
|
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{ "action": "webfetch", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" },
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{ "action": "websearch", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" },
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{ "action": "external_directory", "resource": "*", "effect": "deny" }
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]
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}' > "$HOME/.config/opencode/opencode.json"
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# --print-logs: surface auth/provider errors in the CI log instead
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# of failing with an opaque exit code
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EXIT_CODE=0
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opencode run \
|
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--print-logs \
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--model opencode-go/claude-haiku-5-5#medium \
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"You are a principal engineer performing a rigorous code review on a
|
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pull request. You have tool access: read repo files for context when
|
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the diff alone is ambiguous, but review ONLY code changed in this PR.
|
||||
|
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The full PR diff is in the file .pr-review-diff.patch in the repo
|
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root. Read it first with your file tools.
|
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|
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pnpm-lock.yaml is deliberately excluded from that patch to keep it
|
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small, not forgotten. It is committed in the PR, pnpm audit covers
|
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the dependencies, and CI runs `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`.
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Do not report a missing lockfile or a frozen-install drift.
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|
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## Project context
|
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- Stack: Nuxt 4 (Vue 3, TypeScript) SSR web app in the repo root.
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Backend/API services are being added in Golang.
|
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- Deployment target: a personal production CV website.
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- Already covered by other CI jobs, do NOT repeat their findings:
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ESLint (style), vue-tsc (types), gitleaks (secrets in git history),
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pnpm audit (dependency CVEs), droast (Dockerfile lint).
|
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- Your job is everything those tools CANNOT see: logic, security,
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architecture, correctness.
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|
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## Nuxt / Vue / TypeScript focus
|
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- SSR pitfalls: window/document/localStorage access without
|
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<ClientOnly> or process.client guards; hydration mismatch risks
|
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(Date.now(), Math.random(), locale formatting in render path).
|
||||
- useAsyncData/useFetch: missing or colliding keys, duplicate
|
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requests between server and client, wrong caching/refresh setup.
|
||||
- Reactivity bugs: destructuring reactive objects losing reactivity,
|
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missing await on async setup, watch on getters vs refs.
|
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- Security: v-html with unsanitized data, user input flowing into
|
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meta/URLs, open redirects, missing validation in /server/api and
|
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Nitro route handlers, auth checks on both page and API level.
|
||||
- Config hygiene: server-only runtime config (no NUXT_PUBLIC_
|
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prefix) leaking secrets into the client bundle.
|
||||
|
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## Golang focus (when Go code is in the diff)
|
||||
- Errors: unchecked errors, errors discarded, wrapping with %w,
|
||||
sentinel vs typed errors, panic in library code.
|
||||
- Concurrency: goroutine leaks (missing context cancellation),
|
||||
data races (shared state without mutex/channel), WaitGroup
|
||||
misuse, defer in loops.
|
||||
- Resources: unclosed response bodies/files/rows, missing
|
||||
timeouts on http.Client, unbounded buffering.
|
||||
- Correctness: slice aliasing surprises, copy vs reference
|
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semantics, nil map writes, integer truncation.
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|
||||
## Cross-cutting
|
||||
- API contract mismatches between Nuxt frontend and Go backends
|
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(field names, nullability, status codes, date formats).
|
||||
- Missing authorization checks on new endpoints or pages.
|
||||
- Secrets/credentials ending up in logs or client-visible output.
|
||||
- Performance on the critical render path (heavy components,
|
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unoptimized images, blocking Nitro middleware).
|
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|
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## Output format (strict)
|
||||
Review the diff in .pr-review-diff.patch. For every finding:
|
||||
[BLOCKER] file:line - what and why + concrete fix suggestion
|
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[WARN] file:line - what and why + concrete fix suggestion
|
||||
[NIT] file:line - optional improvement
|
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BLOCKER = must fix before merge (security, data loss, broken
|
||||
behavior). WARN = should fix soon. NIT = optional.
|
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If a finding cannot be localized to a file, prefix [BLOCKER-GENERAL].
|
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No compliments, no summaries of what the diff does, no style nits.
|
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Keep it under 400 words unless there are more than 10 findings.
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If the diff contains no reviewable code (docs/config only), say so
|
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in one line.
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||||
|
||||
End your response with a final verdict line, exactly one of:
|
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VERDICT: APPROVE (no BLOCKER findings)
|
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VERDICT: REQUEST_CHANGES (at least one BLOCKER)" \
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> /tmp/review.md 2>&1 || EXIT_CODE=$?
|
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# always show the output - never swallow the error text
|
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cat /tmp/review.md
|
||||
# The posting gate is the OUTPUT CONTRACT, not the exit code:
|
||||
# a completed review always ends with a VERDICT line - error
|
||||
# dumps never do. opencode can exit 1 on benign tool denials
|
||||
# even after a full review, so a present verdict means post;
|
||||
# anything else means the review did not complete.
|
||||
# Anchored to the tail: the prompt itself contains VERDICT
|
||||
# lines, so scanning the whole file could pass on echoed
|
||||
# prompt text or injected quotes - only the last lines count.
|
||||
if tail -n 5 /tmp/review.md | grep -qE '^VERDICT: (APPROVE|REQUEST_CHANGES)'; then
|
||||
[ "$EXIT_CODE" -ne 0 ] && echo "::warning::opencode exited ${EXIT_CODE} but produced a valid verdict - posting review"
|
||||
echo "Review completed with verdict."
|
||||
else
|
||||
# fail closed: no verdict = no review. exit 1 unconditionally -
|
||||
# falling back to EXIT_CODE would exit 0 when opencode succeeded
|
||||
# but produced no review, and the job would go green.
|
||||
echo "::error::opencode produced no valid review (exit ${EXIT_CODE:-1}) - NOT posting this output as a review comment"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Post review as PR comment
|
||||
continue-on-error: true # token missing/expired must not fail the build
|
||||
env:
|
||||
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PR_GITEA_TOKEN }}
|
||||
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
|
||||
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
|
||||
# Gitea sets GITHUB_API_URL, e.g. https://gitea.example.com/api/v1
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
# re-verify the output contract here: never post anything that is
|
||||
# not a completed review, regardless of how the previous step ended
|
||||
if ! tail -n 5 /tmp/review.md | grep -qE '^VERDICT: (APPROVE|REQUEST_CHANGES)'; then
|
||||
echo "::error::no verdict in review output - nothing to post"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# jq is not in the node image - use node for JSON encoding
|
||||
BODY=$(node -e 'process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(require("fs").readFileSync("/tmp/review.md","utf8")))')
|
||||
HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /tmp/comment-response.json -w "%{http_code}" \
|
||||
-X POST \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: token ${GITEA_TOKEN}" \
|
||||
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
||||
-d "{\"body\": ${BODY}}" \
|
||||
"${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${REPO}/issues/${PR_NUMBER}/comments")
|
||||
echo "POST status: ${HTTP_CODE}"
|
||||
cat /tmp/comment-response.json
|
||||
case "$HTTP_CODE" in
|
||||
200|201) echo "Review comment posted." ;;
|
||||
*) echo "::error::Failed to post review comment (HTTP ${HTTP_CODE}) - check PR_GITEA_TOKEN scope and expiry" ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ name: Renovate
|
||||
# Manual setup: create a bot account with its full name and email set, give
|
||||
# it write access to this repository, and store a token with
|
||||
# repository read/write, issue read/write, user read and organization read
|
||||
# as the RENOVATE_TOKEN Actions secret.
|
||||
# as the RENOVATE_TOKEN Actions secret. Release notes also need a github.com
|
||||
# token (any account, read-only, no scopes for public repositories) as the
|
||||
# RENOVATE_GITHUB_COM_TOKEN secret.
|
||||
on:
|
||||
schedule:
|
||||
# Daily at 04:00 UTC. Gitea only schedules workflows that exist on the
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +37,10 @@ jobs:
|
||||
# default branch through this endpoint.
|
||||
RENOVATE_ENDPOINT: https://git.noelsabia.dev/api/v1
|
||||
RENOVATE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RENOVATE_TOKEN }}
|
||||
# github.com is only used to fetch release notes and other public
|
||||
# metadata. Anonymous requests are rate-limited, which is why the
|
||||
# PR body warned that release notes were skipped.
|
||||
RENOVATE_GITHUB_COM_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RENOVATE_GITHUB_COM_TOKEN }}
|
||||
# This workflow lives in the repository it updates, so scope the bot
|
||||
# to it instead of every repository its account can see.
|
||||
RENOVATE_REPOSITORIES: CV_Website/CV_Site_Nuxt
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ type: Decision
|
||||
title: AI code review setup
|
||||
description: The review job runs opencode with a cheap medium-effort opencode-go model, env-only auth, a read-only permission set, and posts only reviews that end with a verdict line.
|
||||
tags: [decision, ci, ai, opencode, security]
|
||||
status: deprecated
|
||||
status: draft
|
||||
generated: { by: opencode-go/glm-5.3-flash, at: 2026-10-18T16:05:00Z }
|
||||
verified: { by: human:noel, at: not yet }
|
||||
sources:
|
||||
@@ -15,10 +15,6 @@ sources:
|
||||
title: OpenCode Go plan documentation
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
> Superseded by [PR-Agent for Gitea reviews](pr-agent.md) on 2026-10-30.
|
||||
> The opencode job was removed from `pr-checker.yml`; this document remains
|
||||
> as the record of the earlier setup and the failures it fixed.
|
||||
|
||||
# Decision
|
||||
|
||||
The review job installs opencode v2 from the dedicated v2 installer,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
|
||||
# Decisions
|
||||
|
||||
* [PR pipeline layering](pr-pipeline-layering.md) - What runs pre-commit, what runs in Gitea Actions, what the AI review does, and the cost rule that decides.
|
||||
* [PR-Agent for Gitea reviews](pr-agent.md) - A pinned webhook server replaces the per-PR opencode job; internal-only, scoped bot, OpenCode Go model.
|
||||
* [AI review setup (opencode)](ai-review-setup.md) - Superseded 2026-10-30; kept for the env-only auth and verdict-gate reasoning.
|
||||
* [AI review setup](ai-review-setup.md) - Plan model, env-only auth against prompt injection, read-only agent, and the verdict line as the posting gate.
|
||||
* [Vulnerability audit policy](vulnerability-audit-policy.md) - Blocking audit, reviewed ignore-list for unfixable advisories, and the pnpm-11 settings home.
|
||||
* [Release engineering](release-engineering.md) - release-please in manifest mode, conventional commits as input, message format enforced at commit time.
|
||||
* [Snyk paused and secrets policy](snyk-paused-and-secrets-policy.md) - Why the job is skipped rather than deleted, and the token scopes every workflow secret needs.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
type: Decision
|
||||
title: PR-Agent for Gitea reviews
|
||||
description: A pinned PR-Agent webhook server on server0 reviews pull requests through a scoped Gitea bot user, replacing the per-PR opencode job.
|
||||
tags: [decision, ci, ai, gitea, pr-agent, security]
|
||||
status: draft
|
||||
generated: { by: opencode-go/deepseek-v4.1-flash, at: 2026-10-30T20:00:00Z }
|
||||
verified: { by: human:noel, at: not yet }
|
||||
sources:
|
||||
- id: compose
|
||||
resource: deploy/pr-agent/docker-compose.yml
|
||||
title: PR-Agent compose service
|
||||
- id: env-example
|
||||
resource: deploy/pr-agent/.env.example
|
||||
title: Environment variables, without secrets
|
||||
- id: pr-checker
|
||||
resource: .gitea/workflows/pr-checker.yml
|
||||
title: PR Check workflow, opencode job removed
|
||||
- id: install
|
||||
resource: https://docs.pr-agent.ai/installation/gitea/
|
||||
title: PR-Agent Gitea installation
|
||||
- id: images
|
||||
resource: https://hub.docker.com/r/pragent/pr-agent
|
||||
title: Published gitea_app image tags
|
||||
- id: gitea-egress
|
||||
resource: https://docs.gitea.com/administration/config-cheat-sheet#webhook
|
||||
title: Gitea webhook egress allowlist
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Decision
|
||||
|
||||
PR-Agent runs as `pragent/pr-agent:0.49.0-gitea_app` in a long-lived
|
||||
container on `server0`, attached to the existing `gitea_gitea` Docker
|
||||
network. It publishes no ports. Gitea delivers pull-request and comment
|
||||
events to `http://pr-agent:3000/api/v1/gitea_webhooks`; the bot user
|
||||
`pr-agent` posts the result with a scoped personal access token.
|
||||
|
||||
The opencode review job is removed from `pr-checker.yml`. PR-Agent runs
|
||||
`/describe` and `/review` on pull request open/reopen and answers slash
|
||||
commands in the conversation. Push-triggered re-review is disabled, so a
|
||||
PR is reviewed once when it opens, not on every push.
|
||||
|
||||
The model is OpenCode Go's OpenAI-compatible endpoint:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
model openai/glm-5.3-flash
|
||||
fallback openai/glm-5.3
|
||||
api base https://opencode.ai/inference/go/openai/v1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`CONFIG__CUSTOM_MODEL_MAX_TOKENS=128000` supplies the context limit the
|
||||
model table does not know; PR-Agent's default `config.max_model_tokens`
|
||||
still caps the review budget at 32000.
|
||||
|
||||
OpenCode Go requires an `x-opencode-session` header. PR-Agent sends the
|
||||
stable id `pr-agent` through `LITELLM__EXTRA_HEADERS`; without it the
|
||||
provider rejects the request before it reaches the model.
|
||||
|
||||
# Why
|
||||
|
||||
* One container replaces a per-PR CLI install, binary cache and prompt
|
||||
wrapper. The review path is then the same code for every PR.
|
||||
* PR-Agent owns the Gitea webhook and comment plumbing, including the slash
|
||||
commands (`/review`, `/improve`, `/ask`) the repository previously had no
|
||||
way to trigger.
|
||||
* The webhook endpoint stays on the Docker network. Nothing new is exposed
|
||||
to the internet, and comment links still use the public Gitea URL.
|
||||
* The image tag is pinned. A new PR-Agent release is a deliberate change,
|
||||
not a rollout underneath the repository.
|
||||
|
||||
# Gitea configuration
|
||||
|
||||
* Bot user `pr-agent` is a collaborator with write permission on
|
||||
`CV_Website/CV_Site_Nuxt`. The token scopes are `read:repository`,
|
||||
`write:issue` and `read:user`. Gitea has no comment-only collaborator
|
||||
role, so write is the narrowest role that can post comments and labels.
|
||||
* `[webhook] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST = private:3000` is required: Gitea's default
|
||||
lax egress policy allows public targets but refuses private ones, and the
|
||||
webhook target is a Docker-network address. The API is reached at
|
||||
`http://gitea:3000`; `GITEA__WEB_URL=https://git.noelsabia.dev` keeps
|
||||
published links on the public host.
|
||||
* The webhook sends `push`, `issues`, `pull_request` and `issue_comment`
|
||||
events. Only the last two change behaviour today; `push` is kept because
|
||||
PR-Agent may handle push commands in a later configuration.
|
||||
* Secrets live only in `/home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent/.env` (mode 600) on
|
||||
`server0`. The repository contains the compose file and an example env
|
||||
file, never the token or webhook secret.
|
||||
|
||||
# Not verified
|
||||
|
||||
* The OpenCode Go API key was not present when this was committed, so no
|
||||
model call and no real review have run. The first PR after the key is set
|
||||
is the verification.
|
||||
* Whether `glm-5.3-flash` handles PR-Agent's structured review output well
|
||||
enough. `glm-5.3` is configured as the fallback.
|
||||
* Whether two gunicorn workers and the 1 GB memory limit hold under
|
||||
concurrent reviews. The host has roughly 2.5 GB available with Gitea and
|
||||
its runner idle.
|
||||
* Whether the default review prompt is specific enough for this repository.
|
||||
A `.pr_agent.toml` with project instructions is deliberately absent until
|
||||
the first real review shows what it misses.
|
||||
|
||||
# Revisit when
|
||||
|
||||
* The first review fails, returns unstructured output, or misses the kind
|
||||
of finding the opencode prompt used to catch.
|
||||
* A newer `gitea_app` image tag is worth taking; bump the tag and run
|
||||
`docker compose up -d`.
|
||||
* Review volume makes the container's memory limit tight, or Gitea adds a
|
||||
role that can comment without push access.
|
||||
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ Every pull request is checked by three layers, ordered by cost:
|
||||
in one job (one install, cached pnpm store), gitleaks over full
|
||||
history, pnpm audit (blocking), droast Dockerfile lint, Snyk
|
||||
(currently disabled).
|
||||
3. **AI code review** (on PR open, or on a slash command): the PR-Agent
|
||||
webhook server, posted as a PR comment.
|
||||
3. **AI code review** (per PR push): opencode with a plan-covered model,
|
||||
verdict-based, posted as a PR comment.
|
||||
|
||||
The split rule: anything that finishes in seconds and auto-fixes goes in
|
||||
pre-commit; anything slow, network-bound or quota-bound goes in CI; anything
|
||||
@@ -45,16 +45,15 @@ already passed the deterministic gates.
|
||||
|
||||
# Caching
|
||||
|
||||
One cache, served by the runner's own cache server (no external service,
|
||||
entries stay on the home server):
|
||||
Two caches, both served by the runner's own cache server (no external
|
||||
service, entries stay on the home server):
|
||||
|
||||
* **pnpm store**, keyed on the store layout version (v11) and a `sha256sum`
|
||||
of `pnpm-lock.yaml`. Installs hardlink from the store instead of
|
||||
downloading tarballs again. The key is built in a shell step because
|
||||
`hashFiles()` evaluates empty in this act runner.
|
||||
|
||||
The opencode binary cache is gone with the opencode job. PR-Agent is a
|
||||
long-running container on `server0`, so a review no longer downloads a CLI.
|
||||
* **opencode binary**, keyed on the pinned CLI version (`~/.opencode/bin`).
|
||||
Small next to the model call, but it removes a network fetch per review.
|
||||
|
||||
Lint and typecheck also share one job: same image, same lockfile, same
|
||||
install. Splitting them duplicated the install and made both compete for
|
||||
@@ -72,10 +71,6 @@ exposure in the review setup — each fixed where it was cheapest.
|
||||
|
||||
# Failure modes deliberately designed against
|
||||
|
||||
The opencode-specific rows are historical since the review moved to
|
||||
[PR-Agent](pr-agent.md); they are kept because the failure classes still
|
||||
apply to any review implementation.
|
||||
|
||||
| Failure seen | Guard now in place |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Error logs posted as review comments | Posting gate is the output contract (a `VERDICT:` line), not the exit code |
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-2
@@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ config files — the configs say what, these documents say why.
|
||||
## CI/CD and releases (2026-10-18)
|
||||
|
||||
* [PR pipeline layering](decisions/pr-pipeline-layering.md) - Three layers: pre-commit for cheap deterministic checks, Gitea Actions for thorough ones, AI review for judgment.
|
||||
* [PR-Agent for Gitea reviews](decisions/pr-agent.md) - A pinned webhook server on server0 replaces the per-PR opencode job; internal-only, scoped bot, OpenCode Go model.
|
||||
* [AI review setup (opencode)](decisions/ai-review-setup.md) - Superseded 2026-10-30; kept for the env-only auth and verdict-gate reasoning.
|
||||
* [AI review setup](decisions/ai-review-setup.md) - Plan model, env-only auth against prompt injection, read-only agent, verdict line as the posting gate.
|
||||
* [Vulnerability audit policy](decisions/vulnerability-audit-policy.md) - Blocking audit; reviewed ignore-list for unfixable advisories in pnpm-workspace.yaml.
|
||||
* [Release engineering](decisions/release-engineering.md) - release-please in manifest mode; conventional commits enforced at commit time.
|
||||
* [Snyk paused and secrets policy](decisions/snyk-paused-and-secrets-policy.md) - Quota-paused job kept in place; `write:issue` scope required on every workflow token.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +1,5 @@
|
||||
# Update Log
|
||||
|
||||
## 2026-10-30 (PR-Agent replaces the opencode review job)
|
||||
|
||||
* **Decision**: [PR-Agent for Gitea reviews](decisions/pr-agent.md) - a pinned `pragent/pr-agent:0.49.0-gitea_app` container on `server0` reviews PRs through the Gitea bot user `pr-agent`; the endpoint stays on the `gitea_gitea` Docker network.
|
||||
* **Update**: [pr-checker.yml](../.gitea/workflows/pr-checker.yml) - removed the `review` job, the opencode installer and the verdict-posting step. PR-Agent now runs `/describe` and `/review` on PR open/reopen and answers slash commands.
|
||||
* **Creation**: `deploy/pr-agent/` - compose service, example environment and operator README. The real `.env` lives only at `/home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent/.env` (mode 600) on `server0`.
|
||||
* **State**: the container is running and the webhook signature path is verified. Gitea gained `[webhook] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST = private:3000` (one restart, healthy) and the repository has a signed webhook. The OpenCode Go API key was still missing at commit time, so no model call or real review has run yet.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2026-10-27 (release-please still never tagged: the deleted head branch)
|
||||
|
||||
* **Fix**: [release-please-config.json](../release-please-config.json) gained `"changelog-host": "https://git.noelsabia.dev"` - the changelog compare links were generated against `github.com/CV_Website/CV_Site_Nuxt`, a host this repository does not live on. Root cause of the missing tags: **Gitea rewrites `head.ref` to `refs/pull/<n>/head` when the merged PR's branch is deleted**, and release-please parses that field as the release branch, so `BranchName.parse` fails and the release is dropped - silently, exit code 0. Evidence: run 143 (task 475) logs `✖ Bad branch name: refs/pull/22/head` right after `Found pull request #22`, then `Expected 1 releases, only found 0`; #22 did carry `autorelease: pending`. The repository deleted every merged branch (`default_delete_branch_after_merge: true`); it is `false` now. Four versions (1.1.0-1.4.0) were consumed by the manifest with no tag ever created, so the release baseline has to be restored by hand. See [Release engineering](decisions/release-engineering.md).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,8 +16,7 @@ generated: { by: opencode-go/glm-5.3-flash, at: 2026-10-18T12:41:52Z }
|
||||
| Whether these decisions stay in this bundle or fold into the sibling `OKF_CV_Website` bundle, which already describes the frontend at design level | after the production image exists | None. |
|
||||
| When and how often Snyk runs once re-enabled: weekly schedule, ready-for-review gate, or per-push | re-enabling the snyk job | Stay disabled. |
|
||||
| Whether the AI review job should gate merges (required status check on the verdict) or stay advisory | branch protection setup | Advisory. The review comment is information; blocking merges on an AI verdict is a policy choice, not a technical one. |
|
||||
| ~~How the opencode CLI version in CI gets upgraded~~ - **closed** (2026-10-30): the opencode job was removed; the review path is a pinned PR-Agent container. See [PR-Agent for Gitea reviews](decisions/pr-agent.md) | done | — |
|
||||
| Whether `glm-5.3-flash` through PR-Agent produces acceptable reviews on this repository | first PR after the OpenCode Go key is set | Keep it; `glm-5.3` is the configured fallback. |
|
||||
| How the opencode CLI version in CI gets upgraded: manually bump the pinned 2.0.32, or automate when a new major appears | first review failure after an opencode release | Manual bump. Pinning exists so upgrades are decisions. |
|
||||
| ~~Whether the Go plan's per-model usage windows survive real review frequency, and which model the review should use~~ - **decided** (2026-10-20): review model is `opencode-go/claude-haiku-5-5#medium` in [pr-checker.yml](../.gitea/workflows/pr-checker.yml). Cheap per token, and it has a real `#medium` effort level; `deepseek-v4.1-flash` only exposes low/high/max, so it always paid for maximum reasoning. The earlier pro -> flash switch (two consecutive `Endpoint is unavailable` failures) is in the [log](../log.md) | done | — |
|
||||
| Removing the two reviewed audit ignores when `node-forge` or `braces` ship patched releases | next dependency update round | Watch for new releases. |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Copy to .env on server0 and fill in; never commit .env.
|
||||
# chmod 600 .env
|
||||
|
||||
CONFIG__GIT_PROVIDER=gitea
|
||||
|
||||
# The API is reached over the Docker network; links in comments use the
|
||||
# public URL instead.
|
||||
GITEA__URL=http://gitea:3000
|
||||
GITEA__WEB_URL=https://git.noelsabia.dev
|
||||
|
||||
# Bot user pr-agent, scoped token (read:repository, write:issue, read:user).
|
||||
# Not the admin account and not a workflow secret.
|
||||
GITEA__PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN=
|
||||
|
||||
# Secret configured on the Gitea webhook. Required: the server rejects
|
||||
# unsigned webhooks with HTTP 403.
|
||||
GITEA__WEBHOOK_SECRET=
|
||||
|
||||
# OpenCode Go exposes an OpenAI-compatible chat-completions endpoint, so
|
||||
# PR-Agent reaches it through its openai provider with a custom base URL.
|
||||
CONFIG__MODEL=openai/glm-5.3-flash
|
||||
CONFIG__FALLBACK_MODELS=["openai/glm-5.3"]
|
||||
CONFIG__CUSTOM_MODEL_MAX_TOKENS=128000
|
||||
OPENAI__API_BASE=https://opencode.ai/inference/go/openai/v1
|
||||
OPENAI__KEY=
|
||||
|
||||
# OpenCode Go requires a session id header; a stable id is enough here.
|
||||
LITELLM__EXTRA_HEADERS={"x-opencode-session":"pr-agent"}
|
||||
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# PR-Agent for Gitea
|
||||
|
||||
PR-Agent runs as a webhook server next to Gitea on `server0`. Gitea sends
|
||||
pull-request and comment events over the `gitea_gitea` Docker network; the
|
||||
endpoint is not published to the internet.
|
||||
|
||||
| Piece | Value |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Image | `pragent/pr-agent:0.49.0-gitea_app` |
|
||||
| Container | `pr-agent` |
|
||||
| Webhook URL, from Gitea | `http://pr-agent:3000/api/v1/gitea_webhooks` |
|
||||
| Config | `/opt/pr-agent/.env` (root, mode 600) |
|
||||
| Logs | `ssh … agent@server0 logs` |
|
||||
| Deploy / restart | `ssh … agent@server0 deploy` |
|
||||
| Status | `ssh … agent@server0 status` |
|
||||
| Upgrade | edit the root-owned compose file, then run `deploy` |
|
||||
|
||||
## Gitea side
|
||||
|
||||
1. The bot user `pr-agent` is a collaborator on `CV_Website/CV_Site_Nuxt` with
|
||||
write permission. Its personal access token is scoped to
|
||||
`read:repository`, `write:issue` and `read:user`.
|
||||
2. The repository webhook sends `push`, `issues`, `pull_request` and
|
||||
`issue_comment` events, with JSON content type and the shared secret.
|
||||
3. Gitea's `[webhook] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` includes `private:3000`. Without it,
|
||||
Gitea's default egress policy refuses webhook deliveries to private
|
||||
addresses, including the Docker network.
|
||||
|
||||
## Operator access
|
||||
|
||||
The agent does not log in as `noel`. A dedicated `agent` account has one
|
||||
forced command and three actions:
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
ssh -i ~/.ssh/pr_agent_control -o IdentitiesOnly=yes agent@91.99.207.62 status
|
||||
ssh -i ~/.ssh/pr_agent_control -o IdentitiesOnly=yes agent@91.99.207.62 logs
|
||||
ssh -i ~/.ssh/pr_agent_control -o IdentitiesOnly=yes agent@91.99.207.62 deploy
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The SSH key is restricted with `restrict,command=…`; the account has no
|
||||
Docker group, no general sudo, and no shell. Sudo permits only the three
|
||||
root-owned helper scripts in `/usr/local/sbin`, and those helpers operate on
|
||||
the fixed `/opt/pr-agent/docker-compose.yml`. The compose file, `.env` and
|
||||
helpers are root-owned, so the agent cannot turn “restart” into a different
|
||||
container or a host mount.
|
||||
|
||||
`setup-agent-access.sh` creates the account and moves the stack to
|
||||
`/opt/pr-agent`. `remove-noel-access.sh` then removes the inherited access
|
||||
from `noel`: the `docker` and `sudo` groups, the keys in
|
||||
`/home/noel/.ssh/authorized_keys`, and the old PR-Agent directory. Run both
|
||||
on the server as root, and only run the second after the restricted command
|
||||
works and you have another admin path.
|
||||
|
||||
For git, use a repository-scoped deploy key instead of the personal Gitea
|
||||
key: `~/.ssh/pr_agent_gitea.pub` is added as a write deploy key on
|
||||
`CV_Website/CV_Site_Nuxt`. The old personal key must be removed from Gitea,
|
||||
or it still grants every repository the user can see.
|
||||
|
||||
## AI model
|
||||
|
||||
The agent uses OpenCode Go's OpenAI-compatible endpoint:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
model openai/glm-5.3-flash
|
||||
fallback openai/glm-5.3
|
||||
api base https://opencode.ai/inference/go/openai/v1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`CONFIG__CUSTOM_MODEL_MAX_TOKENS` tells PR-Agent the context limit, because
|
||||
the model is not in its token table. The effective review budget is still
|
||||
capped by PR-Agent's default `config.max_model_tokens` of 32000.
|
||||
|
||||
OpenCode Go requires an `x-opencode-session` header; PR-Agent sends the
|
||||
stable id `pr-agent` through `LITELLM__EXTRA_HEADERS`.
|
||||
|
||||
The transfer file used during installation was empty, so set the key as
|
||||
root and redeploy:
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
sudoedit /opt/pr-agent/.env # set OPENAI__KEY=…
|
||||
sudo /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-deploy
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## First check
|
||||
|
||||
Open a pull request in `CV_Website/CV_Site_Nuxt`. The server runs `/describe`
|
||||
and `/review` on open/reopen; comment commands such as `/review`, `/improve`
|
||||
and `/ask` are handled from the PR conversation. If nothing appears:
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
ssh -i ~/.ssh/pr_agent_control -o IdentitiesOnly=yes agent@91.99.207.62 logs
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
A `403` in the Gitea webhook delivery log means the secret does not match or
|
||||
`ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is still missing; a `401` from PR-Agent means the
|
||||
signature header and secret disagree.
|
||||
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# PR-Agent webhook server for the self-hosted Gitea instance.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Runs on the existing gitea_gitea network and publishes no ports. Gitea
|
||||
# reaches it as http://pr-agent:3000/api/v1/gitea_webhooks, so the webhook
|
||||
# endpoint is never internet-facing. Gitea still publishes comment links with
|
||||
# its own ROOT_URL (https://git.noelsabia.dev).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Deployed by hand on server0 from /home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent; see the
|
||||
# README next to this file.
|
||||
|
||||
services:
|
||||
pr-agent:
|
||||
image: pragent/pr-agent:0.49.0-gitea_app
|
||||
container_name: pr-agent
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
env_file:
|
||||
- .env
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
PORT: "3000"
|
||||
# Importing the app costs roughly 250 MB. Two workers leave headroom on
|
||||
# the 3.8 GB host that also runs Gitea, its runner and a web app.
|
||||
GUNICORN_WORKERS: "2"
|
||||
mem_limit: 1g
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- gitea
|
||||
healthcheck:
|
||||
# The server has no HTTP health route; an open TCP socket is enough to
|
||||
# distinguish a running gunicorn master from a crashed container.
|
||||
test: ["CMD", "python", "-c", "import socket; socket.create_connection(('127.0.0.1', 3000), 3).close()"]
|
||||
interval: 30s
|
||||
timeout: 5s
|
||||
retries: 3
|
||||
start_period: 30s
|
||||
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
gitea:
|
||||
external: true
|
||||
name: gitea_gitea
|
||||
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# Final step: remove the agent's inherited noel access.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Run on server0 only after the agent command works:
|
||||
# ssh -i ~/.ssh/pr_agent_control -o IdentitiesOnly=yes agent@91.99.207.62 status
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This removes noel from docker and sudo, clears noel's authorized_keys,
|
||||
# and deletes the old PR-Agent directory that held the secrets. Make sure
|
||||
# you have another admin path (provider console or a new key) first.
|
||||
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
|
||||
echo "run as root" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
cat <<'EOF'
|
||||
This will:
|
||||
- remove noel from the docker and sudo groups
|
||||
- clear every key in /home/noel/.ssh/authorized_keys
|
||||
- delete /home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent (the /opt copy remains)
|
||||
Existing noel SSH sessions keep their old groups until they log out.
|
||||
Make sure you have another admin path before continuing.
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
read -r -p "Type REMOVE to continue: " answer
|
||||
[ "$answer" = "REMOVE" ] || { echo "aborted"; exit 1; }
|
||||
|
||||
if id -nG noel | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -qx docker; then
|
||||
gpasswd -d noel docker
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if id -nG noel | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -qx sudo; then
|
||||
deluser noel sudo
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -f /home/noel/.ssh/authorized_keys ]; then
|
||||
cp -a /home/noel/.ssh/authorized_keys \
|
||||
"/root/noel-authorized_keys.$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S).bak"
|
||||
: > /home/noel/.ssh/authorized_keys
|
||||
chown noel:noel /home/noel/.ssh/authorized_keys
|
||||
chmod 600 /home/noel/.ssh/authorized_keys
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
rm -rf /home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent
|
||||
|
||||
cat <<'EOF'
|
||||
|
||||
Done. Test the restricted path again:
|
||||
|
||||
ssh -i ~/.ssh/pr_agent_control -o IdentitiesOnly=yes agent@91.99.207.62 status
|
||||
|
||||
Still to do outside this script:
|
||||
- remove the old personal SSH key from Gitea (Settings > SSH / GPG Keys)
|
||||
- add ~/.ssh/pr_agent_gitea.pub as a write deploy key on CV_Site_Nuxt
|
||||
- put the OpenCode Go key in /opt/pr-agent/.env and run the deploy helper
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# One-time root setup for the least-privilege PR-Agent operator account.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Run on server0:
|
||||
# sudo bash /home/noel/agent-access-setup.sh
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This creates the agent user and moves the PR-Agent stack to /opt/pr-agent.
|
||||
# It does NOT remove noel's current docker/sudo access. Verify the agent
|
||||
# command printed at the end first, then run remove-noel-access.sh.
|
||||
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
|
||||
echo "run as root" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
AGENT_USER=agent
|
||||
AGENT_HOME=/home/$AGENT_USER
|
||||
PR_AGENT_DIR=/opt/pr-agent
|
||||
SRC_DIR=/home/noel/self-hosted/pr-agent
|
||||
PUBKEY_FILE=/home/noel/.ssh/pr_agent_control.pub
|
||||
DOCKER=/usr/bin/docker
|
||||
|
||||
for f in "$SRC_DIR/docker-compose.yml" "$SRC_DIR/README.md" "$SRC_DIR/.env" "$PUBKEY_FILE"; do
|
||||
[ -f "$f" ] || { echo "missing $f" >&2; exit 1; }
|
||||
done
|
||||
case "$(cat "$PUBKEY_FILE")" in
|
||||
ssh-*|ecdsa-*|sk-ssh-*) ;;
|
||||
*) echo "$PUBKEY_FILE does not look like an SSH public key" >&2; exit 1 ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
grep -q '^Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/\*.conf' /etc/ssh/sshd_config \
|
||||
|| { echo "sshd does not include sshd_config.d" >&2; exit 1; }
|
||||
|
||||
if ! id "$AGENT_USER" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash "$AGENT_USER"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
passwd -l "$AGENT_USER" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
|
||||
chmod 700 "$AGENT_HOME"
|
||||
install -d -m 700 -o "$AGENT_USER" -g "$AGENT_USER" "$AGENT_HOME/.ssh"
|
||||
|
||||
# The stack must not be writable by the agent: a changed compose file would
|
||||
# turn "restart the service" into arbitrary root containers.
|
||||
install -d -m 755 -o root -g root "$PR_AGENT_DIR"
|
||||
if [ ! -f "$PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml" ]; then
|
||||
install -m 644 -o root -g root "$SRC_DIR/docker-compose.yml" "$PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
install -m 644 -o root -g root "$SRC_DIR/README.md" "$PR_AGENT_DIR/README.md"
|
||||
if [ ! -f "$PR_AGENT_DIR/.env" ]; then
|
||||
install -m 600 -o root -g root "$SRC_DIR/.env" "$PR_AGENT_DIR/.env"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if ! grep -q '^name:' "$PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml"; then
|
||||
sed -i '1i name: pr-agent' "$PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
cat > /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-deploy <<EOF
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
$DOCKER compose --project-directory $PR_AGENT_DIR -f $PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml pull
|
||||
exec $DOCKER compose --project-directory $PR_AGENT_DIR -f $PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml up -d
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
|
||||
cat > /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-logs <<EOF
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
exec $DOCKER compose --project-directory $PR_AGENT_DIR -f $PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml logs --tail=200 pr-agent
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
|
||||
cat > /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-status <<EOF
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
exec $DOCKER compose --project-directory $PR_AGENT_DIR -f $PR_AGENT_DIR/docker-compose.yml ps
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
|
||||
cat > /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-control <<'EOF'
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
case "${SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND:-}" in
|
||||
deploy) exec sudo -n /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-deploy ;;
|
||||
logs) exec sudo -n /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-logs ;;
|
||||
status) exec sudo -n /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-status ;;
|
||||
*) echo "allowed: deploy, logs, status" >&2; exit 1 ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
|
||||
chown root:root /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-deploy /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-logs \
|
||||
/usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-status /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-control
|
||||
chmod 755 /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-deploy /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-logs \
|
||||
/usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-status /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-control
|
||||
|
||||
cat > /etc/sudoers.d/pr-agent-control <<'EOF'
|
||||
agent ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-deploy, /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-logs, /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-status
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
chmod 440 /etc/sudoers.d/pr-agent-control
|
||||
visudo -cf /etc/sudoers.d/pr-agent-control >/dev/null
|
||||
|
||||
PUB=$(cat "$PUBKEY_FILE")
|
||||
printf 'restrict,command="/usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-control" %s\n' "$PUB" \
|
||||
> "$AGENT_HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys"
|
||||
chown "$AGENT_USER:$AGENT_USER" "$AGENT_HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys"
|
||||
chmod 600 "$AGENT_HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys"
|
||||
|
||||
cat > /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/60-pr-agent-agent.conf <<'EOF'
|
||||
Match User agent
|
||||
ForceCommand /usr/local/sbin/pr-agent-control
|
||||
PermitTTY no
|
||||
AllowTcpForwarding no
|
||||
X11Forwarding no
|
||||
PermitTunnel no
|
||||
AllowAgentForwarding no
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
chmod 644 /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/60-pr-agent-agent.conf
|
||||
if ! sshd -t; then
|
||||
rm -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/60-pr-agent-agent.conf
|
||||
echo "sshd config test failed; removed the new file" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
systemctl reload ssh
|
||||
|
||||
cd "$PR_AGENT_DIR"
|
||||
"$DOCKER" compose pull
|
||||
"$DOCKER" compose up -d
|
||||
sleep 5
|
||||
"$DOCKER" compose ps
|
||||
|
||||
cat <<'EOF'
|
||||
|
||||
Agent access is ready. Test from the laptop:
|
||||
|
||||
ssh -i ~/.ssh/pr_agent_control -o IdentitiesOnly=yes agent@91.99.207.62 status
|
||||
|
||||
Old access is still in place. Only after that command works, run:
|
||||
|
||||
sudo bash /home/noel/agent-access-remove.sh
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user